Full text of "United States Cryptologic History, Series VI, Vol. 5: American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-89"

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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

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(U) American Cryptology during the
Cold War, 1945-1989

(U) Book IV: Cryptologic Rebirth, 1981-1989

Approved for Release by
\ISA on Appeal on
31-14-2011. FOIA Case
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This monograph is a product of the National Security Agency history
program. Its contents and conclusions are those of the author, based
on original research, and do not necessarily represent the official
views of the National Security Agency. Please address divergent
opinion or additional detail to the Center for Cryptologic History
(S542).

This document is not to be used as a source
for derivative classification decisions.

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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Series VI
The NSA Period
1952 -Present
Volume 5

American Cryptology during the
Cold War, 1945-1989
Book IV: Cryptologic Rebirth, 1981-1989

Thomas R. Johnson

CENTER FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
1999

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Table of Contents

(U) BOOK IV: CRYPTOLOGIC REBIRTH, 1981-1989
(U/ /FOUO) Chapter 21: The Reagan Revolution

Page

EQ. 1.4. (c)

fea.,1.4. (d)

Background 263

The National Security Mechanism under Reagan 265

The Inman Appointment • 265

General Faurer Becomes NSA's Director 266

The Odom Administration 267

At the White House 270

SIGINT Resources in the Reagan Years 271

The Cryptologic System in the 1980s 278

The FSCS Study 281

"Battlestar Galactica" 282

Comsat 286

288

Cryptologic Communications 290

Cryptologic Computers 291

Computer Security 292

Operations Security 294

INFOSEC and the New Way of Doing Business 295

The Second Parties -the United Kingdom 299

Australia 302

New Zealand 303

Third Parties 304

306

All the Rest : 307

(U) Chapter 22: The Second Cold War

Vrhe. SIGINT System and t he Soviet Problem 315

\ 1 1 315

The Second Cold War 318

KAL007 '. , 320

320

: 321

323

324

Washington , 325

Moscow .: 328

New York 331

The Postmortems 332

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Verification 334

The Relocatable Targets Problem 335

(U) Chapter 23: The Rise of Terrorism and Unconventional Targets in the 1980s

Terro rism 345

347

349

. . . : 351

: 354

The War on Drugs 361

SIGINT and Counterintelligence 365

(U) Chapter 24: Military Crises and SIGINT Support during the
Reagan Administration

Urgent Furv , 371

374

379

JustUause

(U) Chapter 25: Iran-Contra

Contra 387

The Nicaraguan Revolution and the Concern about

Communist Subversion 387

Iran 392

(U) Chapter 26: The Year of the Spy

Gunman 401

Prime '. 407

Pelton 409

Walker 417

Pollard 422

Hall 424

Carney 425

The Puzzle Palace 426

The American Library Association Suit 428

Epilogue 428

(U) Glossary 433

(U) Sources 441

(U) Index 453

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(U//FW Chapter 21
The Reagan Revolution

(U) BACKGROUND

(U) Nineteen-eighty marked more than just a change of decade. It was a change of
mood. Some have called it the Reagan Revolution. Reagan, a forever optimistic actor from
California, came to office with a world view in complete contrast with that of the 1970s.
He was tired of talk about limitations, wanted none of the gloom that had settled over the
White House in the late Carter years. He would restore America's power in the world. He
would start by spending the nation back into prosperity.

(U) When Gerald Ford left office, the national debt was $644 billion. When Jimmy
Carter departed, it was $909 billion. When Ronald Reagan left office, it was more than 2
and one half trillion dollars. The severe gap between income and expenditures had a long-
term impact on many areas of national life, not the least on the funding of defense
programs.

(U) It was Reagan's dual approach that created the problem. He would generate
demand by cutting taxes, but, paradoxically, he would increase spending on national
defense. This would leave a gap between revenues and expenditures that would be made
up by cutting domestic programs. But domestic programs could not be cut that much, and
a considerable portion of the national debt came from the funding of defense programs.

(U) At the core of Reagan's defense revival was intelligence. It meant getting good
information on adversaries, and it meant employing that information in active ways - a
strong covert action program. The new DCI was a long-time Reagan friend, the manager
of- his successful presidential campaign in 1980 - William Casey. Casey's intelligence
background was OSS in World War II. OSS had been excluded from COMINT during the
war, and so to them intelligence meant HUMINT, i.e., agents. He had no experience with
SIGINT, but he was a fast learner.

(U) When Casey became DCI, "technical intelligence" had just about taken over. The
Carter administration believed in it, and most of the money went toward it. Despite the
well-known Reaganesque proclivity toward agents and covert actions, this did not really
change during his administration. His transition team wanted more money dumped into
satellite programs, and the Reagan administration cut its sails in that direction from the
first day. 1 Casey himself quickly came to understand the value of SIGINT, and did not share
the institutional view of NSA that so dominated the thinking of his own staff. His own
deputy, Bobby Inman, said later that

(U) For all of my difficulties with Bill Casey on so many other issues, on this one I would give him
a clean bill of health....While he set out to rebuild and revitalize the DDO, he recognized the value
of Signals Intelligence and the role it played....He did not bring an instinctively parochial view to
the issue. Was it relevant? Was it timely? Was it useful? Did you need more money? These were
the sorts of basic attitudes he brought. 2

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(U) William Casey and Ronald Reagan

(U) The Reagan administration marked the height of the Cold War. The president
referred to the Soviet Union as the Evil Empire, and was determined to spend it into the
ground. The Politburo reciprocated, and the rhetoric on both sides, especially during the
first Reagan administration, drove the hysteria. Some called it the Second Cold War. The
period 1982-1984 marked the most dangerous Soviet-American confrontation since the
Cuban Missile Crisis.

(U) Despite the president's support of intelligence programs, NSA was wary. The
White House viewed intelligence as a foreign policy tool, and used it to advance larger
foreign policy interests, regardless of security implications. Three instances make the
case.

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— (T3//3I-UMDRA) The best known exposure of SIGINT since the Pearl Harbor hearings.,
of 1945 had actually come in 1983, when the Reagan administration played the
intercepted cockpit conversations of the Soviet pilot as he s hot down KAL-007. The SIGINT
gave the administration a tremendous foreign policy coup

(U) There were numerous other instances. British historian Christopher Andrew cites
just one - the 1988 exposure of the decrypt of Iraqi military communications relating to the
Iraqi use of poison gas on their Kurdish population. 3 It came from an atmosphere in which
the loss of sources and methods was deemed less important than the foreign policy gains.

"(FOUO)-Counterbalancing the Reagan administration's penchant for misuse of
intelligence was the president's strong support of his intelligence agencies! In 1986 he
became the first American president to visit NSA, as he gave the official dedication speech
for NSA's two new buildings, Ops 2A and Ops 2B. He wanted to loosery the legal reins
governing intelligence, and signed a new executive order, 12333, which give NSA latitude
in SIGINT collection that it had not had during the Carter years. Reagan revived the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), moribund under Carter. The
new chair, Anne Armstrong, was a strong and effective advocate for the intelligence
community.* / Q 1<4 _ (c)

(U) THE NATIONAL SECURITY MECHANISM UNDER REAGAN
(U) 77ie Inman Appointment

(U) Casey needed a deputy, and he was not inclined to go to the existing CIA structure.
Thus the search turned outside CIA, and eventually settled on NSA director Admiral
Bobby Inman. The way that Inman was selected became a Washington legend. His prime
sponsor was Senator Barry Goldwater, who had urged that Reagan make Inman the DCI.
As DIRNSA, Inman's reputation had become so special that he was regarded as essentially
untouchable. Bob Woodward, in his book Veil, described Inman in the adulatory tone of
the times:

(U) Inman knew the intelligence business cold. He was the best source on everything from the
latest spy satellite to the bureaucratic maneuvering required to get intelligence programs going.
He had a fabulous memory. With his boyish, toothy smile, large head, thick glasses, Inman looked
like a grown-up whiz kid. He was one of the few intelligence officials who would talk to reporters
and get them to hold off on stories that compromised intelligence. He had nurtured all the
important relationships in the Congress. Goldwater could not recall an instance in which Inman
had failed to return a phone call or to track down an answer on the rare occasion when he didn't
know it. S

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(U) Others in the news media had similar comments. According to the Washington
Star, "It is reassuring both to those who want to see U.S. intelligence operations
strengthened and to those who don't want to see the CIA crashing through the forest in its
previous 'rogue elephant' role.... There is not a mark on him/ says a former admiral who
worked with Inman in naval intelligence." At the Senate confirmation hearing, Senator
Gold water opened by saying: "You have my vote even before I hear your testimony...."
Inman became the first superstar to emerge from NSA. Most expected him to maximize
the role of SIGINT and to turn up his nose at covert operations and other messy programs. 6

(U) General Faurer Becomes NSA's Director

(U) Inman's successor as DIRNSA was Air
Force Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer.
Faurer had a strong flying background (he
piloted both B29s and RB-47s) and experience
in missile and space operations. Although he
had no direct experience in cryptology, he had
served two tours at DIA and three others in
intelligence-related jobs. He came to NSA
from Europe, where he had been both J2
USEUCOM, and deputy chairman of the
NATO Military Committee. He thoroughly
understood the intelligence needs of theater
commanders, and he made support to
military operations a central theme of his
tenure at NSA. 7

(U/ /FQUO) If Inman could be described as
"brilliant and brittle," "Line" Faurer might
have been accurately depicted as avuncular
(U) General Lincoln D. Faurer but determined. He valued accommodation

and collegiality, and he tried to reconstruct
NSA's management system based on new management principles emphasizing
cooperation and corporate decision-making. 8 It was difficult to redirect NSA's staff system
in such a radical way. Under Inman, management had been top down, and Inman neither
needed nor wanted a staff system. Faurer was just the opposite.

(0//3I)" Much of Faurer's energy was directed toward sharpening support to military
operations. As the forme r deputy chairman of NATO's Military Committee, he focused on
SIGINT support to NATO]

Multilateralism was
the only feasible approach in the NATO environment. 3

EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

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(S//GI ) Much of his effort along this line was doomed to frustration. During the
Grenada operation, NSA was shut out of operational details (see page 372), bringing the
dispute over this long-running problem to a boil. After the bombing of the Marine
barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the Navy insisted that SIGINT support to the remaining
Marines be routed through Sixth Fleet. Faurer, experienced in the ways of military
operations, rejected that approach. "We fought that battle and it got more heated after the
bombing than it did before and it's dead wrong. I mean, you just can't live with it that
way." He cultivated his relationships with the J3 (chief of the JCS operations staff)
throughout his tenure, trying to educate each successive occupant of the chair, and he got
understanding nods but no results. "And it went on the entire time. We never solved the
problem." 10

(U/ /FOUO) Faurer developed a high
regard for both his bosses, Casey and
Weinberger. As for Casey, once Faurer got
over the difficulty of understanding what
he was saying (a problem that followed
Casey his whole life - unintelligible
speech), he acquired great respect for the
DCI. "I happen to think Bill Casey is as
fine a DCI as we've had in the time I've
been associated with intelligence, and I go
back to Jim Schlesinger." 11 But Faurer
read his own charter literally, and believed
that in DoD, his direct supervisor was
Weinberger. He never accepted the
delegation of NSA to the deputy secretary
of defense, William Taft. Faurer fought
Taft constantly to insure that NSA's
national role remained an independent
responsibility. They had disputes over
NSA's national role in policy issues and
over budget issues that transcended the
Defense Department. They were never resolved, and Faurer was actually fired at Taft's
behest over a now-obscure budget issue several weeks prior to the agreed-upon
retirement date. General Faurer, a bulldog to the end, went down fighting for what he
believed in. 12

(U) The Odom Administration

(U//FOUO) Faurer's replacement in 1985 was a former armor officer who had become
one of the Army's top Sovietologists. William Odom had had a tour at the Potsdam mission
in the mid-1960s! The Potsdam mission was one of the best training grounds for attache
work, and it was followed six years later by a tour as assistant Army attache in Moscow.

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(U) Caspar Weinberger

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Odom was exposed to SIGINT, especially in Moscow, and over the years he developed a keen
appreciation for the interplay of intelligence disciplines. 13

(U) When Zbigniew Brzezinski became
Jimmy Carter's national security advisor, he
plucked his former student, William Odom, out
of the Army to serve on his staff. Said
Brzezinski, "I knew him from an earlier
association with me at the Research Institute
on International Change at Columbia, I
respected his views on Soviet military affairs
and strategy, and I considered him to be an
innovative strategic thinker." w

(U) After four years in the White House,
Odom had gone on to serve as the deputy
assistant chief of staff for intelligence in the
Pentagon, and soon took over as the ACSI. 15
His broad exposure to Army intelligence made
him a prime candidate to succeed Faurer. And
the Army had not had a director since
Marshall Carter departed in 1969.

(U//FOUO) Odom brought a unique
personality to the job. According to his deputy,
(U> General William Odom Robert Rich, he was a good listener and a

reasonable person to work for, who could
examine the intellectual facets of a decision and come up with the right answer. But he did
not project this image. What most NSAers remember was a different Odom: "...ready, fire,
aim; loud, boisterous, ranging over all kinds of intellectual territory, strategy of the
nation, strategic concepts, tactical concepts." 16 Many felt that he suffered from the typical
disease of ivory tower intellectuals - hearing one voice only: his own.

(U/ /FOUO ) Odom had a different perspective on NSA. He likened the job to that of
commanding a specified command. It had, he liked to point out, operational control over
three service components, a worldwide scope of operation, its own logistics system, its own
training school, a unique research and development organization, its own procurement
system, and so forth. Next to the DCI, it was the most powerful job in American
intelligence. 17

(U/ /FOUO) For a specified command, though, it lacked certain essentials. Most
prominently, NSA had no staff system analogous to that of a military command. Without
a staff, the director simply had to accept the judgments of his deputy directors, and had no
independent means of managing actions or verifying information. It was a consequence of
historical evolution at NSA, and it fitted NSA's unique way of doing business. Odom

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battled the system his entire time at NSA, but felt that he never changed the way NSA
operated. 18

(U/ /FOUO) What NSAers remembered most distinctly from the Odom era were the
Ten Thrusts (see Table 18). Originally written by Odom himself, these began as six
thrusts relating to SIGINT, and focused primarily on maintaining NSA's edge in various
technical disciplines such as cryptomath and in sharpening the focus of customer support.
Harry Daniels, the DDI, took immediate exception to a list of thrusts which excluded
INFOSEC issues, and submitted his own. Odom struck one of the original six from the list
and added Daniel's five, to come up with a nice round number. It was a good list, just right
for the mid-1980s. Odom did seem to understand the business.

-4SUSS) Table 18
General Odom's Ten Thrusts

1. Modernize the SIGINT collection and processing systems to cope with the
changing target communications technology.

2. Integrate tactical and national SIGINT capabilities to satisfy more
effectively military requirements in peace, crisis, and war.

3. Maintain and improve our capabilities to support diplomatic, economic,
and other nonmilitary requirements for SIGINT support.

4. Maintain a large U.S. lead in cryptanalytic capabilities (both computer
capability and personnel) .

5. Design a framework for a survivable SIGINT system, under all conditions,
including general war, which we acquire incrementally and through
astute dual-use applications over the next decade.

6. Provide easily attainable, inexpensive, user-friendly Information
Systems Security features.

7. Speed up research for major breakthroughs in the technology of
computer security; at the same time, help industry manufacture more
"trustworthy " computer products for defense and other government
needs.

8. Establish a program to reduce significantly the HUMINT threat to
Information Security Systems.

9. Provide modern, secure, user-friendly key management systems.

10. Remove the COMSEC block obsolescence condition by the end of 1991 and
establish a program to protect against this condition in the future.

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(fjWfir) The most controversial thrust was to insure a survivable system. Fashioned
during the Second Cold War, it made a lot of sense at the time.l

According to his successor, Rear
Admiral William Stude man, there was a tendency at NSA to try to wait out the Odom
directorship in hopes that would simply go away. 19

(U/ /FOUO) Like Faurer, Odom worked for two bosses, Weinberger and Casey, but he
managed the trick with aplomb. Within DoD he generally reported directly to the
secretary of defense but, aware of the Faurer-Taft confrontations, carefully kept William
Taft in the loop with occasional briefings. His real affinity, however, was clearly for
Casey. The two got on well together, and Odom held Casey in high respect for his
substantive knowledge of intelligence issues and his ability to deal with them off the cuff.
They formed a united team in 1986 to try to stop the press from publishing leaks that
damaged intelligence sources and methods. 20

(U) At the White House

P.L. 86-36

CFOUO) NSA still enjoyed a special relationship with the White House. After a /brief
and fitful flirtation with the idea of bringing someone from State Department in to riin the
Situation Room, Rich ard Allen, the first of a long line of Reagan's national security
advisors, chose NSAer as his Situation Room chief. | [ stayed

during the first Reagan administration, long enough to get a clear picture of how
intelligence issues were handled.

(U/ /FOUO ) Under Carter, intelligence and national security topics got a highly
organized, if somewhat egocentric, direction from Brzezinski. But this process never got
started under Reagan. The leaks, the employment of SIGINT to push a foreign policy
agenda, the disjointed way in which intelligence in general was treated (culminating in
the Iran-Contra imbroglio) was a true bill of the process. For in fact, there never w&s a
process under Reagan. j

(U) Reagan modeled his White House administrative procedures after Nixon, wiih a
strong staff chief, Edwin Meese. Everything was routed through Meese, and even Richard
Allen contacted the president through him. This cut off the president from direct access to
intelligence, and when Allen departed he had never been able to establish a relationship
with Reagan. His successor, Judge William Clark, accepted the job only on condition that
he enjoy access to the president, but the damage had been done, and during the first
Reagan administration the White House never had a strong national security advisor j nor
did it ever have a system in which tailored, focused intelligence arrived in the Oval Office.
The job became a revolving door, with first Allen, then Clark, then Robert McFarlk ne,
John Poindexter, and finally Frank Carlucci, cycling through. According to] | the

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process, if there was a process, lacked substance, and difficult intelligence issues were
dealt with in a superficial way. 21

(UM) SIGINT RESOURCES IN THE REAGAN YEARS

-(G) Ronald Reagan inherited a cryptologic system in parlous shape. Manpower over
the previous decade had dropped from 88,600 to about 41,000 (see Table 19). At first
glance, money appeared to be on the increase, but that was before inflation was factored in.
The 1970s was a decade of high inflation, and the gap between current and constant
dollars had widened progressively through the ten years (see Tables 19 and 20).

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$0 1.4. (c)

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(C) A long with money came people - lots of them. NSA's total population rose by 40
percent during the 1980s. Beginning with 19,018 in 1983, the Agency's population peaked
in 1990, just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, at a total of 26,679. The dramatic rise
was across the board, civilian and military, but was most pronounced on the civilian side
(see Table 22). While the military component rose 24 percent, the civilian side increased
by 46 percent. 28

re)-Table22
NSA's Full-Time Civilian Strength, 1982-1989 27

25,000 ..

(U) Almost a thousand billets came to NSA in 1986 as the result of a decision by the
General Services Administration to turn over support operations. Part of a broader plan to
relinquish maintenance to single-tenant government-owned facilities, the GSA plan for
NSA involved both maintenance (542 billets) and security guards (381 people). In October
of 1985 Terence Golden, administrator of GSA, met with General Odom, and in April of
1986 Odom formally accepted the plan. 28

(U) The hiring glut took place mostly at the lower grades, but NSA's average grade
level stayed in the range of GG-10, substantially higher than the government-wide
average. What took place to level it out was rapid promotions. The 1980s saw a major
surge in promotions, with a dramatic spike in fiscal year 1985. But the downside was the
slide in average experience level, as new hires replaced old hands. 29

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(U//FOUO) In the light of the rapid civilian hiring program, the military contribution
to cryptology became a source of concern. As the percentage of the military population
declined, its influence would also inevitably decrease, along with military cryptologic
experience levels. This could unfavorably impact support to military operations.
Moreover, rapid civilian hiring was taking place primarily out of colleges, and military
conversions, once a dominant source of civilian manpower, had declined by 1982 to 6.7
percent of all hiring actions. In 1988 Dr. James Donnelly headed a panel that looked at
military manpower in the cryptologic system. Donnelly's main concern was the increasing
congregation of military billets at the front end of the system, leaving very few at NSA,
where much of the "technology transfer" had to take place. 30 . EO 1.4. (c)

— (67-The fastest-growing segment of NSA's population during the 1980s was actually
the part-time work force. A product of the Carter administration, the part-time segment
grew This explosive growth

outstripped all other hiring areas, and a significant percentage of hiring actions (8.7
percent in fiscal year 1982) came from part-time to full-time conversions. One major
reason for the increases in part-time employees was that NSA management discovered
that they did not count against the Agency's official strength. It was thus a way to
increase personnel without appearing to do so. 31

(U) As the work force grew, so did the percentage of women and minorities on the rolls.
From 1977 to 1993, for instance, the percentage of women at NSA grew from about 26
percent to 39 percent (see Table 23). But the percentage of women by grade declined
dramatically as grade rose, even though the decade opened with NSA's first female deputy
director, Ann Caracristi. Women constituted a majority up through grade eight, but at
that point the chart dipped dramatically, and women made up less than five percent of the
grade fifteens. This compared closely with the overall government statistics, as Table 24
shows.

-(€7 Table 23
NSA's Population by Gender, 1977-1993 32

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(U) Table 24

Percentage of Women by Grade at NSA, DoD and Federal Workforce

PERCENT

PERCENT (BY GRADE) OF WOMEN IN TOTAL WORKFORCE
NSA, DOD, AND ALL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

100

NSA

ALL FED —

DOD ~~

. 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

GJMDES

(U) The concentration on college-level hiring increasingly tipped the scales toward a
more highly educated workforce. In the ten fiscal years from 1972 to 1982, for instance,
the percentage of employees with college degrees increased 24 percent, while those with
advanced degrees increased 125 percent. Those with less than two years of college actually
declined by 22 percent. 34

(U) More people required more space. And as personal computers became more
common (during the decade 70 percent of the workforce was provided with a PC), people
tended to require larger offices. So NSA launched an unprecedented building boom which
resulted in the addition of 240,000 square feet per year during the decade. Much of it was
leased space. The International Tower Building came under an NSA lease in 1980. The
following year the Agency began leasing the new Airport Square buildings, which were
replacing woods and fields in the vicinity of the FANX complex at BWI.

That same year General Faurer broke ground on Ops 2A and Ops 2B, which were
dedicated by President Reagan five years later. In 1990 the new Research and
Engineering building was dedicated, to add to the Special Processing Lab (opened in 1988)
and numerous leased facilities in the general Fort Meade vicinity, (see Table 25) 35

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(U) Dedication of Ops 2A and 2B by President Reagan

(U) One solution to the space problem was to go upward. In 1983 NSA awarded a
contract to American Seating Company to provide and install systems furniture, which
would permit the workforce to add personal computers and other office aids without
increasing floor space per person. The original contract provided for some 8,000
workstations at a price of about $5 million. But it was only the beginning, and by 1993
approximately 20,000 workstations had been installed at a cost of $60 million. This
improvement came in the late stages of an earlier movement to provide raised flooring.
Begun in the basement of Ops-1 in the 1960s, raised flooring was originally installed only
in rooms with computer mainframes. As smaller computers took over the Agency, people
got tired of tripping over cables strung across tile floors from one machine to another.
Slowly, workspaces were vacated and raised flooring installed. By 1993 some five million
square feet of raised flooring had been installed in NSA buildings at Fort Meade. It not
only got unsightly and potentially dangerous electrical cables off floors; it had the
attendant benefit of providing carpet tiles, which reduced noise (and looked nicer). 37

(U) In the early days Fort Meade had been serviced (excepting only the Baltimore-
Washington Parkway) by narrow, winding roads going east and west to bedroom suburbs

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(U) Table 25
Growth of NSA Space from 1973 to 1994

CROSS SQ FT
(in sullioni]

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

CALENDAR YEAR

of Severna Park, Glen Burnie, Laurel and Columbia. The drive to either Severna Park or
Columbia commonly took half an hour or more, much of it spent waiting in a long snake of
cars twisting through the Maryland countryside. With NSA population projections going
virtually through the roof, NSA began looking at an environmental overhaul. In the early
1980s the State of Maryland began widening Route 32 both toward the east and west. It
was called the Patuxent Freeway project, and as sections became functional in the late
1980s and early 1990s, traffic congestion around Fort Meade declined (but didn't go
away). 38

(U) THE CR YPTOLOGIC SYSTEM IN THE 1980s

■fSflSft-The Army was hardest hit by the r eductions of the 1970s. |

Gone were five sites in Southeast Asia and

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plus scattered locations in

Virginia and California.
The only true addition was the INSCOM component of the cryptologic conglomerate at
Kunia. \ To a degree this reflected the fact that Army SIGINT collection was the least
technologically sophisticated of the services (see map page 280) .

Security Service lost three sites in Southeast Asia,

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(U) The FSC5 Study

(TS//SI/TKH n 1983 NSA began a study of the increasing coslt of , the system

jits conclusions caught the attention of the DCI and Congress, and in

December of that year Vice Admiral Burkhalter, director of the Intelligence Community
Staff, established the Future SIGINT Capabilities Study (PSCS). Burkhaljter broadened the
study to the entire SIGINT system. The objective was to match existing' and ptogfanimed
systems against assumed target changes and to identify the gaps. Phas es I aridjl\ would
look at everything

-(G)-The resulting documents highlighted the increasing technological sophistication of
the targets, and they marked a watershed of sorts. It was no longer possible to think of the.
SIGINT system in the same terms as professional cryptologists had thought of it since World ''
War 1. 1 Pi \

-(StfSitThe study focused on target changes that would affect collection and processings

(S//SI) Though FSCS concentrated on hardware and software, it did stray into
manpower implications.

Moreover, the skill mix would move rapidly into high-tech areas, and the

people hired would be engineers, cryptomathematicians, and computer systems designers.
The armed services did not produce people like that - NSA would have to hire increasingly
from colleges or private industry to find the kinds of people it needed. Retention would be
more difficult as NSA would have to compete with private industry for college-trained

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technical people. The federal salary structure simply could not compete in these areas -
job satisfaction would have to be the carrot. 40

(T0//DI/TK) To a workforce of the late 1990s grown accustomed to the new
communications challenges, this sounds very familiar. In the mid-1980s, it was visionary.
The FSCS study spawned a plethor a of committees looking at various aspects of the
problem.

(U) "BattlestarGalactica"

— (TS//SI/TK) The plan for an overall SIGINT system was dependent on the resolution of
an ongoing donnybrook over overhead resources. |

The proposed system was so grandiose that it was referred to by Admiral Inman

as "Battlestar Galactica." 42

(TS//SI/TK) The outlines of the new system were revolutionary.

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- (S//SFTK) NSA, being the signal processing organization, participated in all the
system discussions and studies. The Agency generally kept its political opinions to itself,
confining its advice to technical assessments of the feasibility of various approaches.
Robert Hermann, director of NRO in the early 1980s, once said "NSA didn't care, shouldn't
have cared." 45 But under the surface there was growing concern at the Agency about
costs. An NSA advisory board wrote to General Odom in July of 1985 that SIGINT satellite
costs in the National Reconnaissance Program were growing so fast that they could
squeeze out some favored programs in the CCP. It would be a good idea to get a handle on
satellite program costs, and soon. 46

(S//SI/TK) In fact, NSA's role in the overhead system was not so sterile as it appeared
from the outside. Within the vortex was a fierce bureaucratic battle to control the SIGINT
satellite business. Part of this undoubtedly stemmed from the philosophy of SIGINT
management that NSA had always lived by. In the United States, SIGINT was monolithic,
and control was vested in a national manager. But the overhead business was controlled
by the NRO, and when NSA tried to intervene, either to manage the satellite planning and
programming, or to exercise day-to-day direction over satellite operations, it was on NRO's
turf.

(TS//SI/TK - ) But viewed from NSA's perspective, the issue revolved around a
management system that was inefficient from a cost standpoint. NSA managers believed
that NRO was paying far too much to its favored contractors for satellite system design,
launch and operation, and that this was impacting on money that should have been
available for other SIGINT programs.

EO
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(T3//3I/TK) Despite disagreements at the top, NSA and NRO managed to cooperate in
the creation of a new system tasking center, the Overhead Collection Manage ment Center
(OCMC). It resulted from a July. 1983 .conference betweer (chairman of

the SIGINT Committee), Robert Rich (deputy director of NSA) and Jimmy Hill (deputy

fcould not secure agreement even in such a small group, so he

director of NRO).

wrote a memo to John McMahon (deputy DCI) proposing a new joint tasking center on the
DEFSMAC model. (Attached to the memo was a two and a half page nonconcurrence from
Hill. presented McMahon with three options, and McMahon selected one which

created an OCMC at NSA headquarters, and permitted DIRNSA to name the director, the
director of NRO to name the deputy, and the DCI to name the chief of requirements. This
permitted conflict resolution at a technical level, and resulted in a joint organization that
soon proved its worth. 48

(TS//SI/TK) Disputes over satellite system
control continued into the program.

(TJ) George Cotter

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fe3.::;i i 4.....(c)

(TG//BLTK) In the fall of 1987, after a war of paper between NSA and the intelligence

community staff, General William Odom took NSA's case to Congress. He had several
complaints.

And he did not like the vast sums required,
sheer robbery of the public purse," he said later. 55

'I thought [the new system] was

(T0//0LTK) Much of NSA's dislike came down to system control. Odom felt that NSA's
views had hot been takeninto account by NRO. He viewed NRO as a vast bureaucracy in
which two programs, A and B, warred with each other, to the detriment of the national
SIGINT manager. NRO t ended to view the issue as a simple co mpetition between a new
program on the one hand. on the other. NSA looked

at it in the context of the entire SIGINT system, and from that perspective a decision that
seemed right to NRO looked wrong to NSA. 56

(TS//SI/TK ) In January of 1988 the new DCI, Judge William Webster, cancelled the
new system. In a letter to Senator David Boren of the SSCI, he explai ned that rece nt

budget cuts put too much of a squeeze on the program. The NRO could save f?P

not deploying it, and intended to do so. What he did not say was that NSA, the chief
operator of the SIGINT system, was now in active opposition. But this was not news to
Boren, owing to Odom's testimony on Capitol Hill. 57

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(U) Comsat

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BSfc. 86-36
Ei'6-''i ;: .:4., (c)

(U) Cryptologic Communications

-{67 No area of cryptologic operations was expanding faster tha n communications. A
chart of communications capacity from 1973 to 1993 (Table 28),

| Yet the system was being operated by about the same number of people as it had

required twenty years earlier.

£0 1. 4. (c)

-4S#Si*Table28

orypioiogic

mmumcanons. l\h&-iwa

Worldwide capacity

Number of circuits

Messages annually

Secure phone systems

Instruments

Cost of communications

Manpower

(U/ /FOUO) NSA had become the largest single user of the DSSCS system, and by the
early 1980s had outrun the ability of the DoD system to support it. The only answer was to
lease large numbers of commercial circuits, from landline and microwave to satellite. 65

(U//FOUO) Internally, NSA replaced its communications terminal system under a
new project called EMBROIDERY. Under EMBROIDERY, every communications terminal
becamd a computer, just as field site collection positions were b eing computerized. Using
off-the-shelf IBM equipment, NSA outfitted its

IDDF/ 1

Jtideway, and DAYSENP communications systems with new equipment and new

methodology.

which had been deployed in the mid-1970s. ao

replaced STREAMLINER,

P.L. 86-36

(U) NSA's impressive communications design capability was sometimes employed in
the service of other organizations. This was the case with a system called Umstead, a
commercial desi gn originally adapted for government use by an NSA engineer named
to transmit voice and data via satellite. It was light, mobile and
inexpensive, and looked like the answer to an Army tactical communications problem.
The Army's problem came into rather stark relief during a large 1981 exercise called
Crested Eagle. Army tactical forces simply lacked enough communications channels to
carry what they needed, and intelligence got such a low priority that little of it got to the

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customers. Sixty percent of the signals intelligence traffic had to be couriered, and much
of it was still in courier two weeks after the exercise had ended.

(U) Through mid-decade, top Army field commanders insisted that Umstead would
solve the problem. But it was opposed by Signal Corps generals on somewhat obscure
grounds, and was never purchased. Umstead was used on a few occasions by NSA, but
never achieved its true potential, and wound up sitting on the shelf. 67

(U) Cryptologic Computers

(U// TOUQ) If the 1960s and 1970s were the era of mainframe computers, the 1980s
were an era of small systems. By the late 1970s the mainframes at Fort Meade were
becoming so congested that they looked like the Beltway at rush hour. As access time
increased, a movement away from mainframes accelerated. In the early 1980s computer
companies were beginning to produce personal computers in large quantities at low prices,
and NSA managers began defecting to these systems. Kermit Speierman and Walter
Deeley were early proponents of personal computers and off-the-shelf software.

(U// FOUQ ) The improved efficiency and cost effectiveness of the computer-on-every-
desk approach was counterbalanced by a strong trend toward nonstandard equipment and
software. With so many products available in stores, it was difficult for NSA's computer
people to keep up. The driver was maintenance: when hardware and software
malfunctioned, it was impossible to keep everything running. Moreover, central control
over formats, file access, etc., the basis of the cryptologic system's effectiveness, could be
lost. Chaos could be the result 68

(U/ /F0UO) To save the situation, NSA tried to standardize PC hardware. In 1984 it
issued a request for proposal for an Agency Standard Terminal Workstation (ASTW). The
IBM PC XT, a relatively new entry in the world of personal computers, won the award. It
was a big win: the contract was ultimately valued at $199 million, and NSA bought 21,000
units. The next year the Agency awarded a contract for an Agency Standard Host (ASH),
which would interconnect the ASTWs. American Telephone and Telegraph won the
contract, valued at $150 million. Seven hundred twenty systems were finally sold to
NSA. 69

(U) In the early days, most personal computers ran on the DOS operating system, but
it was not suitable for internetted systems. Kermit Speierman of NSA discovered that Bell
Laboratories had devised an operating system called UNIX, which was at the time the
only system that operated in a multi-user, internetted environment. UNIX became the
dominant operating system in the 1980s. 70

(U/ /FOUO ) Computer power was the essential ingredient in cryptanalysis. In the
1970s NSA had forged ahead with the help of supercomputers, first from Control Data
Corporation (CDC) and later from Cray. But the early 1980s were a period of tension in
the supercomputer business. The Japanese were rumored to be about to enter the
business, and in view of their devastating impact on the commercial VCR business, there

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was a potential threat to national security if American supercomputer companies were to
be bested or even driven out of business. These problems were part of the background
noise of 1982, when NSA's Kermit Speierman was doing some work at Los Alamos and
talking to scientists there about NSA's computer power problems. The outgrowth of those
discussions was a decision to jointly host a conference at NSA in 1983 on supercomputer
problems. Called "Frontiers in Supercomputing," the week-long conference focused on
how to design and build faster supercomputers. It was clear that serial processing would
not be fast enough - the industry needed massively parallel processing to have a chance of
staying ahead. 71

(U//FOUO) General Faurer, who gave the closing speech, had become convinced that a
permanent institute was needed, and asked Speierman to create one. Working through an
NSA committee, Speierman put together a concept for a Supercomputer Research Center.
Faurer needed $16 million and a lot of executive push, so he briefed the outlines of the
research center around Washington. He was able to muster support from every quarter
but the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where his boss, William Taft, was
staunchly opposed. But Taft was ultimately outflanked, and NSA began looking for a
home for the center. Although Boston and North Carolina were considered, NSA finally
selected the nearby Bowie area, and on November 27, 1984, Maryland governor Harry
Hughes announced from the steps of the State House in Annapolis the creation of the
Supercomputer Research Center. 72 The center would not have survived without Faurer's
forceful intervention at the DoD level. Said Speierman several years later, "...he was
completely convinced. I think that's a real tribute to him. And he never flinched from that,
conviction. Without that 100 percent conviction on his part... I don't think any of this
would have happened." 73 It was one of the disputes with Taft that resulted in Faurer's
early departure from NSA.

(U) Computer Security

(U) In 1965 a small computer science firm called SDC of Santa Monica, California,
became concerned about security of their computer products. With computer networking
in the offing, computer files could become vulnerable to unauthorized users, almost as if a
safe had been jimmied. SDC hosted a conference attended by several computer companies
and by the head of the Rand Corporation computer sciences division, Dr. Willis Ware.
Ware quickly took the lead on the issue. 74

(U// FOUO) Ware, as it happened, sat on NSA's Scientific Advisory Board, and called
General Carter to tell him that he was about to get a hot new issue on his plate.
Contending that NSA was the only agency in the federal government that had the
technical expertise, Ware plugged for the Agency's direct involvement. The issue bubbled
slowly for two years, but in 1967 the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) at Cameron Station,
Virginia, made a formal request to the secretary of defense that NSA be named the
computer security authority. This was followed in short order by requests from several
other federal agencies. NSA first became involved with these requests on a voluntary
basis -it had no charter to do this unless cryptographic equipment was involved, and

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in this case it wasn't. Nor did NSA have an
organization officially tasked with the job.
The DSA request to the secretary was still
pending and had generated a lot of
controversy within NSA. Many felt that NSA
should avoid the task.

(U/ /FOUO) Having dodged responsibility
for the new COMPUSEC mission for several
years, NSA finally made a partial step in
1969 with the issuance of a memorandum by
the deputy director, Louis Tordella. Noting
that NSA possessed no official responsibility,
Tordella nonetheless acknowledged that a
moral responsibility was involved.
Thenceforth, NSA would provide assistance
to other intelligence community (IC)
organizations based on experiences that NSA
had had with its own systems. NSA would
not assist non-IC organizations. 75

In 1972, the consequences of continued inaction were starkly illustrated by an
incident involving DIA. The Defense Intelligence Agency had created several intelligence
community databases designed for multilevel security access, and DIA contacted USIB
about running a security check of the system so that they could get their systems
accredited for SI and TK information. NSA and other members of the intelligence
community, with participation from defense contractors, obliged. By the time the attacks
terminated, the penetration was so thorough that a penetrator at a distant remote
terminal had actually seized control of the system. DIA never got its accreditation, and
the results of the exercise made many at NSA skeptical that multilevel security could ever
be achieved.

(U/ /FOUO ) NSA's role in computer security expanded in 1973. Needing a focus for
research on the subject, Tordella named the ADC (assistant director for comsec) as the
responsible official, and ADC established a small center for technical information on the
subject, specifically to support federal agencies. Despite Tordella's decision, however,
little happened through the end of the decade. Lew Allen requested sixty-seven billets for
the fiscal year 1975 program, but was turned down, in part because NSA's role was still
controversial. 76

(U// FOUQ ) Late in the decade an OSD staffer and former NSA employee, Stephen
Walker, approached Bobby Inman about the computer security mess. Walker explained
that in OSD there was a strong feeling that NSA should «xpand its effort and become the
office of primary responsibility for computer security in the federal government. However,
Walker personally opposed locating the organization within COMSEC. Inman agreed and
asked George Cotter, the assistant director for telecommunications, to take on the task.

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Working closely with Walker, Cotter set up the Computer Security Center as a separate
organization. It was formally created on the first of January, 1981, as the Department of
Defense Computer Security Center, with a small staff working directly for Cotter.
Originally it was to have a separate building, to be located in the parking lot outside Ops-3
on the main Fort Meade campus. But, as often happens with money, the line item was
diverted, and went into construction of the Special Processing Laboratory. In the end, the
center never got its own building, and it continued to operate out of borrowed spaces. 77

(UZ/ TOUO ) NSA's role in computer security remained a lightning rod for dissent both
within NSA and in the outside world. That role waxed and waned depending on the
political winds. Under Reagan, it expanded, and under NSDD 145 the DoD Computer
Security Center became the National Computer Security Center, with an expanded
mission to bring computer security products to non-national security organizations. At the
same time, Walter Deeley and Harry Daniels, who were running the COMSEC organization,
convinced General Odom that COMPUSEC should be part of their organization, and so the
Center was resubordinated to the (now called) DDI, responsible for INFOSEC, which
included both COMSEC and compusec. 78

(U) But NSDD 145 encountered congressional opposition, and it was overturned in
1987 by the Computer Security Act. This legislation split the mission between NSA and
the National Bureau of Standards (NBS, which soon changed its named to NIST, National
Institute of Standards and Technology). NSA retained its role within the national security
community, but NBS got the mission to deal with all others. It was clear from the
legislation, however, that NSA would retain a strong technical advisory role with NBS,
which lacked the expertise on the subject. 79

(U) Operations Security

(U) The experience in Vietnam had generated an operations security program called
Purple Dragon (see Vol II, 551). NSA had been the core of the effort, and it became the
institutional memory for OPSEC. But as Vietnam faded from mind, memories of OPSEC
programs grew dim. So in the early 1980s NSA began holding OPSEC seminars around the
Pacific Rim for military organizations. The program quickly expanded to the Coast Guard,
the White House, GSA, Customs, and NASA. This nascent effort became a full-blown
OPSEC training program at the National Cryptologic School. The National OPSEC Course
was open to all federal agencies, and 80 percent of the attendees were non-NSA. 80

(C) In 1983 Caspar Weinberger directed that all DoD organizations have OPSEC
programs, and NSA became responsible for OPSEC education. But while NSA spread the
word about effective OPSEC programs, it had none itself. The "Year of the Spy" (see page
401) brought on a thorough internal examination of security practices. The panel, headed
by David Boak concluded in 1986 that NSA had effectively flunked its own OPSEC exam.
This led to the establishment of a DDI OPSEC working group to bring NSA into compliance
with its own established standards. 81

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(U) In 1988, President Reagan signed NSDD 298, which established the OPSEC
program of the federal government. Every agency with "classified or sensitive activities"
would establish a formal OPSEC program. The order gave NSA the training and technical
support mission for all federal programs. It also established an Interagency OPSEC Support
Staff, with re presentatives from NSA, FBI, CIA, DOE, and GSA. A SIGINT professional,
was named to head the NSA effort. 82

(U) INFOSEC and the New Way of Doing Business

-(€D In 1983 the Communications Security organization got a new boss. Walter Deeley,
who had revolutionized SIGINT timely reporting, was sent by General Faurer to do the
same thing to the COMSEC business. Deeley took stock of American COMSEC, and did not
like what he saw. As he later said to a congressional committee, "I was appalled. Within
weeks I told Faurer that I would rank the United States in the top half of the Third World
countries when it comes to protecting its communications. What I found was a secluded
organization with fewer than 2,000 people, including all the printers of our codes and
ciphers, no charter to effect change, no money except to engage in research and
development, and customers who really didn't want our products." 83 Two years later he
said to another committee: "The United States is in jeopardy because it does poorly
protecting its vital communications. ...As a nation so far, we have not made this
commitment.... " 84

(U) The New Way of Doing Business, as the Deeley revolution was termed, was based
on embeddable COMSEC products, or "COMSEC on a chip." Instead of protecting point-to-
point circuits, NSA would go for bulk encryption. The Agency would get into a partnership
with commercial manufacturers to produce encryption technology. The revolution did not
just happen; it was carefully planned and executed. 85

(U/ /FOUO) One of the first battles of the Deeley era was over national policy. The
struggles of the Carter administration over what federal agency was to control national
COMSEC policy continued into the Reagan years. Admiral Bobby Inman had been sure that
Carter would lean toward expanded authorities by the Department of Commerce, and he
successfully stalled the Carter White House on the issue, hoping for a more favorable
decision from the incoming Reagan people.

"IGWhe new administration was temperamentally inclined to give the problem to DoD.
This was strongly reinforced by the problems in Soviet exploitation of U.S. domestic
communications, the problems with Moscow embassy security, exposure of the Walker
ring, and concern over potential penetration of American computer systems. A coterie of
NSC staffers, headed by Kenneth deGraffenreid, pushed hard for NSA involvement. The
result was a new National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 145. Issued in 1984, it
established COMSEC as a high-priority national objective, and named the secretary of
defense as the executive agent for the security of government communications related to
national security. NSA was designated the "National Manager for Telecommunications
Security and Automated Information Systems Security," a longish title which placed the

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Agency directly in the center of the COMSEC business. Moreover, NSDD 145 did away with
the old United States Communications Security Board, which had accomplished so little
over the years. Instead, the directive replaced it with a new Systems Security Working
Group (SSSC) and, under it, the National Telecommunications Information Systems
Security Committee (NTISSC, pronounced "entissic"). NBS had separate responsibility
for the private sector, but even there, NSA had a technical and advisory role. NTISSC, the
real player in this game, was dominated by NSA, and its secretariat was located in NSA
spaces. 86

-('U>T he ink on NSDD 145 was hardly dry when it was attacked in Congress. The issue
turned on a congressional distrust of DoD involvement in computer security. The
Department of Commerce, which had been involved in COMPUSEC by the Carter order (PD
24), was anxious to reverse the course of NSDD 145, and a behind-the-scenes brawl
developed between NSA and Commerce over the COMPUSEC authority. The fight was
ultimately settled by Congress, which in 1987 passed Public Law 200-135, legislation
which was promoted by Congressman Jack Brooks of Texas. This gave Commerce control
over COMPUSEC in all cases except those involving classified government contracts, in
which NSA was still the prime actor. Although the new law was supposed to affect only
computer security, NIST was expected to establish crypto standards and policy for
computer security, a domain in which NSA had formerly operated with complete freedom.
The hearings which led to the legislation revealed the huge technological lead that NSA
enjoyed in the field of computer security, but the demons of congressional distrust could
not be overcome. 87

(S) The secure voice revolution that had begun in the 1970s accelerated under Deeley.
He brought with him the perspective of a SIGINTer who knew how to exploit other
countries' communications.

j In 1980 Deputy Secretary of Defense

(iraham Clay tor endorsed the STU-ll program and recommended large-scale procurement.
In 1982, his successor, Frank Carlucci, decided to buy 5,000 STU-II sets and allocated $120
million for the program. The STU-II was strongly endorsed by Alexander Haig, Carlucci
and President Reagan himself. 88

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-flS)-But STU-II was just a waystation. The revolution in voice security was wrought by
a new product, the STU-III. The basis for the STU-III was a public key algorithm called
designed by engineers from NSA's Rl. When Deeley came to the COMSEC

organization, he "captured" Rl and created a special projects office to develop the STU-III.
Deeley made the decision to have the STU-III built by private industry, and three
contractors - RCA, AT&T, and Motorola - each developed a unique STU-III device, all
three of which sold competitively. It was a low-cost (about $2,000 per copy) terminal that
would sit on a desk. There would be unique plastic key for each device, but the device
would not work w ithout another key, developed on demand from a central key
\management center.

(U) The key management facility was originally collocated with a contractor in
Waltharn, Massachusetts. In 1988 NSA moved the facility to an old 1950s-era bomb
shelter in the Maryland countryside owned by AT&T, near Finksburg. 90

(U) The crypto gear that NSA had designed for the new communications era had, by
the early 1980s, come to the end of the rope. The KW-26, a marvel of its day, could only
secure 100-wbrd-per-minute circuits. The KG-13 and KW-7 were out of production and
becoming more difficult to m aintain every day. The replacement device, developed under

a project named would.be the KG-84. Small, lightweight (20 lbs), cheap (base

price of about $5,100), it was designed to operate at speeds up to 9600 bps. Cost of
maintenance was also a big selling point: while the KW-26 mean time between failure
(MBTF) was 1,840 hours, the worst-case MBTF for the KG-84 was 17,000 hours. The KG-
84 began appearing in comm centers in the mid-1980s. 91

— te)-One of the COMSEC improvements of the 1980s was OTAR (over-the-air re-keying).
NSA had long wanted to dispense with paper tape re-keying, with its attendant courier
problems and possibility of loss or pilferage. The Agency had incorporated OTAR into the
Vinson tactical voice system of the late 1970s, but the rationale was combat. If an
American unit with a Vinson were overrun, the field commander would need a way to
quickly re-key all other Vinson equipments. Vinson was an OTAR device by exception
only; it was normally keyed just like any other COMSEC device. The KG-84 was designed
with an optional OTAR capability, but DCA thought so little about it that at one time it
directed that all KG-84s be rewired to disable the OTAR feature. 92

(C)'-B ut two events in the 1980s spurred a reversal of fortunes for the OTAR concept.
One was the invasion of Grenada, which conclusively demonstrated that the services could
not easily talk to each other, and drove the JCS to reform the concept of jointness and to
direct the services to marry their communications system. This led, ultimately, to a new
COMSEC key distribution doctrine which would permit U.S. forces to communicate with
each other on almost all tactical crypto devices using electronically distributed key. 93

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(U) The second was the arrest of John Walker in May of 1985 (see page 417). Walker
had been stealing crypto key since 1968 and selling it to the Soviets. The massive
hemorrhage of classified information was directly attributable to the wide and easy
availability of crypto key, and sparked a complete re-look at COMSEC keying doctrine.

-(S)-What resulted was a JCS decision in 1988 to implement OTAR on every KG-84
device in the world. Vice Admiral Jerry Tuttle, the JCS J6 in 1988, forced the issue after
being told that NSA was having a hard time keeping up with the demand for paper keying
tape and that the KG-84 had been designed with an OTAR capability that was not being
used. Tuttle made the historic decision to require OTAR on KG-84 circuits, and by the
early 1990S the KG-84 had been completely converted to the new method of operation. 94

(U //FOUQ) Until NSA came up with an effective OTAR strategy in the 1980s, the best
it could do was to protect the crypto keys from tampering. The Agency always had a small
group working o n protective packag ing, but the big breakth rough cafflelwith the hiring of^

a chemist nd.in.6i

in the 1960s.

a Harvard Ph.D. in chemistry,

had specialized in the detection of poison gasses during World War II.

86-36

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(U) Australia

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(U) Australia's parliament had been controlled by Conservatives since the sacking of
Gough Whitlam in 1975. But in 1983 the Australian Labor Party (ALP) regained control.
The left wing of the party had been critical of Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser's close
relationship with the United States. There were threats to close Aussie ports to American
warships and strident declarations of brotherhood with the government of Vietnam. But
when party leader Bob Hawke took the premiership, he excluded the left wing of the party
and repudiated the anti-U.S. planks of the party platform. In foreign affairs he formed a
close bond with Ronald Reagan. Soon after his election he publicly declared that the U.S.
would continue to enjoy access to defence facilities in Australia, including Alice Springs
(also known as Pine Gap). His public statement in support of the facility revealed the
base's purpose: "...provision of early warning by receiving from space satellites
information about missile launches - and the occurrence of nuclear explosions." It was
more than the U.S. wanted him to say, but was received with relatively good graces in
view of his strong support for the joint effort. 106

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(U) The new relationship occurred just in time for controversy. In the summer of 1984
the Labor Party under David Lange assumed power in New Zealand. The party had long
had a nuclear-free plank, and left-wing members were pressing for withdrawal from
ANZUS. Lange, being a centrist by persuasion, tried to ignore the anti-U.S. tide,
continuing to push a decision into the future. The Reagan administration also tried to ride
out the storm, believing that Lange would be a New Zealand Bob Hawke on the issue. But
it did not understand the depth of Lange's difficulties. Lange's problem turned on the
nuclear-free issue and the determination of his left wing that no American nuclear vessels
would be permitted in New Zealand ports. The U.S. delayed port visits in hopes that
Lange could solve the political problem. Finally, in March of 1985 the U.S. requested
permission for a non-nuclear vessel, the USS Buchanan, to visit Auckland in connection
with a scheduled naval exercise. This was done under a tacit agreement with the Lange
government that the first port visit would be by an obviously non-nuclear vessel, following
which Lange could announce that he had determined that it was not a nuclear vessel and
could enter. But the deal broke down because Lange could not push it through his party
caucus, and he announced that the Buchanan would not be permitted to enter port. The
outraged Reagan administration cancelled the joint exercise and suspended all military
cooperation with New Zealand, including the flow of intelligence information. 109

(U) Third Parties

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(U) All The Rest

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(U) Notes

1. (U) John Ranelagh.Tfce Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 666-
72.

2. (U) Inman interview.

3. (U) Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from
Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 501.

4. (U) DDIR files, in NSA retired records 96026, Box 10, "President Reagan." interview, Juanita M. Moody, by

David HatchJ_

Jl6 June 1994, OH 32-94, NSA. NSA Archives

44700NZ.G15-0306-1.

5. (U) Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster, "1987V46-
47.

"P. L. 86-36

6. (U) Washington Star, 3 February 1981. U.S., Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination
of Admiral B. R. Inman to be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. 97th Cong., 1st sess., 198i, 1.

7. (U)CCH Series VI.D.2 .15.

8. (U Interview, Robert Rich, by Tom Johnson

OH 12-97, NSA.

9. (U) Interview, Sir Peter Marychurch, by Henry Schorreck, 17-18 October 1989, OH 1 1-89, NSA.

EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

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10. (U) Interview, Lincoln D. Faurer, by Robert D. Parley, Tom Johnson anc
8-87, NSA.

20 March 1987, OH

11. (U) Ibid.

12. (U) Faurer interview. Washington Post, 20 April 1985, article by George Wilson.

13. <U) Interview, Lt Gen William Odom, by Tom Johnson, 19 August 1997, OH 13-97, NSA.

14. (U) NSASAB Special Task Group for G Group Study: Reporton G Group Machine Systems, 16 March 1979.

15. (U) Odom interview.

| and Tom Johnson, 2 September 1994,'

16. (U) Rich interview. Interview, Robert J. Hermann, by
OH 45-94, NSA.

17. (U) Odom interview.

18. (U) Ibid.

1 9. (U) Odom interview. Chief, A2 executive files, in NSA retired records 96228, Box'4, "Programming Data;
1988." QMR.3/87. Interview, Adm William O.Studeman.byRobertParley.OH 5-91, NSA.

20. (U) Odom interview.

21. (U) Interview,

;/P.L. 86-36

by Tom Johnson, 30 May 1997, OH -97, NSA.

22. (U) NSA Archives, acc'nr 92456, Box 72942.

23. (U) Ibid.

24. (U)CCH Series XII.OO, Box 4, "SIGINT Satellite Program Costs."

25. (U) NSA retired records, shipment 90176, Box 63063, "FY 87 Hearings/Testimony/Brief, FY-86 CCP."

\ tS22. CCH Series XII.D., "Military

26. (U) Informal documentation on population provided bj
Manpower Review Group, 1988."

27. (U) CCH Series XII.D.,
date.

'Space Management from a Resource Management Perspective," no

28. (U)QMR,1.87.

29. (U) Ibid.

30. (U)QMR, 3/83, 2/82. CCH Series XI0., "Military Manpower Study."

31. (U)QMR, 2/94, 2/82.

32. (U)QMR,2.82.

33. (U)Ibid.

34. (U) Ibid.

35. (U) | | "Sp ace Management...." [Edward Wiley] On Watch: Profiles from the National Security Agency's

PastForty Years,91.

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ED ..J. 4. (c)

36. (U)QMR,2y93.

37. (U)QMR, 4/83, 2/93.

38. (U)QMR,4/83.

39. (U)CCH Series XI.R. DDIR files, Box 1 , "FSCS Phase II Wrapup Report.'

40. (U)ChiefA2 files, "FSCS."

41. (U)Ibid.

42. (U) CCH Series XI.R (papers of Maj Gen John Morrison). Interview,

by Tom Johnson, 10,

17 July, 6 August, 1996, OH -96, NSA. DDIR files, Box 3, "Overhead Senior Steering Council " Inman interview.

43. (U) DDIR files, Box 3, "Overhead Senior Steering Council" ; Box 1 , "FSCS Phase III Wrapup Report."

44. (U) DDIR files, Box 1 , "FSCS Phase III Wrapup Report."

45. (U) Hermann interview.

46. (U) CCH Series XI.R.

47. (U) Hermann interview. CCH Series XI.R

48. (U) Memo from Joh&McMan6n, 15 July 1983, in CCH Series XII.OO, Box 4, "DCI Letters * Interview,

.. ": ; ?P.L. 8 6-36

]by Tom Johnson and£

3 May 1994, unnumberedNSA OH£

interview.

49. (U) DDIR files, Box 3, "Overhead Senior Steering Council," memo dated 21 December 1987.

50. (U) DDIR files, Box 11, "Overhead SIGINT Strategy Study," memo dated 25 July 1988.

51. (U) Ch A2 files, "SSCI Study, 1987." Black papers, memos dated.18 November 86 and 28 July 1986.

Interview^

]by Tom Johnson, 19 February 1997, NSA OH 04-97, NSA-

52. (U) Black papers, memo dated November 1986. NSA Archives acc nr 25892Z, CBOB 75, Ch A2 files, Box
"Ch A2 Strategic Planning."

53. (U) Black papers, "Project^
§4. (U) Interview wit h)

[Baseline Summary," 31 October 1986.
by Tom Johnson, 6 August 1997. 1

3 , "Overhead Senior Steering Council."

hterview. DDIR files,

Sox

55. (U) Odom interview. DDIRiiles, Box 3, "Overhead Senior Steering Council," memos dated 16 and 18
December 1987.

"56. (U) DDIR files, Box 3, "Overhead Senior Steering Council," 14 January 1988 memo.

57. (U) DDlR fUes, Box 3, "Overhead Senior Steering Council." Ch, A2 files, "Strengthening Intelligence'
Capabilities Against

58. (U) DDIR files, Box 13, "Collection and Processing of Intelligence, 1981." Interview
Tom Johnson, 4 June 1996, OH 18-96, NSA.

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i up sfcLKb mamm i -umbra/talcnt iccyi ioix//xi

59. (U)Ch,A2 files, "A213 Working Aid 004-87."

60. (U) Ch, A2 files. DDIR files, Box 13, "Collection and Processing oflntelligence, 1981." NSA Archives acc nr
46092, H04-0208-7.

61. (U)

"The Selection o.

as Alternate

Headquarters and ReconstituttonSite for NSA/CSS," 15 February 1984. DDIR files, Box 13,^lleeaona«i^~ ,:a " EO 1 4 (c)
Processing of Intelligence."

62. (U) Henry Millington, untitled manuscript ori the history | | cCHSeries XII.D.

63. (U) Ibid.

64. (U)Ibid.

65. (U) NSA Archives, acc nr 44602, H03-0609-6.

66. (U) NSA Archives, acc nr 32597, H01-0101-7; 44602, H03-0609-6; 36692, H03-0203-5.

67. (U) Eugene Becker, manuscript on Umstead available in CCH Series XII.D. ,„ ; : ; '!p . L . 8 6-36

68. (U) Interview, George Cotter, by Tom Johnson, December 1996, OH 7-96, NSA. J

69. (U)QMR, 2/93, 95. Cotter interview. j

70. (U) Cotter interview. ;

71. (U) Interview, Kermit H. Speierman, by Robert D. Farley, 16 January 1986, DH 2-86, NSA. j

72. (U) Speierman interview. E-mail note fromGeorgeCbtter to Tom Johnson, 19 August 1997, NSA j

73. (U) Ibid. !

74. (U)

untitled draft history of NSA computer Security, in NSA CCH Series XII.D.

draft.

75. (U) Comsec History, and Background and Papers, 1946-1970, in CCH Series V.H.1.1,

76. (U j I draft.

77- ^ ^ aft ' David G - B °ak, A History of U.S. Communications Security [The David G. Boak

Lectures] (Fort Meade: NSA, 1973). Cotter interview.

78. (U) Boak lectures. QMR, 1/87. , '

79. (U) Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issiies in 17.S. CryptograpkicPolicy, Report of a Special Panel of the ACM U.S.
Public Policy Committee (USACM), June 1994 (New York: ACM, 1994).

80. (U)

Purple Dragon: The Origin and Development of the United States OPSEC Program, Ft.

Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, 1993.

81. (U) CCH Series VI.F.2.1.

82. (U j \p urpleDraeon.

83. (U) NSA Archives, acc nr 36741, CBPJ 46.

84. (U) NSA Archives, acc nr 36740, CBPJ 46.

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85. (U) | ( interview. QMR.2/93. Interview, Lt Gen Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF (Ret.), by Robert D. Parley,
I j and Tom Jqhnson.

86. (U) George F. Jelen, "Informa tion Security. An Elusi ve Goal," Harva rd University Center for Information
Policy Research, 1985. Interview J by

r and Tom Johnson, 2 February 1993,

OH 2-93, NSA. Faurer interview. DDir files^ 96026, Box 14, "Embassy Telecommunications Security
Assessments."

87. (U) Deputy Director's Records, Box ll,"Compusec.'
CBPJ 46.

interview. NSA Arch ives, acc nr 36740,

88. (U)Deeley quote from c-2527; OH 29-93. NSA Archives, acc nr 42366, H03-04094 .

, by . Tom Johnson, 18 February 1997. STU-III video in' GQH video

89. (U) Interview,
collection. •

90. (U) Interview.

by Tom Johnson, 5 March 1997.

■' illll 'P.L. 86-36

91. (U) NSA Archives, acc nr 32597, H01-0101-7. QMR.1/83.

92. (U)

Johnson, 12 February 1997. .

93. (tfl | [ iraft history.

Jdraft history of OTAR, in GCH Series XII.D. Interview;

by Tom

94. (UQ

Jraft history. Boak Lectures. .

byTon* Johnson anc

95. (U) Interview

96. (U) Interview / | by Tom Johnson, 16January 1997.

97. (U) | [ nterview. l I nterview.

98. (U) | [ interview.

15 May 1997, OH 7-97, NSA.

99. (U) Inter viewJ

Analysis) file

, by Tom Johnson and

10, 1998, OH 14-98, NSA. V52 (Threat

retained in OPI spaces.

EO 1.4. (c)

100. (U) Foreign Relations Directorate, CDO UK files, "IPC-Kern Committee."

101. (U) CDO UK files, "STU-III."

102. (U) CDO UKfiles J~ l lnterviewy-MiltonZ^ " ~

103. (U) Ibid.

104. (U)QMR, 1/83. Interview, Timothy W. James, by Tom Johnson, OH 10-97, NSA.

105. (U) James interview.

106. (U) I l ane ?An Alliance Unravels: The United States and ANZUS," Naval
War College Review (Summer 1993), 109-10. CCH Series XII.OO., Box 3, History of Rainfall, 25-26.

107. (U) DDIR files. Bo x 3. "U.S.- Austral ian Relations." Odom interview. Foreign Relations Directorate, U.S.-
Australian Agreement James interview.

EO 1.4. (d)

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108. (U

NISA's Involvement in U.S. Foreign SIG1NT Relationships, U.S. Cryptologic

History, Series 6, Vol. 4 (Fort Meade: NSA, 1995).
109. (V j

]"An Alliance Unravels:'

110. (U)

NSA's Involvement in U.S. Foreign SIGINT Relationships.

3IQINT Relationships, 1962-1985." Ch,

111. (U) CCH Series VI.C.4; XII.D., "Development of the

A2 files.

112. (U) DDIR files, Box 13, "Collection and Processing of Intelligence.'' CCH Series VI.K.1.5.

113. (U

'Foreign SIGINT Operations: The Legal Side," IAI International Notes andNews

(Fort Meade: NSA, June 1993).
114. (U

NSA'sInvoluement in US: ForeighSIGINTRelationsh^^

115. (U) Ibid., 120.

1 16. <S4SI) Foreign Relations Directorate, CDp | | files, "Development of th< ~
Relationships," in CCH Series XII.D.

117 JSWStJ Foreign Relations Directorate, CDo | | "Record of Meeting

JlGINT

>bruary 20, 1975.
118. (SflSn CDo j | riles, the

^Agreement.

119. (ftySb "Development of th<

SIGINT Relationship 1862- 1985,'

1986. Interview, Whitney E. Reed,by Tola Johnson. CDO l I files. "Developments of thi
SIGINT Relationship..." | ... I nterview.

120. (U) | [nterview. CDC| | files.

121. (U j interview. NSA Archives, acc nr32941Z,G14-0308-6,Orion Agreement, undated.

122. (U) CCH Series VI.C.4.

J 24 March

1 9*3 iTffPTl

CCH Series VI

'A Historical Overview of the U.S. SIGINT Effor

October 1998, in. v

NSA's Invotvementin U.S. Foreign SIGINT Relationships, 115-16:

124. (U) Ibid., 118.

P.L. 86-36

125. (U

Directorate, CDO

EO 1.4. (d)

NSA's Involvement in UJ3. Foreign SIGINT. Relationships, 1 19. Foreign Relations
'Country Handbook," 1982.

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(U) Chapter 22
The Second Cold War

(U) THE SIGINT SYSTEM AND THE SOVIET PROBLEM

(T3//3I) By the end o f the 1970s, the SIGINT system was optimized for its principal
target, the Soviet Union.

— ( TOZ/Q t) What distinguished the system, however, was the w ay that it all knitted
together. Analysis of Soviet force posture was a complex weave

J Exploitation of the best source,

was prioritized for

processing based on an assessment of all the other indicators.
_,(S//SB" This system had been employed in an analysis of Soviet and Warsaw Pact

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(U) The Second Cold War

(U) The most distinguishable characteristic of American foreign policy during the
Reagan administration was hard-line anticommunism. Reagan's views were so well-
known that they apparently induced great consternation in Moscow. The Soviet view of
Reagan was confirmed when, barely two months into his first term, Reagan referred to the
USSR as the "focus of evil," and seized every opportunity to brand the Soviet Union as an
international outlaw. The Soviets reciprocated by launching a propaganda blitz, at one
point comparing Reagan to Hitler. This was not in the spirit of detente. 14

^ (U) Militarily, the Reagan administration

* opened a campaign of psychological military

warfare. American aircraft, especially from
the Strategic Air Command, probed East Bloc
borders in increasingly provocative flights.
SAC sent B-52 flights over the North Pole to
see what the Soviet reaction would be. The
Navy was by all odds the most daring,
however. Two huge naval exercises - one near
the Murmansk coast in .1981, the other in the
Sea of Okhotsk in April of 1983 - served notice
that Allied naval forces would intrude into
what the Soviets had come to regard as their
own private lakes. The Navy also delighted in
using sophisticated evasion techniques to
elude the USSR's ocean reconnaissance
systems. These techniques would frequently
be turned against the Soviets in high-tech sub-
shadowing exercises. 15

(U) These actions were calculated to induce
(U)Yuri Andropov paranoia, and they did. In early 1981, KGB

chief Yuri Andropov, who had apparently come

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to believe that the U.S. had decided to launch a first nuclear strike, launched Operation
Ryan. Ryan was an attempt to get as much information as possible about this supposed
attack. The scare peaked in 1983. In February of that year the U.S. began the deployment
of nuclear-armed Pershing missiles. In March, Reagan made his famous "evil empire"
speech, and only two weeks later he announced the inauguration of his Strategic Defense
Initiative, later dubbed "Star Wars." 16

(U) Cold War hysteria reached a peak in the autumn of the year with two events: the
Soviet shootdown of KAL-007 (see page 320) and the NATO exercise Able Archer. The
latter was an annual NATO command post exercise of a distinctly nonthreatening nature.
But in 1983 the scenario was changed to involve the secretary of defense, the chairman of
the JCS, the president, and the vice president. Moreover, Able Archer 1983 added a
practice drill that took NATO forces from the use of conventional forces through nuclear
release. This, says Gordievsky, was interpreted in Moscow as the possible initiation of a
preemptive strike, and this extremely dangerous postulation was used as a spur to
intensify intelligence collection. It also, according to the same source, resulted in a very
high state of KGB alert. 17

(U) A last bit of melodrama was provided by the "Bogus War Message" of 1984. This
bizarre episode had its origins in Reagan's penchant to ham for the microphones. Just
prior to his weekly radio address on August 11, 1984, he was asked to do a voice check. Not
content to do a routine countdown, he said "My fellow Americans. I'm pleased to tell you
today that I've signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in
five minutes." Although this was supposedly off the record, it was overheard by all three
networks and was broadcast over NBC and ABC. The Soviets took a very dim view of the
incident, calling it "unprecedentedly hostile toward the USSR and dangerous to the cause
of peace." 18

EO 1.4. (c)

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(U) KAL-007

EO 1.4. (c)

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320

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(U) But it was a real aircraft. Early on September 1, Korean Airlines flight 007 had
taken off from Anchorage, Alaska, on its way to Seoul. It was programmed to fly
commercial track R20, which skirted Soviet airspace along Kamchatka. It was obviously
off course.

(U) While the SU-15 maneuvered, the airline pilot was engaged in routine
conversations with the tower at Narita airport, outside Tokyo. At 0320 the tower
controller gave KAL-007 permission for an altitude change, and three minutes later the
pilot reported that he had climbed to the new altitude and had leveled off. At 0327 the
controller tried to contact KAL-007, but the answer was lost in a haze of static. Tokyo
tower never heard from KAL-007 again. 25

EO 1.4. (c)

I OP bfclKb lyyiUMlN I -UMBRA/TALENT KCYI 10LC//X1

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J was making the call at the request of Major General James O'Donnell,

commander of 5th AF.) The analyst at l ~j began reading a just-published UPI

dispatch:

A Korean Air Lines jumbo jet flying from New York to Seoul Wednesday with 269 people aboard,
including a U.S. congressman, was forced to land on Sakhalin, a Soviet-occupied island north of
Japan. The congressman was identified as Larry MacDonald, Democratic representative of
Georgia....

EO 1.4. (c)

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324

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(U) Washington

• II : | /p.L. 8 6-36

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EO 1.4. (d)

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EO 1.4 r '(d)

(Q//DI) Saturday afternoon an outraged secretary of state, George Shultz, who was the
ranking administration official in Washington that day, accused the Soviets of shooting
the aircraft down in cold blood. He stated that the the Soviets had tracked KAL-007 for 2
1/2 hours,

(0//DI)

arrived at the White House just before 1700 that

Saturday. They met in the Situation Room with NSC officials John Poindexter, Ken de
Graffenreid. Bob Kimmel. and Oliver North and[

The NSC people informed them that they would be

briefing President Reagan the next morning. 42

EO 1
EO 1

P.L. 86-36
EO 1.4. (c)

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P.L. 86-36

. (S//SI) returned to the White House at 08 00 Sunday, and

were ushered into the Cabinet Room, where they briefed the president.

The briefing lasted only ten minutes, but the questions
that followed went on for almost forty. Following that, the president conducted a highly
unusual Sunday morning press conference to condemn the Soviets and demand an
admission of guilt. 43

(U) Briefing President Reagan. Clockwise: President Reagan, George Shultz, Robert McFarlane,
William Casey, and Caspar Weinberger.

(U) On Monday evening Reagan went on television again to repeat his charges and
outline a program of sanctions against the USSR. To back up his charges, he played part of
the tape. At the same time, administration officials were appearing on TV talk shows to
condemn the Soviet shootdown. The State department frantically rounded up support for
sanctions from friendly capitals. It was a full-scale propaganda blitz. 44

(U) Moscow

(U) The Soviets went into public denial. In the first official press release from Moscow,
almost twelve hours after the shootdown and some nine hours after debris was confirmed
floating on the ocean, Tass reported an encounter with an unidentified plane, which, it was
alleged, failed to respond to queries and continued on its way. The next day Tass still
denied any knowledge of the fate of the aircraft, but began hinting that it might have been
some sort of "spy flight." It was not until Sunday, September 3, that Soviet official sources

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328

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admitted that it might have been the missing KAL flight; but they reiterated that it was
undoubtedly on an espionage mission. 45

(U) The spy scenario was one that the Soviets repeated and embellished. A writer in
the Moscow Literaturnaya Gazeta for September 7 alleged that KAL-007 was "...a
provocation hatched a long time ago and carefully prepared by the US CIA." He went on:
"It is universally known that Boeing passenger aircraft are equipped with modern control
instruments and also that they can be fitted with the most advanced intelligence
gathering intruments to carry out highly secret assignments." 46

(U) The Soviets did not finally admit that they had shot the aircraft down until
September 6, three days after President Reagan had played the incriminating tapes. They
expressed regret that it had proved to be a civilian aircraft, but held the U.S. "fully
responsible," in line with their contention that its flight course had been charted by the
CIA. 47

(U) Nikolay Ogarkov

(U) On September 9, with worldwide criticism mounting, the Soviets took the
unprecedented action of putting the chief of their general staff on television to explain the
Soviet side of the story. Nikolay Ogarkov proved to her an articulate spokesman for the
Soviet story, gesticulating at the flight route on the map and hammering away at the spy
theme: It has been proved irrefutably that the intrusion of the South Korean airlines
plane into Soviet airspace was a deliberately, thoroughly planned intelligence operation.
It was directed from certain centers in the territory of the United States and Japan. A
civilian plane was chosen for the mission, deliberately disregarding or, possibly, counting

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EO 1.4. (c)

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on the loss of human life. American radars, he asserted, tracked the flight (ignoring the
V\ laws of physics which prevented that) and would have warned the plane had it not been a

\\ spy flight. He contended that it flew in tandem with the RC-135, in a pattern designed to

V- confuse Soviet air defense, then broke off into Soviet territory, deliberately evading

\ \ pursuit. 48

(3//3I-3FQKE) A by-product of the press c onference was Ogarkov's assertion that the

Sukhoi pilot fired cannon bursts at the airliner.

— (0//0I-0POKB) Soviet reactions to KAL-007 were a product of history. The insular
nature of the regime had produced over years an obsessive concern with safety and secrecy,

I The 1983 shootdown was, in fact,

TpD^crBCT/fmiwiiMT nairr n , n nrni r . rr i rrvi i ^| py i

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preceded by a similar incident involving a Korean Airlines commercial flight five and a
half years earlier. On April 20, 1978, a KAL 707 flying from Par is to Seoul by way of
Anchorage strayed into Soviet airspace over the Kola Peninsula.

EO 1.4. (c) — (9//3I-3PQKE) The Soviet concern for border security had escalated to paranoid
intensity by August of 1983. The Reagan administration's campaign of psychological
warfare and border probing had been bringing up the temperature for two years. Soviet
tempers boiled over in April of 1983 as a result of the U.S. naval exercise in the Sea of
Okhotsk.

(U) «eiv York

(U) U.S. ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick represented the United States at the UN. The
Reagan administration intended to lay the wood to the Soviet Union, and she was well
equipped to do this. Acerbic even in calm seas, she could be ferocious in a fight.

(U) After listening to denials from the Soviet ambassador, she launched an attack
reminiscent of Adlai Stevenson's charge during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. She
played the tape J

L following which she made a point-by-point refutation of

Soviet denials and evasions: Contrary to Soviet statements, there is no indication
whatsoever that the interceptor pilot made any attempt either to communicate with the

EO 1.4. (c)

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331

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airliner or to signal it to land.... at no point did the
pilots raise the question of the identity of the
target aircraft.... At a distance of two kilometers,
under the conditions prevailing at the that time,
it was easily possible to identify a 747 passenger
airliner. Either the Soviet pilot did not know the
Korean plane was a commercial airliner, or he did
not know what he was firing at [sic]. 53 Her
interpretation of what had happened was near
perfect, and her language was supported by the
voice transcript. Her more general charge later
in the speech about historic Soviet brutality and
disregard of international law had much less to do
with the evidence, and was part of the Reagan
administration's diplomatic offensive against the
USSR. KAL-007 simply opened the door of
opportunity .

(U) Jeane Kirkpatrick

(U) The Postmortems

?0 1.4. (c)

(U) When it was all over, the intelligence community, as well as the journalistic world,
had some reassessing to do. What did the Soviets know, and when did they know it? What
did the intelligence community know, and how did they use it? And what contributions
did the White House make to the situation?

(U) To answer the last question First, the White House pounced on the shootdown and
squeezed it dry of propaganda value. It was one of those opportunities that comes but once
in a lifetime. There is no question that the Reagan administration made the very, very
most of it. In years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a Russian journalist
assessed it as the single most disastrous propaganda defeat they ever suffered. 54

TOP SKRET//COM1MT UMBRA/TALC M T KCY I IOLC//X1

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P.L. 86-36

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JSUSif

_/lt was an example of how quickly a large and far-flung bureaucracy could

move once pri cked. It is hard to see how anyo ne could have done better. Seymour Hersh,
one journalist singled out NSA for excellence and for a non-

political approach. (He did not, however, have kind words for the Reagan people.) !

/ (T0//0I-UMDRA:

William Casey

decreed on September 21, 1983, that "...it is now time to circle the wagons and stop
talking." But the Reagan administration, in some ways the most porous in memory, could
not seem to stop talking. 58

tS//SI-3F0KE) And, finally, how culpable were the Soviets in the i ncident?
^ . [ Xxiven the paranoia

that had existed since April, it was unthinkable that such a penetration could be permitted
without action. A scenario like that would place everyone's jobs at stake.

(U) The Soviet SU-15 pilot claimed that he did not recognize it to be a civilian airliner.
Flying in the dim light of an early dawn, with the cabin blacked out so passengers could
sleep, it could have looked like a military aircraft from a distance. The size of the
silhouette, the rotating beacon, argue the opposite case. But far more egregious errors of
visual identification are made every day, and were made during the attack on the Liberty
in 1967, to name just one case.

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EO 1.4. (c)

333

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EO 1.4. (c)

was the Reagan people who insisted that the Soviets could not have mistaken a 747 for a
707. That was their value judgment. It was wrong, but not so wide of the mark that one
can inpute anything more sinister than righteous wrath. It was the height of the Second
Cold War.

(U) VERIFICATION

(U) SALT II was never ratified by the Senate, thus leaving a huge question mark
about the fate of strategic arms limitation. In the absence of a ratified treaty, however,
both sides decided independently to abide by the provisions of the draft. When Reagan
became president, that was how matters stood.

(U) Reagan, too, continued the informal arrangements that the Carter administration
had left him. But under Reagan there was much less trust. The issue of a "Soviet strategic
breakout" from the treaty was never far from anyone's mind, and the intelligence work to
discover such a "breakout" was intense. In late 1982 intercepted telemetry from a Soviet
missile test showed 95 percent encryption, the first time Soviet telemetry encryption had
ever hit that level. The intelligence community assessed that above 70 percent amounted
to denial of capability to monitor treaty compliance. The next year, as the debate of
telemetry encryption continued to rage, an advisory committee reported to the president
on a long history of Soviet arms control treaties, including SALT I. The report reinforced
Reagan's natural tendency to distrust the Soviets anyway. 59

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334

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•fSHn 1983, the Reagan administration decided that all future U.S. ICBMs would have
encrypted telemetry, partly in retaliation for the earlier Soviet decision to encrypt theirs.

and U.S. telemetry became unreadable. 62

In this case the defense won,

(U) The Relocatable Targets Problem

- (S//SH Monitoring the Soviet operational force was the key to SALT verification.

EO 1.4. (c)

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335

*©QGIB* 3S0734 9

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(U) The Sovi ets introduced the SS-20 in 1977. The SS-20 was an IRBM with a range of

5,000 kilometers.

This made it a threat to NATO forces. But the real news about it was its mobility. The SS-
20 was the first/relocatable strategic missile in the inventory. 67 .

(ID SS-20

-4SH>S-20 units moved into former SS-4 and SS-5 sites in the western USSR, and in the
Far East they occupied former SS-7 complexe s. By the mid-19 80s the Soviet SRF had ten
SS-20 divisions composed of 48 regiments and Units in garrison were not

fully operational - to achieve that, the unit had to go to the field.

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EO 1.4 . (c)

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•fS) Following on the heels of the SS-20 was a new threat - the SS-25 ICBM. With a
range, of 10,500 kilometers and a deployment MO similar to the SS-20, the SS-25 soon
became the highest priority in the intelligence community. The first units became
operational in 1985. 69

EO 1.4. (c)

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•fS) The relocatable target problem continued to be a research effort until 1985. Then,
in July of that year, the intelligence community got its marching orders, in the form of
NSDD-178. The directive was specific and unambiguous. It directed the Department of
Defense "to develop a program to provide a capability to attack relocatable targets with
U.S. strategic forces...." Soviet relocatable targets would be placed at risk and kept that
way beyond the year 2000. "At risk" was defined as having the ability to destroy at least
50-75 percent of the force. 76

■(S) NSDD-178 generated money and priority. Essentially, the intelligence community
was to remove all stops to find relocatable targets. The effort was headed by the Mobile
Missile Task Force, a multi-agency committee set up within DoD to direct the effort. 77

TO P 3CCnCT//COMI N T - U M 0riA/TALCNT KCVI IOLC//X1

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(U) Notes

■^P.L. 86-36

1. (U) Interview
NSA.

by Tom Johnson anc

16 September 1997, OH 15-97,

3. (U) Interview

4. (Uf~"~~

]20 July 1992, OH 1-92, NSA.

interview. Carter Presidential Library, NSF, in CCH Series XVI.I., "Poland."

5. (U) Washington Post, 27 September 1992. Zbigniew Brzezinski,Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National
' Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: Straus, Giroux, 1983), 465-68. Bernstein and Politi, 259.

6. (U) Carter Library, NSF, PDB, 2 December 1980.

EO 1. 4. (c)

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8. (U

interview.

9. (U) CCH Series XII. M| p apers,

10. (U)Ibid. Ploss,Mosco w| ~

11. (U) CCH Series XII.M.

12. (U) Ibid.

13. (U)Inman interview.

76;

14. (U)

15. (U) Ibid. ... / :

16. (U)Ibid. JohnPrados, "The WarScareof 1983," Miiitory HistorvQi^rterij-CSpring 1997),.9c 63-73. Anatoly .
Dobrynin,7n Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York:
Times Books Division of Random House, 1995), 522-23.

17. (U)

For the President's Eyes Only, 475. Prados, "The War Scare of

1983," 68.

18. (U) Facts on File, 604.

19. (U) CCH Series XII.D.

20. (U) interview.

21. (U) ESC, A Historical Monograph of the KAL 007 Incident (San Antonio: Kelly AFB, 1984)/ in CCH.Series
X.J. ' // /

22. (U) DDIR files, Bos 2, "KAL-007"; Box 2,

23. (U) CCH Series VHI.35 1

]A2505 Memo 27 June 1984.

24. (U) ESC, Historical Monograph....

25. (U) Tower conversations quotedin Amembassy Tokyo message 051354Z September 1983, as provided from
Japanese authorities. Typewriter barMessage contained in CCH Series VII1.35.

26. (U)ESC, Historical Monograph....

27. (U ^interview. ESC, Historical Monograph.

28. (U) Interview
18-86, NSA.

iy Tom Johnson, 12 June 1986, OH

29. (U) ESC, Historical Monograph....

30. (U) ESC, Historical Monograph. To add to the mix, South Korean television reported shortly after 0900 that
the flight had been forced down by the Soviets and had landed safely on Sakhalin Island. This appeared to have

EO 1.4. (c)

•P.L. 86-36

"EO 1.4. (c)

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341

DOCID : 380734 9

E.G 1.4. ( c )

TOP SECRET//COM1NT-UMDRA/TALCNT KCYIIOLP/XI

been pulled out of thin air and may have been done to calm families wa iting at Kim po Airport for th e flight to

arrive, according t

See interview

by Robert

Farley and Tom Johnson, 15 April 1986, OH 14-86, NSA,
■ 31. (U) ESQ, Historical Monograph.....
32. (U) Interview.

ESC, Historical Monograph....

33\(U) ESC, Historical Monograph.... Interview J

34. (U) CCH Series Xli j ~

35. (ujl

]nCCH

Series VIII.35.

36. (U) In terviewf
Interview,

by Robert Farle^ and Tom Johnson] 20 February 1986, OH 9-86, NSA.

by, Robert D. Farley and Tom Johnson, 10 October 1986, OH

24-86, NSA.

37. (U) | [ i
in II.B.

nterview.

interview,

iew£

38. (U) Interview,

interview. Interview,^

interview. OCH Series VIII.35, message series

by Tom Johnson and Robert D. Farley, lo April{1986, OH 13-86 , NSA. [

by Tom Johnson, 1 ; September 1998, OH 1998-19/NSA.

39. (U j [ nterview. .-,

40. (U) DDIR MembJto William Clark, William Casey, Withers, 1 September 1983, in CCH Series VIII.35.

41. (U) Schultz press conference, 1 September 1983, in CCH Seriei? VIII 35. CCH Series XI.R. Dobrynin, In
Confidence, 536. \

42. (U] | | summary of events can be found ihCCH Series VIII.35.;

43. (U) IWO Press Review, in CCH Series XI.R. Interview,
D. Farley, 18 December 1985, OH 19-85, NSA\

by Robert

44. (U) IWO Press Review, 6 September 1983, and State Department KAL Working Group Report #3, in CCH
Series VIII.35. '•, ... \ \ \ i.\ \ ill

45. (U) FBIS Bulletins in CCH Series VIII.35. . v.\ \ j i |

46. (U) CCH Series VIII.35. According to Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin, Andropov,
though convinced that the CIA had used the aircraft for espionage, was highly upset that it had been shot down
and wanted to "come clean" with the foreign press. He was talked out of it by; Defense Minister Ustinov. See In
Confidence,537-S. . ■. '

47. (U) IWO Press Review for 7 September 1983, in CCH Series XI:R. '■ '

48. (U) FBIS item 118 from Moscow domestic service, in CCH Series VIII.35,:

49. (U: interview; " " P-L- 8 6-36

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TOP5CCnCT//COMIMT-UMDnA/TALi:WTKi:YllOLC//X1

50. (Uf

tn CC.H Series VIII.35. All important Soviet sources confirm that

the decision was ma.de in the Far East. See, for instance, Dobryriin,' In Confidence, 538. (Dobrynin also confirms
that the radar system on Kamchatka was basically inoperative that night.)

a -copy -can be'found ifl'CCH Series VIII.35.

51. (U)

Other facts about the incident came from Facts on File, 28 April 1978.

52. (U) NSA/CSS message 261419Z August 1983, in CCH Series VIII.35

53. (U)New York Times, 7 September 1983, 15, in CCH Series VIII.35.

54. (U) Washington Post, September 1,1996, in CCH Series VIII.35. Reagan Library, NSF, in CCH Series XVI.J,
"KAL007."

55. (U) P05 critique, undated, in CCH Series VIII.35. Faurer interview.

56. (U) Seymour M. Hersh, The Target is Destroyed: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America
Knew About It (New York: Random House, 1986).

57. (U) DIRNSA message to | \ f ■■March -1985; in CCH Sertes VIir.35:

58. (U) DCI memo, 21 September 1983, in CCH Series VIII.35.

59. (U) Reagan Library, NSF, in CCH Series XVI .J, "SALT Monitoring." . ' .

60. (U) Folder on arms control and SIGINT, in CCH Series XII.D.

61. (U) Ch A2 files, Box 3, "RT Location Project." DEFSMAC papers, paper dated'i994. QMR, 1/79. NSA

Archives, acc nr 25759, CBOL 16
1983), 79.

62. (U) Ch A2 files. Box 3, "RT Location Project,"

MquisitAoiii," CryptologicQtiarterty (Winter

62. (U) Interview,
Instrumentation Signals, June 1987, in CCH Series XII.D.

63. (U)Ibid.

by Tom Johnson; 27 July 1998, OH 1.3-98;' NSA. , SISR Vol IV, Foreign

64.

:J"I.UII U1J I

Crypto logic

Quarterly (Spring 1997), 75-89.

65. (U) NSA Archives, acc nr 420-83Z, H03-0503-1.

66. (U) Informal interview with

67. (U) Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 1989, issue

68. (U)ChA2files,Box2.

by Tom' Johnson, 4 February 1997.

EO 1.4. (c)

69. (U) Ch A2 files, Box 3, "RT Location Project.'

70. (U) Interview

by Tom Johnson, OH 12-96, NSA Interview,

by Tom Johnson, 23 May 1996, OH 15-96, NSA.

71. (IT literview. Ch A2 files, Box 3, "RT Location Project."

16 1.4. (c)

Pi. 86-36

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343

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I OH SblKb I /yt-UMIN 1-UIWBKA) 1 ALENT Kfc t 'HOLE//X 1

72. (U | j interview. Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue 22, September 1996.

73. (U) nteryiew.

74. (U)CCH Series VI.PF.7.1. ' """^P.L. 8 6-36

75. (U) Ibid. ..==•■/■'

76. (U | fe les, Box 3, "RT Location Project"; ^elocatabie Targets Master Plan"; Box 4, "A2 Ops, General."

77. (U)CCH Series VI.PF.7.1. : . ' /

78. (U) | liles. Box 2,1 | *;Box3. r F inal Report": Box 3, "RT Location Project"; Box 3,

"Project Illustration." nterview |- .. j lnjterview.

79. (U)|

***vww- : - :: - !! "eO 1.4. (c)

80. (U j | fiies, Box 3; "Rf Location Project"; Box 4, "CSPAR Steering Group."

81. (U) interview.

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(U) Chapter 23
The Rise of Terrorism and
Unconventional Targets in the 1980s

(U/ /FOUO ) The U.S. SIGINT system had developed a modus operandi in dealing with
military targets which drove the functioning of the system for many years. When faced
with other types of targets, however, the system tended to become unstuck and
dysfunctional. Paradoxically, the Reagan period, with its focus on Soviet strategic forces,
became the time when the system was first wrenched into a response to unconventional
targets.

■ (3//3I)"They had been there all the time, of course. One of the earliest targets of the
post- World War I period were the rumrunners, a target that virtually defined the
successful Coast Guard SIGINT effort in the interwar period. The establishment of NSA
was due partly to CIA's insistence |

[

But resources were hard to come by, and most of the money went to
watching the Soviets and fighting the Vietnam War. P-L- 86-36

tS//SI-) I n the late 1960s, as SIGINT budgets b egan to slide, some of NSA's prime
contractors, attempted to sell their wares on the

international market J "

.£0 1.4. (c)

(U) TERRORISM

(U) The single biggest factor in nonmilitary targeting, however, was the rise of
international terrorism. Originating in the Middle East as an Arab reaction to successive
military defeats at the hands of Israel, the disease spread to Northern Ireland in 1969, to
the Basque country of northern Spain in the 1970s, and elsewhere. From 1968 to 1970
terrorist incidents worldwide increased 113 percent each year, and 24 percent from 1970 to
1972. The infamous Palestinian assault at the 1972 Munich Olympics was followed by a
brief decline in incidents, but in 1976 they began to rise again - 41 percent each year from
1975 to 1978. Moreover, terrorists shifted their attention from property to people. In 1970
half the incidents were directed against people, but in 1981, 80 percent were. 3

- (TS//fir ) NSA's response was delaye d by organization and methodology. From the
latter standpoint, international terrorism

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(S//SI) The other problem was organizational. It was not until after the Munich
Olympics that NSA created an organization whose task was, specifically, international
terrorism.

(TS//SI - UMBRA) In 1981, following the conclusion of the Iranian hostage crisis, Dick
Lord, who was then chief of G, commissioned a study to see if NSA could do better than it
had been doing on the terrorist problem. At about the same time the fledgling Reagan
administr ation directed that all intelligence agencies devote more resources to counter-
terrorism.

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i^iy 'Airline Hijackings

1.4. (c)

(S//SI) Terrorism in the 1980s was dominated by a series of high-profile hijackings.
Most, though not all, were orchestrated by Middle Eastern political organizations like
Amal and Hezbollah. President Reagan, like President Carter before him, was seized by
these incidents, and each in turn claimed the total attention of his NSC staff until it was
resolved. Likewise, most of the intelligence available to the NSC during the course of
hijacking operations

(U) Typical of these support operations was the reporting series on TWA 847. Hijacked
by Islamic terrorists on a flight from Athens to Rome on June 14, 1985, the flight was
diverted to Beirut. Over the ensuing three days it played hopscotch across the

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(U) Trans World Airlines 847

Mediterranean between Algiers and Beirut. At one of its Beirut stops the terrorists
executed an American naval enlisted man, Robert Stethem, and threw his body on the
tarmac beside the plane. They threatened to execute many more. On June 16 the plane
departed Algiers for the last time and came to rest in Beirut. There ensued two weeks of
diplomatic negotiations among the United States, Israel, Syria and the Amal organization
under Nabih Barri. Ultimately, Syrian president Hafez al-Assad of Syria obtained the
release of the American hostages from TWA 847, in return for the Israeli release of several

(U) The flight of TWA 847

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hundred Lebanese Shiite captives being held illegally in Israeli jails after an Israeli army
raid into southern Lebanon. The hijackers never succeeded in their primary aim - the
release of seventeen terrorists being held in Kuwaiti jails.

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(U) Briefing President Reagan

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(U) THE WAR ON DRUGS

(U) Although the federal government had always been concerned about drug
trafficking, the first significant effort did not occur until 1972, with Nixon's "War on
Drugs." This campaign was mostly words and was soon drowned out by the Watergate
affair. President Ford created the Drug Enforcement Administration, and under Jimmy
Carter the State Department got involved through the creation of the Bureau for
International Narcotics Matters. But it did not receive much push until the
administration of Ronald Reagan. Although the Reagan approach came to be symbolized
by Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" advice on the use of drugs, Reagan's thrust was to stop
drugs before they arrived in the country. The idea was that, eventually, there would be
nothing to say No to.

(U) Faced with rising complaints about
the burgeoning drug trade in Florida, in
1982 Reagan created the South Florida
Task Force, an unfunded consortium of
federal and state agencies involved in
combatting drugs and the drug trade. In
order to give it prestige, Reagan named his .
vice president, George Bush, to head the
task force.

(U) Growing out of this was the
National Narcotics Border Interdiction
System, or NNBIS, an attempt to combat
drug smugglers at U.S borders. Under
NNBIS, the federal government organized
six regional centers in New York, Chicago,
Long Beach, El Paso, New Orleans and
Miami. Each center was staffed by
representatives from participating
agencies - fourteen on the federal side,
including DEA, FBI, Customs, Coast (U)GeorgeBush
Guard, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms (BATF), Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Border Patrol.
Associated with it were more than 14,000 state and local law enforcement agencies. 47

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lOf bbCKbiyyCUlVIINI-UWBRAy T ALb i a i tKEYMOLE//X1

"!P.L. 8 6-36

(U/ /FOUO) Intelligence support for the effort was critical, and. NSA was called in
almost immediately. In 1983 NSA sent a representative!

m response to a specific request from the vice president's office. Later, the Agency
sent representatives

(S//SI) From the first, legal issues drove much of the effort. The Posse Comitatus Act
prohibited defense organizations from participating in law enforcement except in certain
very narrowly defined circumstances relating to the information having been collected as
incidental to the foreign intelligence mission. In May of 1983 NSA, under pressure to
assume a more proactive stance, requested clarification of the rules of engagement. The
kp 1 . 4 . ( c) Department of Justice reply was not an especially useful restatement of the rule that the

information could be disseminated to the Coast Guard and Customs Service as a by-
product of NSA's foreign intelligence mission. But t he next year the attorney general
issued a new set of guidelines which loosened the rules.

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— (3//Sf) When SIGINT support began, law enforcement agencies were enthusiastic, and
all kinds of partners turned up in NSA's antechamber. One of the closest working
relationships was with the Coast Guardj

— (S//SI) Other partnerships were more difficult. The Drug Enforcement Administration
had no experience with foreign intelligence organizations, working instead with the law
enforcement authorities in various countries. Unlike the FBI, DEA had no experience in
using SIGINT leads to help an investigation, and chafed under any restrictions regarding
the use of evidence in court. If SIGINT could not be introduced at trial, many in DEA did
not understand its value. 54 In the late years of the decade, relations with DEA cooled.

(U/ /FOUO) Once involved in counternarcotics, NSA disc overed a big wide world of
SIGINT efforts beyond the confines of NSCID 6.j "~~

(U) The Asian drug problem, though far less visible to the administration, was of much
longer standing. At least 90 percent of the world's opium came from Burma, Iran,
Afghanistan and Lebanon, and the Golden Triangle (a point where the borders of Burma,
Laos and Thailand meet) was the single most productive area. In Burma, the Shan United
Army (SUA), a nation unto itself, managed the reduction of raw opium into # 4 heroin (a
process that reduced its volume by a factor of ten) and transportation, often by pack

EO 1.4. (c)

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animals, over the border into Thailand for onward shipment. Owing to the complete lack
of cooperation of the Burmese and Laotian governments, opium production rose
dramatically in the 1970s. 57

(U) Shan United Army (SUA)
drug shipment

The push came from the
U.S. Army. In 1971 it was estimated that
between ten and fifteen percent of U.S.
troops in Southeast Asia were addicted. In
the United States, the dramatic rise in drug
addiction prompted President Nixon's War
on Drugs campaign.

EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

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(U) SIGINT AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

jProject VENONA had resided in that office. As productive as venona !

had been, it represented ! | .

/ . i

(U) CIA, too, had fallen on parlous times. The counterintelligence division headed by \

James Angleton had acquired a lurid reputation (made famous by David Martin's book A \ 2.4. ( c )

/ Wilderness of Mirrors). CIA director William Colby had fired Angleton in 1974, and in the j

ensuing commotion the counterintelligence mission had been virtually shut down. 64 |

(S//SI) The resurrection began in 1981 with the Casey regime at CIA. In response to \
I increasing intelligence community calls for more emphasis, NSA in 1983 created G14, the \

counterintelligence division. 65 j

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J This and Vienna had emerged in the 1980s as the key

international cities for KGB operations. (Pelton and Walker, for instance were both
summoned to Vienna for meetings; see page 412.) [

— B3//0I1 NSA's participation in counterterrorist, counternarcotics, and counter-
intelligence problems gave Agency people valuable experience in these nontraditional
areas. The pessimism of the late 1970s turned into optimism within ten years. Yes, SIGINT
could make a real difference, and NSA did not have to cede the field to HUMINT efforts.

| In the White House and the NSC staff, where it really counted, SIGINT had

become an integral part of the national security apparatus. It was to give the cryptologists
a big jump on the SIGINT problems that were to confront the nation in the post-Cold War
World.

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(U) Notes

1. (U)

available from CIA history office.

2. (U) Director of Central Intelligence, "Report on the Intelligence Community," January 1978, 37-38, in CCH \
Series VI.C.1.23. David Kahn, "Cryptology Goes Public," Foreign Affairs (Fall, 1979), 141-59.

P.L. 86-36

3. (U)

"International Terrorism and the National Security Agency: The Evolution of' a

Centralized Response," 1986, 2, unpublished manuscript in CCH files.

4. <U) Ibid., 6-8, 11.

5. (U> Ibid., 9-11.

6. (U) Interview!

Terrorism...," 6-11.

by Tom Johnson, 20 February 1997, OH 5-97, NSA,

"International

7. (U)

Quarterly, Vol 10 (Fall/W.inter 1991), 1-29.
8. (U)

Jpryptotogic EO 1.4. (c)

'International Terrorism...i" 13.

9. (U)Ibid.

10. (U)Ibid.

11. (U)Ibid.

August

»ustl997,OH 11-yV,

International Terrorism...," Ch:.HI.

' Ea'urec- interview. -Interview.

13. (U)

[interview.

by.Toni Johnson, 15

"International Terrorism...," Ch IV.

14. (U) NSGfiie 5750/15,

15. (U) Reagan Library, NSF, in CCH Series XVI.J, "Hijack of TWA 847."
June 1985 and follow-ups thereto, in CCH Series CII.D. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as
Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1 993), 653-664.

16. (U) Interview,

17. (U) | t nterview. Reagan Library, NSF, in CCH Series XVI.J

by Tom Johnson and Robert Farley, 20 February 1987, OH 7-87, NSA.

18. (U) Reagan Library, NSF,

"Sh'ultz's frustration appeared in his

autobiographical account of his years as secretary of state, Turmoil andTriumph..., 673.

19. (U) Henry Millington, untitled manuscript on the histor yT" | m CCH files. CCH Series VIII.45.

20. (U) CCH Series VIII.45.

21. (U) Memo from LTG Odom to William Casey, 12 May 1987, in CCH Series VIII.45.

22. (U) Memo from LTG Odom to George Shultz, undated, in CCH Series VIII.45.

EO 1.4. (c)

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23. (U) CCH Series VIII.42. | [ for the President's Eyes Only..., 464. According to journalist Bob

Woodward, this threat came from both HUMINT and SIGINT sources, and was considered highly credible by
Casey. See Woodward, Veil: TheSecretWarsoftke.CIA1981-1987(N<swYark: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 167.

24. (U) Interview

25. (U)Ibid.
26.

,.by Tom Johnson arid

2 January 1996, OH 1-96, NSA.

Woodward; Vefc:'

EO 1.4.

27. (Uj

28. (U

^interview. CCH Series VII1.51.1.; VIII.40, New'YorkTimes article 26 March 1986.

interview.

29. (U) CCH Series VIII.51.1.

30. (U)|_

31. (U) CCH Series VIII.51.1.

32. (U) l l in CCH Series XII.D.f

33. (U) interview.

Jri CCH Series XII.D.

^Pf.L. 8 6-36

Imterview.

34.

35. (U) NSOC logs available in CCH Series XII.D. CCH Series VIII.51.1:

36. (U) CCH Series VIII.51.1,

37. (U)New York Times, April 15, 1986, in CCH Series VIII.51.1. .

38.

39. (U) CCH Series i VIII.51.1. Deput y Director's files, 96026, Box It "Iran Situation V1986.? Interview, I |
[ bytom Johnson, 1 1 July 1997

40. (U) CCH Series VHI:5i.l.

41. (U) | ~) nterview. I

EO 1.4. (c)

42. (U) CCH Series VIII.42, VIII.51.1.

43. (U) Washington Post, August 2, 1994, in CCH Series VIII.51:1 .

44. (U) Ibid.

t in CCH Series VIII.D.I

jnterview. Duane R. Clarridge (with Digby

45. (u:

Diehl), A Spy for All Seasons: MyLife in the CIA (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1997), 332-33.

46. (U:

interview. Hylandihterview.

47. (U) CCH Series VII.75.

48. (U) Interview}"/"

49. (U)' '

by Robert Parley and Tom Johnson, 2 April 1987, OH 10-87, NSA.

iterview. CCH Series VII.75.

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50. (U)CCH Series VII.75

51. <U)CCH Series VII.75

52. (U) | i nterview. .Interview,

53. (U)Ibid.

54. (U) Ibid.

55. (U) | [ interview.

56. (U)Ibid.

57.4SAW-NSA, Foreign Relations Directorate, CDO

58. (U) Ibid.

59. (U) Ibid.

[article in Cryptolog (August-September 1986), 1.

jarticle. r I nterview.

by Tom Johnson, 10 September 19.97.

--^Sfe.L. 8 6-36

"Jfiles:

: "EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

6o.-(s#sw:do

6l.16#SryCDO

Interview,

Tom Johnson, 17 December .1996.

62. (U) Ibid.

63. (U | i nterview.

64. (U) Interview,

66. (U

and

by Tom Johnson, 25 September 1997.

Jto. SSCI, 13 November 1985, in CCH/Series XII.D., "C/I file." "Reasons

65. (U) Statement by
for the Creation of G14," in CCH Series XII.D.

interview. Reagan Library, NSF, in CCH Series XVI.J., "Counter-intelligence."

67. (U)Ibid.

68. (U)

interview. Memo from

and Casey testimony before SSCI, in CCH Series XII.D., "C/I File."

to Guy Vanderpool, 17 August 1987,

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(U) Chapter 24
Military Crises and SIGINT Support during
the Reagan Administration

EO 1.4. (c)

- CTQ//SI UMDRA) The effects of Vietnam lingered on in NSA's relationship with
military commanders. Through the late 1970s the JCS and NSA continued to squabble
over the ownership and employment of SIGINT assets, and a new JCS directive, "Concept of
SIGINT Support to Military Commanders," issued in 1982, failed to completely set things to
rest. Within NSA, however, there were new efforts to satisfy requests for SIGINT support
throughout the period. One of the key iss ues, which was rapidly b eing resolved by 1980,
was that of making available information through rapid sanitized

reporting.

(U// FOUO ) General Faurer probably struck the best balance between strategic SIGINT
management and military support mechanisms. It was paradoxical, then, that the biggest
disaster in the military support arena occurred during his administration. It was the
invasion of Grenada.

(U) URGENT FURY

(S//SI SPOKE) Grenada, a microscopic speck in the far eastern Caribbean Sea, had
virtually no name recognition for Americans before October of 1983. A British colony
since 1763, it had gained improbable autonomy in 1967 and complete independence seven
years later. Widespread dissatisfaction with its prime minister led to a coup and a new
leader, Maurice Bishop, a charismatic Marxist. Bishop appeared to fall under the
influence, of Fidel Castro's Cuba. Cubans began showing up in waves to "assist" the
Marxist regim e, and the government began co nstruction of a 9,000-foot runway near the

capital which,

would be ideal for Soviet Bloc military

aircraft. Then, just when the U.S. intelligence community was becoming concerned, the
Bishop government was supplanted on October 13 by a more radical movement under the
finance minister, Bernard Coard. Six days later Bishop and three other cabinet ministers
were executed under the direction of the army commander, Hudson Austin. J

(U) Amid the civil disturbances that spread throughout the island during the coup, the
Reagan administration became concerned about the fate of approximately 1,000 American
and other foreign nationals, and began considering a rescue mission. But the postulated
influence of Cubans in the situation undoubtedly weighed more heavily on their minds
than the fate of innocents. On October 14 the JCS was told to whip up an invasion plan in
very short order. General Vessey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requested an
implementation date of 25 October, less than two weeks away. 2

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(U) Owing to an extremely
compressed time schedule, the plan
was not a model of coordination.
Vessey decided at the outset to exclude
a number of peripheral organizations,
including the Strategic Air Command,
Defense Management Agency, NSA,
and four parts of the JCS staff, J4, J5,
the Deputy Directorate for Political-
Military Affairs, and the Public Affairs
Office. Vessey chose to rely entirely on
DIA for intelligence. This was done
partly for secrecy, partly because of the
short time schedule. 5

(S//SI ) The JCS decision to exclude
NSA and the Public Affairs Office
turned into a major fiasco. The
exclusion of NSA had been tried before,

(IT) St. George's, Grenada

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/ / (U) The operation succeeded, in the sense that the JCS got 8,000 U.S. troops onto the

/ / island, rescued nearly 600 Americans and 120 foreign nationals trapped by the political
/ / chaos, restored popular government, and eliminated the potential threat to U.S. lines of
/ | communications in the Caribbean. All this was accomplished with only nineteen
/ / Americans killed and 116 wounded. The main antagonists turned out to be the Cuban
I ; soldiers on Grenada, who had established a much more secure foothold than American

I / intelligence had suspected. 7

/ / (U) But it was recognized by everyone involved as a "learning experience" for a

military machine gone rusty since Vietnam. The post-operation critiques named
j j intelligence as one of the areas of failure, but did not come to the obvious conclusion that

? / intelligence was hamstrung by the JCS refusal to involve any agency but DIA in the

! / preparation. It also identified communications as an abysmal failure. In their haste, units

deployed without compatible CEOI (communications equipment operating instructions).
Secure voice equipments (i.e., Vinson-equipped radios) supplied by NSA could not talk to
/ ' each other because they did not have compatible key. On several occasions Army units on

the ground could not call the Navy vessels anchored just offshore for air and artillery
/ / support, and twice the Navy began bombing Army units, but the Army could not reach the

Navy to tell them to stop firing. In one well-publicized incident, an officer of the 82nd
Airborne Division had to use a pay phone on the island to call Fort Bragg to ask
I; authorities there to call the Navy. 8

// (U/ /FOUO) After the invasion a dispute erupted between NSA and the Pentagon about

// the exclusion from planning. This resulted in a commitment by the director of DIA,

\l Lieutenant General Williams, to routinely involve NSA in the planning, but this

// commitment lasted for only a few days - NSA was not even invited to the JCS critique

// sessions. 9 In reviewing the situation, General Faurer blamed the top man:

So General Vessey undoubtedly had his reasons and I applaud them for everybody but us. I
recognize the advantage of secrecy in what he did. I also recognize the difficulty of having secrecy
I in our government, but I have no sympathy for secrecy being used as an excuse for not finding a

way to get NSA involved.... 10

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(U) JUST CAUSE

/ (S//SI) The American military invasion of Panama in 1989 was as smooth as Urgent

Fury had been rocky. The crisis in American-Panamanian relations had been in slow-
/ motion evolution for several years, and this allowed the JCS to do long-range planning.

Many of the units involved in Grenada also participated in Just Cause and learned from

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the earlier experience.

(U) Following his successful Panama Canal Treaty negotiations, Panamanian
strongman Omar Torrijos enjoyed almost messianic popularity in his home country. But
Torrijos was killed in a plane crash in 1981, and the country was temporarily rudderless.
This did not last long, however ; A new strongman, Manuel Noriega, soon grabbed the
tiller. 14

(U) Noriega had joined the Torrijos
entourage soon after the ousting of the
Arias government in 1968. His
specialty was intelligence, arid he
worked closely with American military
intelligence people over the years,
attending special training at Fort
Bragg in 1967. When Torrijos died,
Noriega emerged as one of three
powerful army officers heading the
Guardia Nacional. But Noriega was
the smartest of the three, and soon
eased the other two into early
retirement. He gained control of the
Guardia and, through a succession of
figurehead presidents, the
governmental machinery. 15

(U) His relationships with the U.S.
were convoluted. Of all the Guardia
figures, U.S. intelligence regarded him
as the least appetizing, and the State
Department viewed his rise as a

scarcely mitigated disaster. But he proved a useful partner in many respects,

(U) Manuel Noriega

\ | U.S. military authoritiesatSOUTHCOM were forced to work

closely with him, but they did not enjoy the experience. His sexual escapades were
legendary, and it was rumored that he was involved with drug trafficking.

(U) Noriega's reputation, already vile among knowledgeable Americans, took a turn
for the worse when he "stole" the Panamanian elections in 1984. With his own man in the
presidency, the way appeared clear for him, but the next year a Noriega opponent, Dr.
Hugo Spadafora, was brutally murdered, and it was widely rumored that Noriega had
ordered the execution because Spadafora had exposed Noriega's drug dealings. In the
midst of the Spadafora crisis, Noriega replaced the mostly compliant president, Nicolas
Ardito Barletta, with an even more compliant operative, Arturo Delvalle. Alarmed, the
State Department sent its Latin American troubleshooter, Elliott Abrams, with National
Security Advisor John Poindexter, to warn Noriega to back off. The warning had little

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effect, partly because Noriega was deeply involved in supporting the Reagan
administration's undeclared war against the Sandinistas, and thus considered himself
invulnerable. 16

(U) With the onset of the Iran-Contra scandal in 1986, Noriega's usefulness came to an
end, and the Reagan administration began exerting considerable pressure on him to
reform. In June of that year, journalist Seymour Hersh published a New York Times
article exposing Noriega's drug trafficking, and Senator Jesse Helms opened a Senate
investigation into the matter. In February of 1988, two Florida grand juries
simultaneously indicted him for drug trafficking, and he became a fugitive from the
American judicial system. While all this was going on, Panamanians were rioting in the
streets, and the Guardia, which had been renamed the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF)
by Noriega, initiated brutal repression. The economy was in collapse, and under intense
pressure, Noriega agreed to "democratic" elections for May of 1989. Although the
elections occurred as scheduled, the opposition appeared headed for victory. Noriega then
annulled the elections and appointed his own man. 17

(0//0I) JCS planning for intervention in Panama had begun in 1988, following the
Florida indictments, in an operation code-named Blue Spoon. The operation envisioned a
quick military strike composed of SOUTHCOM troops on the ground, considerably
augmented by airborne troops from Fort Bragg, f"

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j / (S//SI) On December 16, Panamanian forces shot and killed a Marine officer. On the

I i same date, they detained and interrogated a Navy lieutenant and his wife. These two

I • incidents culminated months of calculated harassment by the PDF, and the next day

I } President Bu sh directed a military invasion, to begin in the early morning hours of

I j nP^.mV»»r20 f

(U) U.S. airborne soldier

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(S//SI SPOKE) Norieg a disappeared from view at t he outset of operation Just Cause,
and he was never located jntil he took refuge in the Papal

Nunciature on December 24. His last known location, during the evening of December 19,

~2 By the time troops were

on the ground, he had disappeared

(S//SI S POKE) The mystery was eventually cleared up by one of his bodyguards who
surrendered and was debriefed by U.S. intelligence, f

J Partway to Panama City, however, he split from his

convoy and headed for a recreation area outside the Torrijos-Tocumeh Airport, where he
had planned to spend the night with a prostitute. This dalliance was interrupted at about
10 that evening by a phone call from the minister of health, who reported that the
Americans were planning to invade. According to the bodyguard, Noriega ignored the
warning until he heard explosions at the airport. (It was the XVIII Airborne Corps
paradropping into the area.) In panic, he got into his car and drove around in circles for
the rest of the! night, not daring to stop anywhere for longer than a few minutes. The next
day he went to the .house of his secretary's husband's sister and stayed there until
December 24, when he sought Papal asylum. 27

(0//0I-SPOKE) Meanwhile,

HUMINT sent U.S. Special Forces

charging first in one direction, then in another, presumably hot on his trail. At one point
they invaded Farallon, finding hot coffee and still-smoking cigarettes, but no Noriega.
Everyone believed that they were only minutes behind, their quarry, but if the bodyguard
is to be believed, these forays were all blind alleys. He was never at Farallon, or, for that
matter, at any of the other hideouts the Army was monitoring. In all, Special Forces
conducted more than forty attempted snatch operations. 28

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(3//5I) There were other problems, too.

(U//F0U0) All in all, however, Just Cause did much to restore relationships between
SIGINTers and the supported forces. This relationship became critical during Desert Storm
two years later.

(U) Notes

1 . (U) NSA/P051 , "Grenada Invasion - A SIGINT Perspective," 1 February 1984, CCH Series VIII.36. Ronald H.
Cole, Operation Urgent Fury (Washington: JCS Joint History Office, 1997).

2. (U) Cole, Operation Urgent Fury. .

3. (U)Ibid.

4. (U)Ibid.

5. (U)Ibid.

6. (U) Memo, P53, Subject: USSS Support to Grenada Operations, 16 February 1984, in CCH Series XII.D.

7. (U)Ibid.

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8. (U) Telephone interview with

17 April 1998. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury.

9. (U) Cole, Operation Urgent Fury.

1 0. (U) Faurer interview.

11. (U) Unless otherwise annotated, information for this section was taken from

The.

12. (U) Inman interview. i

13. (U) Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, 467.

14. (U) Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Both and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama
(New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 4-5. j

', \

15. (U) Ibid.

' P.L. 86-36

16. (U) Ibid., 8-10.

17. (U

Support to Military Operations: NSA'sC6}^Vuii^n^&§t^tMn Just Cause,"
November 1991 MSSI thesis, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. .

18. <U) Ibid. 19 March 1990 memo fron | "After-Action Report," CCH Series VIII.l l.A.

19. (U l I thesis.

20. (U) Ibid. | I memo.

21. (U) XVIII Airborne Corps Briefing efiJtist Cause, in CCH Series VIII.l l.A.

22. (u | | et al., Operdjioh J ust Cause* XVIII Airborne Corps Briefing on Just Cause.

23. (U | | tliiesis. | | memo.,.

24. (u j [ memo. XVIII Airborne Corp Briefing.

25. (U) CCH Series . Vril.ll.A.

26. <U | jm emo.

27. (uj | - - - ~ EO 1 A(c)

28. (U | ~~|etal., Operation Just Cause, 104-06.

29. (U j j nemo.

30. (U)Ibid.

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(U) Chapter 25
Iran^Contra

(U) The Iran-Contra scandal dominated the newspapers during the second Reagan
administration. The affair hit the newsstands in October of 1986 when the Sandinistas
shot down an aircraft making arms deliveries to the Contras, and captured an American,
Eugene Hasenfus, who had been kicking pallets of material out the back end of the aircraft
for the Contras waiting on the ground. Almost simultaneously, a Lebanese newspaper
broke the story of attempts by the Reagan administration to free American hostages in
Lebanon with sales of arms. From that time on, it was never out of the press.

(U) CONTRA

(U) Ronald Reagan's Republican Party had generally opposed an accommodation with
Panama, and when Reagan was elected president there was some talk about trying to
reverse the treaty. But it was never a serious threat, and Congress chose to let the issue
ride, in hopes that arrangements with Torrijos would work out. Reagan's Latin American
focus was decidedly elsewhere - toward Nicaragua.

(U) The Nicaraguan Revolution and the Concern about Communist Subversion

(U) Nicaragua, in company with most Central American principalities, was a country
wracked by periodic revolution, military coups, tyranny and subversion. The situation
had gotten so bad that in 1912 President Taft had sent in the Marines. They stayed until
1933. In 1927, Henry Stimson was sent to the country to negotiate a political settlement.
He succeeded in obtaining the agreement of all but one general, Augusto Cesar Sandino.
Sandino fled to the hills with a few followers and tried to disrupt the American-sponsored
elections of 1928. He and his followers continued fighting a guerrilla war for seven years,
but in 1934 National Guard troops under an emerging strongman, Anastasio Somoza,
collared the obstreperous revolutionary and summarily executed him. Later that year
Somoza ousted the government and inaugurated forty-five years of dictatorship. 1

(U) Sandino remained the hero of the dispossessed, and the movement, which came to
be named after him, took on an anti-American hue. Somoza and his greedy family stayed
in power, imposing one of Latin America's least enlightened regimes on the defenseless
country.

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(U) By the early 1970s Somoza's son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was in power. Less
politically adept than his father, he fought off the growing Sandinista guerrilla movement
through brute force. His resort to force attracted the attention of Amnesty International,
as well as the liberal wing of the American Democratic Party, which demanded that
foreign aid to the Nicaraguan government be cut off. The issue resonated with President
Carter, but Carter had his hands full with other matters and tried to let the Nicaraguan
situation ride. Omar Torrijos, no stranger himself to strongman rule, once said, "...the
crisis in Nicaragua can be described as a simple problem: a mentally deranged man with
an army of criminals is attacking a defenseless population.. ..This is not a problem for the
OAS; what we need is a psychiatrist." 2

(U) On August 22, 1978, the Nicaraguan scene was permanently disrupted. On that
date an obscure Sandinista general, Eden Pastora, captured the National Palace while
congress was in session and extorted from Somoza a list of concessions, including releasing
various Sandinista figures from jail. Nicaragua went into a state of long-term turmoil,
with mob rioting, looting, government retaliation, executions, and the like. For almost a
year the country descended into chaos, a descent that was finally interrupted on July 17,
1979, when Somoza and his family finally left the country. The Sandinistas took over. 3

(U) The triumph of a viscerally anti-American revolutionary group in Nicaragua
presented the Carter administration with a square dilemma. Carter, always predisposed
toward such popular movements, on the one hand welcomed the overthrow of the odious
Somoza regime, while on the other tried to convince the Sandinistas not to throw in their
lot with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The U.S. promptly shipped $39 million in food aid to
Nicaragua.

(U) It didn't work. The Sandinistas turned slowly but surely toward Moscow. In
March of 1980 they signed a comprehensive economic, scientific and cultural agreement
with the USSR. In July, on the anniversary of the revolution, Fidel Castro was the most
prominent speaker. Cuban advisors moved into Managua. In the meantime, the
Sandinista leader, Daniel Ortega, announced that democratic elections were to be
postponed until 1985, and forced the moderate element, led by newspaper publisher
Violetta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo, into opposition. 4 ; ; OGA

(U) The problem for Carter was not Nicaragua, but the .tinderbox satrapies to the
north - El Salvador, Honduras and Guatejoala-i Following the treaty with Moscow, the
Nicaraguan support for similar guerrilla movements,

especially in El Salvador. Carter tried to play the issue both ways. In order to continue
foreign aid to Nicaragua (the carrot approach to Ortega and company), he publicly
certified th at the Sandinistas were not supplying arms to neighboring guerrilla
movements. Carter privately signed a

finding to support democratic elements (read Contras) in Nicaragua. Just before the
elections that would result in Ronald Reagan becoming president, the Sandinistas began
flooding El Salvador with arms in hopes of overthrowing the government outright. An
outraged Carter sent his ambassador, Anthony Pezzullo, to deliver a stinging rebuke to

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Ortega. Rejected, Carter continued arms deliveries to the repressive right-wing
government of El Salvador. 5

| | While Carter smoldered with pent-up fury at Sandinista perfidy, Reagan was
completely out front with it. The Republican platform for the election of 1980 called for the
overthrow of the Nicaraguan government. As soon as Reagan became president, he
suspended the final $15 million of a $75-million aid package for the country, and in March

that Carter had

begun. A finding of December 1981 stated that the American objective was to interdict the
flow of arm s to neighboring countries, rather than to overthrown the Nicaraguan
government, f •

(U) The Contra movement in Nicaragua had begun in 1980 as an inchoate agrarian
protest against government policies. As the Sandinistas swung to the left, the Contras got
stronger. There were small Contra groups in the south, unorganized at first, but led later
by the very same Eden Pastora who had begun his public life as a prominent Sandinista
general. In the north the groups were larger and better organized; they came to be
dominated by a unified organization under a former National Guard officer, Enrique

s Bermudez. Pastora and Bermu dez did not get along (for obvious ideological reasons, if

\ nothing else). Forced to choose,

(U) It is essential to understand the U.S. political conditions under which the guerrilla
war was being fought. A 1974 amendment to the annual Foreign Assistance Act, called
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, required the president to "find" that each covert activity
was "important to the national security of the United States," and that the president
report such operations to Congress "in a timely fashion." 8

(U) It had become customary to report such "findings" to the HPSCI and SSCI - that
constituted "notification." Thus Congress was aware of, and had acquiesced in, the Contra
operation. But in November of 1982 the "covert" effort was publicly exposed in the
nation's leading newspapers. This produced a great deal of congressional agitation for an
end to the effort, and resulted in a compromise, called the Boland Amendment, after
Edward Boland of Massachusetts, the Democratic chairman of HPSCI. According to the
amendment, no appropriations could be spent "for the purpose of overthrowing the
government of Nicaragua or provoking an exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras."
Although somewhat restrictive, the amendment dealt with intent, not activities. Support
to the Contras remained legal as long as its overt objective was not overthrow, just
interdiction of arms. But the next year, following the harbor mining episode (see page
391), a second Boland Amendment (called "Boland Two") prohibited the expenditure of
funds for the purpose of Contra support, whatever the motivation. This meant that, at
least for fiscal year 1985, the flow of aid would run dry. 9

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OGA

that the Nicaraguans had a good handle on

It was clear, long before Eug ene Hasenfus was shot down,

resupply .flights and that the

Sandinistas had shoulder-launched missiles that could bring them down. (This was how
the Hasenfus aircraft was grounded.) 15

(U) Eugene Hasenfus

(U) The Reagan administration's effort to
stop Sandinista subversion in Central
American ran into all sorts of political
problems. It had only a hair-thin majority
in Congress when, in April of 1984, The Wall
Street Journal released a story claiming that
CIA was helping mine Nicaraguan harbors,
thus endangering commercial shipping.
(Several ships, including a Soviet tanker

had been damaged.) The story created chaos
in Congress, where administration allies were delicately trying to steer the 1985 Contra
aid package to approval. Barry Goldwater broke openly with William Casey, alleging that
he had not been informed of the operation (not that he did not approve, however). Other
congressmen opposed a direct CIA presence in the operation. Aid was voted down, and the
administration was confronted with its first outright break in the funding cycle for its
Contra guerrilla groups. Aid was not restored in any fashion until the 1987 budget year.
But no sooner was aid reestablished than a Contra resupply flight was shot down in late
1986 with a CIA contractor, Eugene Hasenfus, aboard. Chaos again roiled the Contra
program. 17

(U) The Reagan effort against the Sandinistas was smart because it was broad-based.
Not putting its eggs in one basket, the administration funneled military aid to El Salvador
and Honduras, increased intelligence surveillance, and mounted a public information
program to build domestic support. Despite missteps like the harbor mining, they could
rely on Sandinista administrative incompetence and heavy-handed domestic repression. 18
Slowly, the tide began to turn.

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J The problem was not just CIA's dealings with its clients; it also related to the

legality of applying money to a problem whose spending authorization was constantly in
question. Sometimes money had been appropriated; sometimes it hadn't. Sometimes CIA

\ was trying a n end run around congressional restrictions by trying to use defense money.

{ actions required a legal ruling. Should an employee inadvertently step over a
line, would he or she be liable? And who would pay legal fees if the matter ever went to
court? It was not a moot question, as the Iran-Contra scandal would soon demonstrate.

(U)IRAN

(U) In the summer of 1985, Oliver
North, an obscure Marine lieutenant
colonel on the NSC staff, was running a
covert operation to try to get Western
hostages out of Lebanon. His primary
contacts were with Iranians, who were
presumably backing the Lebanese
terrorists holding the hostages. It
involved covert dealings with Israeli
intelligence, trips to Iran, and direct
dealings with an Iranian businessman
named Ghorbanifar. The operation
suffered from leaky security.

riky/m-UMDRA) - The matter
remained strictly a White Hou se affair
until, on September 12, 1985

Charlie Allen, the

NIO for counter-terrorism and the

(U) OBver North

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designated CIA contact point for Oliver
North's hostage release project,

■{SHn November of 1985, Ken deGraffenreid, the NSC staffer in charge of intelligence
issues, discovered that North was devising hand codes for use in the operation.
DeGraffenreid, who fully appreciated the insecurity inherent in such a bootleg code, called
NSA's | | Harry Daniels, the assistant deputy

director for information security (DDI), went to the White House that

afternoon an d discussed the .matter with deGraffenreid, and they decided that
/__ - ___ should give North a threat briefing. North understood the problem and
asked about COMISEC equipment. 22

P.L. 86-36

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-(St The problem was tangled. Nor th would need COMSEC equipment to secure his own

communications, but he did not tell who else might be invo lved in the

communications. The relationship With North broadened as continued to

work with him to protect the operation. In December, North told him that he was involved
in an effort t o free the hostages m Lebanon, and was dealing with Iranians. Thus,
understood from an early date that North was engaged in trying to extricate

! the hostages from Lebanon. 23

had limited choices. If

only U.S. government officials were involved,

first gave North

advising him that if he were

doing th e job.
unclear)

not satisfied, to come back. North soon called
say that the

to say that the] [equipment was not

Jthen provided a certain number (the precise number is
ind demonstrated their use to North in the White House

on at least-one occasion. " T "

(UZ /FOtTO ) Oh several occasions North's Iranian cont acts requested encryption
support/ and in /February of 1986 North Called | to ask for some encryption

equiprneht tHat "might fall into Iranian hands." , [delivered
equiprnent to North for this purpose, but the equipment was never actually Handed over to
the Iranians. 25

■(U//¥mm Unknown- to NSA and

^North had, in early 1986, decided to

mix the Iran and Contra, operations. He needed money to support the Contras, and could
get it by overcharging the Iranians for the missiles that they so badly wanted. But the two
operations got intertwined in other areas too. North used some .of

to secure

. . communications in Latin America in order to cover the drop zones where arms were being
suppli ed to the Contras. Some of this equipment might have been used by non-Americans.

on the other hand, were used to secure hostage-related communications,

.and some of them might have been made available to Israelis:

P.L. 86-36

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■(6)— There was no "standard operating procedure" for support to the White House.

|did things on the fly and did not keep good track of receipts, much less

monitor exactly how, and by whom, the equipment was being used. Because of the
sensitivity of the mission, he had little or no staff support. He kept the DDI, Walter
Deeley, and his deputy, Harry Daniels, informed, and also touched base with the DDO,
Dick Lord (who was primarily, concerned about Oliver North's method of operation) and
Robert Rich, the deputy director. He received general guidance to press ahead and give
the White House whatever it wanted, but to make sure that North understood

H e followed those instructions/'

(U/ /FOUO ) One of the consequences of the press exposure of Iran-Contra was exposure
of NSA's dealings with North on encryption gear. General Odom was outraged. He had
tried his best to keep NSA out of the scandal, and believed that he had done so, but the
North- |~ [ connection dragged NSA into the investigations. This produced an
investigation within NSA itself to determine if procedures had been followed. The NSA
insnsftnr ranpral rHgrnvprgH niimiwvi.is , prnpgdnral violations and concluded that some of
were still not accounted for. The hindsight report also

concluded that botl£

was more difficult to sort out the "What
investigation came up with clear contradiction b etween [
happened and Odom's. According tc

]hjad been "loaned" to foreign nationals. But it
would I have dohe . in his shoes" issue. The

version of what
he briefed Odom on the whple matter in
March of 1986 and got the approval to continue; according to Odom, this meeting never
happened. 28

(U/ /FOUO) There was no resolving the differing accounts, but because there were
procedural violations, Odom decided to discipline^
pay for fifteen days. I '

] suspending him without

3iired a lawyer and fought the charges. He appealed, and

a review panel ruled that the disciplinary action should be dropped and
legal fees (at that point amounting to about $40$0Q) be paid by the government. Odom
was reportedly furious at the board acti on and decided to lower the recompense of legal
fees to less than $10,000. appealed to Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci.

The appeal dragged on until 1988, when a new director, Admiral William Studeman, ruled
E avor. 29

(U/ /FOUO ) Outside of NSA, the
public radar. It never had the potential to rock the Agency the way Watergate had.

affair" was a very minor blip on the

But

inside NSA, it was one of the most divisive personnel issues in Agency history. It pitted a I
director determined to keep NSA out of public scandal against virtually the entire civilian i
hierarchy, determined to protect one of its own from retaliation that they perceived as \
scapegoatism. The puzzling gaps in chronology and differing recollections of what hadj
happened were never resolved. But the bottom line was a verdict in favor of [

by the investigative board, by one former director (Bobby Inman, a member of the board),
and by General Odom's successor, Admiral William Studeman.

(G//GI) But that was not the end of the affair. North had overcharged the Iranians for
the weapons, and had siphoned the profits (which amounted to several million dollars) into

P.L. 86-36

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special bank accounts to fund the Contra operations during periods when congressional
funds were either not appropriated or outright prohibited. A special prosecutor, Lawrence
Walsh, was called in to investigate the possible illegal diversion of funds to the Contras.

(0) Judge Lawrence Walsh

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This approach had worked with in the Pelton investigation in 1985 and during the Church
Committee hearings a decade earlier.

(U) It did not work with Walsh's team. The prosecutors, failing to appreciate the
sensitivity of the information, structured an indictment of North that madef

J central ToTn^tJs^e^rms virtually guaranteeing that North's attorney, Brendan

Sullivan, would request their use in court. The inevitable Sullivan request was a classic
case of "grey mail" - a demand to introduce documents in court, the sensitivity of which
guaranteed that prosecutors would not use them. Sullivan alleged that the reports would
show that North's superiors in the NSC were being kept informed of the operation at every
step. Walsh wanted to use them for the opposite purpose - to depict in considerable detail
how the arms-for-hostages operation functioned. 33

(U/ /FOUQ) Sullivan's requesi xm<^efd^£^~fiigrce]9i^raie betweerj"

NSA and the Walsh team. Walsh simply could not....understand"NSA's concerns about

and contended that, since aspects of NSA ! s mission had
already been discussed in the press, revealing | ~ ivould do no further

damage. In December of 1988 NSA and the Walsh team tried to patch together a
compromise position, but could not arrive at an agreement that the federal judge, Gerhard
Gesell, would accept. In a climactic meeting on December 21, Walsh confronted NSA's
general counsel, Elizabeth Rindskopf, who refused to back down. The matter was referred
to the attorney general, Richard Thornburg, who backed Rindskopf. Walsh, in frustration,
moved to dismiss the conspiracy counts which were the centerpiece of the indictment
against Oliver North. 34

(U) Although the principals in the Iran-Contra investigation were ultimately
pardoned, the decisive moment had actually been reached on December 21, 1988. It was a
constitutional crisis nearly as significant as that which nearly brought an end to
Executive Department cooperation with the Pike Committee in 1975 (see Vol III, 97-98).
Once again, the sensitivity of NSA materials was the centerpiece of the dispute, and once
again, the administration came down on the side of NSA.

(U) Like Otis Pike, Walsh never forgave the intelligence community, and specifically
NSA. He viewed the Agency's conduct as part of a Reagan administration conspiracy to
thwart the Iran-Contra investigation and free North, Poindexter, McFarlane and others
involved in the operation. In his account of the investigation he discussed the forces
arrayed against him:

If I had overlooked the invisible forces On Capitol Hill, I had also underestimated the power of the
formidable departments and agencies responsible for national security. The national security
community comprised the largest and most protected government entities, each with its own legal
staff....We had not begun to address our greatest vulnerability, which derived from the national
security community's power to overclassify information to prevent the full exposure of its
misconduct. 35

He never seemed to consider the inherent sensitivity of the source - to Walsh, it was all a
smokescreen intended to hide malfeasance.

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(U) Notes

1. (U) Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American. Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990 (New York: Free Press,
1996), 21.

2. (U) Ibid, 81.

3. (U) Ibid., 56-77.

4. (U) Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affair (New York: Hilland Wang, 1991).

5. (U) Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 16.

6. (U) Draper, A Very Thin Line, 16. Examples of

samples retained at NSA, in CCH Series XVI.J, "Miscellaneous."

7. {V)Kagan,A TwilightStruggle, 148-50. Draper, A VeryThinLine, 17.

8. (U) Draper, A Very Thin Line, 13- 14.

9. (U) Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 321-22, 337. Draper, A Very Thin Line, , Ps2& : ::

by Toiii3ohnson, 13 January 1997.

r Interview with

Were found in the Reagan Library, NSF, and

... • EO 1.4(c)

<::#P.L. 86-36

10. (U) Interview with

11. (U

manuscript on the histor

January 1997. NSA Archives, accnr 40991, H03-0405-7.

by Tom Johnson, 30

12. (u:

1997.

13. (U) NSA Archives, acc nr 44850, H03-061 1-2. ;:

14. (U

interview. . Interview wijl

by Tom. Johnson, 29 January

15. (U) NSA Archives, acc nr 461 17, H04-0210-7.|
files, "Documents."

interview. NSA Archives, accnr 46117, H04-02 10-7. /

interview. NSA retired records, 96567, GC Iran-Contra

16. (u:

interview.

17. (U) Kagan, A Twilight Struggle^!! '-81.

18. (U) Ibid.

19. (U) NSA Archives, acc nr 46117, H04-0207-7

nterview.

NSA Involvement...., 103.

20. (U) Odom interview. Interview, Robert Mueller; OH 6-98, NSA. NSA retired records, 966567, Box 108267,
"Working file Alsup."

21. (U) Colin L. Powell (with Joseph Persicd), My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 307.
Odom interview.

22. (U) Interview

Tom Johnson, 8 November 1996, OH 34-96, NSA. Interview, Kenneth

deGraffenreid, by Tom Johnson, 20 February 1 998, OH 5-98, NSA.
23. (U) deGraffenreid interview { interview.

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24. (U) Interview,

by Tom Johnson, 1997. DDIR files, Box 10, "Iran-Contra."

interrogation in NSA retired records, 96567.

interview. DDIR files, Box 10, "Iran-Contra." Congressional Quarterly, The Iran-Contrai

25. (U)

Puzzle (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1987). Draper, A Very. Thin Line, 177.

26. (U) Iran-Contra Puzzle. Draper, A Very ThinLine,97, 102
96567.

Jnterrogation in NSA retired record^

27. (U) DDIR files, Box 10, "Iran-Contra."

3nterrogation 'in' NSA retired records, 96567,

P.L. 86-36

28. (U) Interview, Eugene Becker, by Tom Johnson, 14 May and 13 June 1996, OH 1 1-96, NSA.

29. (U) | t nterview'rDblR files, Box 10, "Ira^Contra." New York Times, 3 June 1988,

, OH 14-97, NSA.

30. (U) Interview

November 1997, by Tom Johnson and

31. (U) Mueller interview.

32. (U) Reagan Library, NSF, in CCH Series XVI.J , "Iran-Contra."

33. (U) Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up (New York: W.W. Norton and
Co., 1997), 177-78.

34. (U) Walsh, Firewall, 177-78. Interview, Elizabeth Rindskopf, by Tom Johnson, 20 February 1998, OH 4-98,
NSA.

35. (U)Walsh,FireuraJi,51,54.

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(U) Chapter 26
The Year of the Spy

(U) The Cold War topped off with a series of bizarre counterespionage incidents in the
mid-1980s which served to increase mutual U.S.-Soviet paranoia. More newspaper ink
was expended on these incidents than almost anything since Watergate. They came to be
lumped into a convenient moniker, like Watergate: the "Year of the Spy." Like Black
Friday, the term was not quite accurate in a technical sense - far more than just 1985 was
involved, and far more than just agents were in question. But like Black Friday, the term
stuck as a convenient shorthand. In most of these incidents, NSA was heavily involved.

(U) GUNMAN

- <G) Qf all the problems, the troubles with the new embassy building (termed the NOB,
New Office Building) in Moscow appeared to be the least likely venue for NSA
involvement. But appearances sometimes deceive, and embassy security was one of those
cases. In fact, NSA had developed a certain technological expertise by virtue of its
oversight of the Tempest emanations control program. This, combined with NSA's charter
to establish standards for the protection of all COMSEC equipments, which included the
communications centers in State Department's overseas embassies, got NSA into the act.

-fS)~NSA representatives began serving on a committee in the mid-1950s that dealt
with this problem and began to assert both its expertise and authority in the area. By
1960 NSA was firmly entrenched in embassy security matters, much to the disquiet of
State, which squirmed at any oversight of the overseas physical plant by a DoD agency. 1

4S} When, in the 1960s, the U.S. and the USSR arranged to build new chanceries, NSA
was one of the first agencies to express reservations about the security of the U.S. building
in Moscow. It had become well known in the early 1950s that the Soviets were inclined to
bug anything in the U.S. embassy that they could get their hands on. The infamous
bugging of the Great Seal (exposed in 1952) showed that they possessed sophistication
beyond what would normally have be en expected. In 1966, in commenting on the plans for
the NOB in Moscow | of NSA wrote to U:S. Amba^ P.L. 86-36

Toon that "In past Soviet building activity concerning embassies it could be predicted that
every attempt would be made to 'fix' the materials and the construction. Experience has
shown that some of the fixes can only be found by extensive destruction. In the case of the
Moscow site every attempt should be made to use U.S. building materials and construction
personnel." 2

(U) State did not follow the NSA advice. When construction of the NOB began- in
Moscow in 1979, the state-owned Soviet company was permitted to prefabricate concrete
columns and other components off site, without American inspection. Meanwhile, the

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Soviets insisted that all components for their embassy in Washington be fabricated under
the watchful eye of their own inspectors. Once on-site construction began, the Soviets used
thirty security people to monitor an American work force of about 100 people, while in
Moscow twenty to thirty Navy Seabees tried to watch six hundred to eight hundred Soviet
laborers. 3

£P&) In the early 1980s people on Reagan's National Security Council became
concerned about the hostile foreign intelligence threat in general and about the security of
the Moscow embassy in particular. So in 1982 NSA sent a team of people to look at
technical penetrations in the Moscow embassy. They found the chancery honeycombed
with insecurities, including cipher locks that didn't cipher and alarms that didn't sound.
NSA alerted the, FBI, which did its own survey and confirmed the problems that NSA had
found, plus others. teamed
up with an FBI representative to brief President Reagan on the matter. The State
Department, already suspicious of NSA "meddling" in embassy affairs, was reportedly
unamused. 4

(U) The project, called Gunman, involved the removal of eleven tons of electronic
equipment from the Moscow embassy - teletypes, printers, computers, crypto devices,
copiers - almost anything that plugged into a wall socket. Every piece of equipment had to
be replaced with the same or an upgraded model on a one-for-one swap-out. NSA's cover
story was that the equipment was being shipped back to the States for an OSHA
inspection.

(U) NSA procured the replacement equipment from sources in the U.S. and Europe
and packaged it for shipment in specially constructed boxes to Frankfurt, Germany, where
it would be staged for shipment to Moscow. The boxes were equipped with special sensing
devices that could detect any attempt at tampering. (At the Moscow end no such
tampering was detected.) NSA logisticians loaded all eleven tons onto two chartered

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(U) U.S. embassy, Moscow

Lufthansa Airbuses. They were flown directly from Frankfurt to Moscow, where they
were trucked on flatbeds to the embassy. They were then winched manually to the attic,
which was the only area large enough to stage that much equipment. Then, as equipment
was pulled from working spaces and trucked to the attic, new equipment was carted down
the stairs to the working spaces.

(U) The last items crammed into the boxes at NSA were fifty IBM Selectric
typewriters. The typewriters were an afterthought. They were electric, and some of them
did process classified or sensitive information, but this had been overlooked in the initial
evaluation. A hurried inventory revealed about 250 of them in use in the embassy, but the
IBM plant at Lexington, Kentucky, could spare only fifty, and NSA took them all. Said the
NSA official in charge of the swap-out, "I had no targeting against typewriters.. ..Had those
typewriters not come [in time] from Lexington..., I would have shipped without them
without a wink.!.." 6

(U) Back at NSA, a team of about twenty-five technicians worked around the clock to
try to find bugs in the equipment taken from the embassy. Everyone was aware that the
operation involved huge sums of money and had required presidential approval. NSA's
reputation was literally on the line. Walter Deeley, the DDI, had personally pushed
Gunman through to the White House and in turn pushed his own people to lay out a
maximum effort. But for two desperate months, nothing turned up.

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(U) Then they turned to the typewriters, a lower priority than the equipment that had
come from the communications center. One evening in July Michael Arneson, a
technician analyzing one of the typewriters, found a "ghostly gray" image on his x-ray film
coming from the power cord. Immediately suspicious, he x-rayed the set from the top
down. The x-ray images coming from the center of the set were cluttered and definitely
nonstandard.

(U) What Arneson had found was a sophisticated bug implanted in a structural metal
bar that ran the length of the machine undercarriage. It consisted of sensing devices that
picked up tiny fluctuations in current caused by the typewriter ball rotating as it selected
the next letter to be typed. It drew its power by bleeding the power line (that was the
"ghostly gray image" that' Arneson first noticed) and stored the information for periodic
burst transmissions to KGB receivers waiting in locations outside the embassy. The bug
was undetectable using current technical survey equipment, and the modifications to the
metal bar were imperceptible to routine examination. It could be found only by x-ray
devices.

(U) Technicians discovered ten bugged Selectrics in that first shipment. NSA
immediately retrieved the Selectrics that still resided in Moscow (and in the consulate in
Leningrad). Ultimately they found sixteen implants - but only in typewriters. They had
been installed somewhere in transit (perhaps Poland or Moscow itself) as they awaited
customs inspection. There was a rule that equipment to be used for processing classified
information was to be shipped only in courier channels, but a small percentage had
"escaped" and were shipped in regular shipping channels with office furniture. The KGB
could easily identify candidate typewriters by finding those with Tempest modifications. 7

•(S)-Bugged typewriters had been used in the deputy chief of missions office in Moscow,
by the consul general in Leningrad, and by the human rights officer. Others were in less
sensitive areas, like the office of the agricultural att ache, but paradoxically it was that
typewriter that yielded some of the best information. [

(TS) NSA had additional information on the Soviet project. In 1978 NSA people had
discovered a large antenna attached to a chimney in the south wing of the embassy. It was
cut for 60 and 90 MHz, but had no known function. The bugged typewriters emanated on
60 and 90 MHz. The batteries in the typewriters were dated 1976 and 1979. 9 The entire
thing amounted to a major penetration of the embassy.

"(UV/FOUO) Back in Washington] backed up by an FBI representative,

briefed President Reagan about the Moscow embassy situation.

J Although the president was supportive, NSA received little cooperation

from State Department below the Shultz-Eagleburger level. The ambassador was

P.L. 86-36

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reluctant to accept the Gunman discovery, and actions at the State Department end
proceeded very slowly until the matter came to the attention of the press. In 1985, Walter
Deeley was asked about State Department cooperation. In a statement
uncharacteristically low-key, Deeley replied: "I guess I can tell you the bureaucracy was
opposed to any operation in there." 10 This visit began the eventual unraveling of the State
Department defense of its own security practices, and it led eventually to the decision not
to accept the new embassy building in downtown Moscow, an imbroglio with the Soviets
that stretched well beyond the time frame of the Cold War.

4S) Probably no diplomatic problem was ever subjected to as many high-level
investigative panels as the Moscow embassy. In 1985 The Reagan administration halted
construction of the NOB and barred Soviet workers from the site. A panel headed by
former NSA director Bobby Inman looked at embassy security worldwide, with special
reference to the problems in Moscow. Inman was especially critical of the way State
handled technical security issues. Two years later f ormer Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird specifically examined the situation in Moscow. /

j Finally, the

PFIAB subjected the much-examined Moscow embassy to its own microscope and made
recommendations concerning the improvement of the administrative arrangements for
embassy security. 12

•QS) NSA recommended a "tiger team" approach to fixing the problems. The NSA plan
would have established an interagency Protective Security Engineering and Evaluation
Center that would monitor the situation and devise new solutions. It would need seventy-
six people and just over $28 million per year. The proposal got active NSC support but
opposition from State Department. After a long bureaucratic wrangle, it died. In the
process, however, JSfSA's technical expertise in the detection of bugs had become generally
recognized within and outside of government, and it was considered essential that

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expertise be employed in diplomatic protection. NSA's insistence on employing only
Americans received full support. When the federal government set up new administrative
arrangements for embassy security, NSA was asked to send representatives to virtually
every organization. It was a mission that was a natural outgrowth of the Agency's
expertise. 13

(U) The technical penetration of the embassy had long-term effects on the way
Americans did business in Moscow. Buildings were considered penetrated until proven
otherwise. According to historian Michael Beschloss, in the late 1980s Ambassador Jack
Matlock refused to type out messages on electric typewriters, assuming that the impulses
would go straight to the KGB. He wrote his drafts in longhand. 14

(U) PRIME

(U) From January of 1984 to the spring of 1987, twenty-eight people, almost all of
them Americans, were accused of espionage against the United States. One slipped out of
the grasp of the FBI, but the rest were arrested. Twenty-one pleaded guilty, and almost all
received lengthy prison sentences. Of the seven remaining, all went to trial, and six were
convicted. There were probably others who were never caught. 15

(U) The first spy was not an American. He was Geoffrey Prime, a British linguist who
worked for GCHQ from 1964 to 1977. Prime's case was of major importance to cryptology.

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I But amazingly enough, he was at the time out of touch with the

KGB, and apparently did not report to them again until 1980. Even then the KGB seemed
slow to recognize what they had, and it was not until the following year, 1981, that they
got a knowledgeable interrogator to debrief Prime on the operations. 17

(U) But by that time Geoffrey Prime was no longer "in the know." He had resigned
from GCHQ in 1977 without informing his Russian handlers. Prime seems to have become
uninterested in both GCHQ and espionage and simply drifted away from the work. His
official reason for leaving was a a dislike of lecturing, but that was a comparatively small
part of his job. He did not like to supervise, and he did not get along with computers. The
KGB did little to keep him engaged. GCHQ speculated in later years that Prime may have
become tired of the mental stress of spying, and his private life was in a state of turmoil
during the later 1970s. But no one really knew why he quit.

(U) Prime was finally uncovered as a result of an investigation into allegations of a
bizarre sex life, including pederasty. But the sex allegations eventually spread into
espionage, and Prime pleaded guilty to both. In January of 1982 he was sentenced to three
years on sex charges and thirty-six years for espionage. 18

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(U)PELTON

(U) On January 14, 1980, FBI surveillance recorded the following telephone call made
to the Soviet embassy in Washington:

First person: May I know who is calling?

Caller: I would not like to use my name if it's all right for the moment.

First person: Hold on, please. Sir?

Caller: Yes, urn.

First person: Hold the line, please.

Caller: All right

Second person: Hello, sir,

Caller: Ah, yes. I would —

Second person: Ah, Vladimir Sorokin speaking. My name is Vladimir.

Caller: Vladimir. Yes. Ah, I have, ah, I don't like to talk on the telephone.

Sorokin: I see.

Caller: Ah, I have something I would like to discuss with you I think that
would be very interesting to you.

Sorokin: Uh-huh, uh-huh.

Caller: Is there any way to do so, in, ah, confidence or in privacy?

Sorokin. I see....

Caller: I come from - 1, 1, 1 am in, with the United States government.

Sorokin: Ah, huh, United States government. . . . Maybe you can visit.

(U) A meeting was set up for the next evening, when it would be dark. But at 2:32 the
next afternoon the caller phoned the embassy and said he would be there in two minutes,
and abruptly entered the embassy. FBI surveillance was caught off guard, and managed
only to get a picture of the mystery caller's back as he darted into the embassy grounds. 20

(U) When the caller walked in, he was interviewed by the duty officer, who also
happened to be a KGB colonel, Vitaly Yurchenko. Yurchenko did not know who he was
dealing with, and the interview proceeded gingerly, until the caller pulled out an NSA
Personel Summary and began discussing highly sensitive operations j

The mood changed abruptly. Yurchenko did not know enough about the

technical aspects of NSA's work to proceed further, but he knew that he had a very
valuable potential defector. He made elaborate arrangements to get the caller out of the

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embassy disguised as a Soviet workman, gave him $500 and instructions on how to
establish the next contact. 21 Yurchenko never saw him again.

(U// FOUQ ^ Five years later, the same Vitaly Yurchenko appeared in Washington once
again, but this time as a KGB defector. During the initial interrogations Yurchenko
recalled the conversati on with the mystery caller, whom he (Yurchenko) identified as a
former NSA employee.

jjg) Vitaly Yurchenko

-4&HSfl' Ron Pelton, then forty-five years old, had come into the cryptologic business in
June of 1960, as a USAPSS Russian language intercept operator. After four years in the
Air Force, he converted to an NSA civilian billet. Through his years with NSA, Pelton had
become identified with collection technology and collection management. He had
participated in some of NSA' s most sensitive collection projects, but gradually drifted into
jobs associated with cryptanalysis. By 1979 he was a very highly regarded staff officer

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(b) (7) :••;)

Pelton Had, in fact, written the manual
describing those systems. He had served as a staff member on the Wagner Committee,
which had worked on plans for Bauded Signals Upgrade. Given his grade level (GS-12), it
was hard to imagine a more damaging defector. 23

(U) Pelton possessed a nearly-
photographic memory and a gift of gab
which marked him as a rising star in A5.
But unknown to his management chain, he
had also been operating on the margins of
financial ruin. In the early 1970s he decided
to house his familv[~~

EO 1.4. (c)

Without proper funding, he began building a
large house on a five-acre tract in rural
Howard County, Maryland, doing the work
himself as he could scrounge the materials.
Meanwhile, his family lived in squalor,

But Pelton

soon ran into financial difficulty, and in
April of 1979 he filed for bankruptcy. He
resigned from NSA the following July,
... evidently to improve his financial condition.
Outside of NSA, Pelton failed at everything
he tried, and without a regular paycheck his
condition sank further. He tried marketing,
a product that was supposed to improve
automobile gas mileage, but it didn't work,
and he drifted from job to job in retail sales. 24

^-ftjtftonald Pelton

(U) On October 23, 1985, just three days

the

FBI found Pelton living in an apartment in downtown Washington and working as a boat
and RV salesman for Safford Yacht Sales in Annapolis. Previously religious and
abstemious, he had undergone a complete personality change. He and his wife since 1961
were divorced, and Pelton was living with another woman. Financially, Pelton was doing
better than at any time since his resignation from NSA, but the FBI quickly discovered
that the two drank heavily and were deeply into drugs. They could be observed on
frequent drug buys. 25 The FBI initiated twenty-four-hour surveillance.

(U) Yurchenko's information was old, and no one was sure if Pelton was still passing
information to the Soviets. Then on November 4 Yurchenko redefected to the Soviet
Union, and the FBI lost its only witness, were they to arrest Pelton and bring him to trial.
Not only had they lost Yurchenko, but they had recently let former CIA agent and Soviet
spy Edward Lee Howard slip through surveillance to escape to the USSR. With

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Yurchenko and Howard gone, could Pelton be far behind? The FBI threw a virtual blanket
over Pelton - at one point over 200 agents were involved in the surveillance. 26

(U) David Faulkner, the FBI agent in charge of the case, was afraid Pelton would flee
the country, but had no evidence to hold him, unless Pelton himself gave it to them.
Wiretaps (authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court) showed that Pelton

and his girlfriend, Ann Barry, were into alcohol and drugs. |

I 1 Butthere/ b) (7) (c)

was no evidence of contact with the USSR. So Faulkner, after a thorough workup on
Pelton's character and personality, decided on a risky strategy. He rented rooms at the
Annapolis Hilton and set one of them up as an interrogation room for him, Pelton, and a
second agent Dudley "Butch" Hodgson. Then, at 0930 on Sunday, November 24, Faulkner
called Pelton, who was at the yacht company office, identified himself, and asked Pelton to
come to the hotel to talk to him on a matter of "extreme urgency" involving sensitive
national security.

(U) Once Pelton was in the room, Faulkner proceeded to detail the life of a
hypothetical person, who clearly was Pelton himself. The two FBI agents also played the
tape of the phone calls to the Soviet embassy in 1980. Pelton immediately understood that
the FBI knew all about his espionage, but seemed to think that they wanted him to become
a double agent. So, declining the offer to have a lawyer present, he proceeded to try to talk
his way out of it, admitting obliquely that the person that Faulkner and Hodgson sketched
was really himself. He admitted a lot - contacts with Soviets, trips to Vienna, payments of
$35,000 plus expense money, all to secure the FBI's "cooperation." 27

(U) By the end of the interview, Pelton so trusted the two agents that he gave up his
passport to them and was permitted to go back to his apartment in Washington. But that
evening Faulkner again called Pelton, who was by this time at the apartment, and asked
him to come Back Jbr mor e questions. During this second interrogati on in Annapolis,
Pelton placed an X on a map
by a considerable distance.)

(His mark was off

Unce Pelton admitted that what He had done would damage

the United States (a key element in the evidentiary chain), Faulkner and Hodgson gave
Pelton a waiver of rights, which he signed. Once they had his signature, they arrested
him. 28

(U) Pelton's "confession" told the FBI that he had several contacts with the Soviets in
Washington and had met KGB interrogators at the Soviet embassy in Vienna, Austria,
twice: once in 1980 and once in 1983. A third trip was planned in October of 1985, but
Pelton missed his contact in Virginia in September, and made no further contact with the
Soviets. In fact, by the time of his arrest he was trying to avoid them. 29

(TS//SI-UMBRA) His first Vienna meeting had been very thorough, consisting of some
forty-four hours of debriefing, but it was conducted by people who had no expertise in
cryptology and was less productive. The 1983 meeting was conducted by a KGB handler
who, although not an expert in cryptology, was highly skilled at interrogation. This time
there was very little that Pelton did not tell them about his jobs '

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eo l . 4 . ( c ) (U) Throughout, Pelton had been unhappy with the amount of his KGB payments, and

he tried to drop contact following each meeting. He initially demanded $400,000, but in
the end settled for $35,000 spread over five years. For him, spying was not very
lucrative. 30

(U) Ronald Pelton was the first spy that NSA took to court. In pretrial negotiations
NSA worked gingerly toward a plea bargain, which was how all previous espionage cases
had been resolved. But Pelton's defense lawyer, Fred Warren Bennett (who had also
defended John Walker earlier in the year; see page 420) advised Pelton to hang tough and
go to trial. Bennett expected that the "confession," consisting of unreco^ef^admissions to
two FBI agents in a hotel room, would be thrown out. Without it, the?g&veifrSn&ft didn't
have a case. 31

(T0//0I) The trial was scheduled to
begin on May 27, 1986. Preparations
were lengthy and elaborate. The
government had to establish the
sensitivity and fragility of SIGINT, and
had to reveal in open court SIGINT of value
that Pelton had revealed to the Soviets.
The Agency decided to put William
Crowell, the chief of A Group, o n the
stand to tell the jury about SIGINT. j"

(U) William Crowell

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(U) The strategy worked. The judge allowed FBI agents to testify about Pelton's
admissions in the hotel room, even though they did not amount to a signed confession.
Crowell's testimony and cross-examination did not result in damaging revelations beyond
those already agreed upon. In the end, the jury convicted Pelton on four of the six counts.
Sentencing was left to the judge. 33

(U//F OU6 ) The trial was followed by a long interval before sentencing, agreed to in
order to debrief Pelton on what he had told the Soviets. The carrot was the sentence: if he
cooperated, the government would ask for a lighter sentence. The debriefin g was done in a

It lasted from

July to December, and was excruciating. Withoutdocuments, it was a matter of dredging
through Pelton's memory.

NSA came away with information that it would never have thought
to ask Pelton. One of the most jolting was the revelation that, before going to the Soviets,
Pelton had tried to sell his wares to muckraking journalist Jack Anderson. Anderson took
the information and published it, but never paid Pelton. Desperate for cash, Pelton then
decided to contact the Soviets.

p.L. 86-36 (U) At the sentencing, the FBI indicated that Pelton had cooperated. But it wasn't

- sufficient. An outraged judge gave him the maximum sentence on all counts - three
consecutive life terms plus ten years. 34 He was remanded to Lewisburg Penitentiary in
Pennsylvania.

- I'l'S/M IJ Mil U AT R onald Pelton was the most damaging cryptologic spy since William
Weisband in the 1940s

was a devastating blow, far exceeding anything that other, more famous spies like Aldrich
Ames later gave to the Soviets.

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(U// FOUO) But to the public Pelton was a minor spy, and today few Americans even
remember who he was. This curious twist resulted partly from Pelton's own personality.
He came across as a buffoon - haggard, stubbly chin, hang-dog expression. The press
constancy referred to him as a minor functionary at a rela tively low salary level, as if this
somehow separated him from truly sensitive information.

(U) Benjamin Bradlee

(U) The Pelton trial eventually became
notorious for a sideshow - the Ivy Bells
incident. This bizarre story overshadowed
the trial itself, and became a cause celebre on
the issue of First Amendment rights.

(U) It began in December of 1985, soon
after Pelton was arraigned in federal court in
Baltimore. An alert newspaper reporter
heard the name "Ivy Bells" being introduced
by the defense lawyer, and it appeared in the
newspapers the next day. An even more alert
Washington Post reporter, Bob Woodward,
picked up the reference and went to his editor,
Benjamin Bradlee, with a proposal that the
Post publish a story on Ivy Bells, an operation
that Woodward had been tracking for years
through his collection of various bits of
journalistic expose. But instead of approving
the article for publication, Bradlee called the
federal government.

— (TS//SI UMBRA) The first meeting took place in the offices of the intelligence
community staff on F Street in downtown Washington, on December 5. Bradlee attended,
in company with Len Downie (the managing editor) and his lawyers. The principal for the
government was General Odom, along with his own lawyer, Elizabeth Rindskopf, and the
director of naval intelligence, Admiral Richard Haver. Bradlee outlined the story that
Woodward had put together, and said that, since Pelton had told the Soviets all about the

he co^ild see no damage to national security. Odom replied that

| that publication could

result in severe damage to national security. Bradlee scoffed at this and gave to the
government team a synopsis of previous publications)

beginning with a New York Times article by
Seymour Hersh in 1975, during the Church and Pike Committee hearings. Admiral Haver
later summarized Bradlee's charge: "All of this indicates that the security of very

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sensitive information with the U.S. government is very poor, a fact that Mr. Bradlee finds
most disturbing." But Rindskopf assured the Post that NSA did not intend to use Ivy Bells
at trial except in a very general sense, and Bradlee agreed to withhold publication, at least
until he could examine the trial transcript to see how much information the government
revealed. Odom remarked later about Bradlee that "I found his behavior in that situation
beyond reproach." And so the immediate threat receded. 37

(U) But the story "had legs," as journalists like to say. The next April, with trial about
to begin, Woodward put together a story on the Ivy Bells operation that would run
concurrent with the trial. Scheduled to run on May 4, its publication was once again
delayed afterJVilliam Casey called Bradlee to protest. On the tenth, Ronald Reagan called
Post publisher Katharine GrahamT urgirig~tirat~portions-ef--fehe article be deleted in the
interest of national security. But he added ominously that, if the Post did not police itself,
the Department of Justice might initiate prosecution under Section 798 of the criminal
statute.

(U) The issue remained secret until later in May, when NBC released a rather general
story on Ivy Bells. Casey stated publicly that he was considering recommending
prosecution of NBC under Section 798. But with the story already out, the Post decided the
time was ripe for its own story. A newspaper that had published The Pentagon Papers and
the Watergate story, both under threat of retaliation by the Nixon administration, was not
likely to back down in this case, but Bradlee ultimately agreed to delete details of the
story. He later said that fear of prosecution did not faze him, but national security did. "In
my heart, I think the Russians already know what we kept out of the story. But I'm not
absolutely sure of that." 38

(U) Once again, Casey went to Justice with a request to prosecute and issued a public
warning to news organizations not to publish "speculation" on sensitive national security
issues. The warning related to material that was being revealed in the Pelton trial. But
the DCI was out on his own limb. Justice Department lawyers were notoriously reluctant
to prosecute news organizations in situations where first amendment rights could be at
issue. In this case, they openly scoffed at the idea of prosecuting for "speculation." 39

(U) The Pelton trial occurred at the tail end of military operations against Libya
resulting from the La Belle Discoteque bombing. Government leaks in that case led to
threats by Casey and NSA director Odom to prosecute news organizations that published
the leaks (see page 359). It also led the Reagan administration to threaten to polygraph
everyone with access to "sensitive intelligence" (read primarily SIGINT), a threat that was
derailed when Secretary of State George Shultz threatened to resign if anyone from' his
department were confronted with a demand to be polygraphed. 40 Senator David
Durenburger of the SSCI examined the issue from both sides and cast a pox on both houses.
The Reagan administration had been a notedly leaky ship and had to tighten up if it were
to have any credibility in the courtroom when prosecuting news organizations. But, on the
other hand, news media seemed to have taken the wraps off. "...for whatever reason, there
is a growing sense that there is nothing which is not fair game." 41

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(U) WALKER

-(B)- In the late 1960s, the KGB created a new organization. Called the Sixteenth
Department of the First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence), it was set up specifically
to recruit and handle foreign code clerks who could provide cryptographic information.

(U) In November of 1984, one Barbara Walker, then living in Maine, contacted the FBI
about her ex-husband, John A. Walker, who was living in Virginia. John, she alleged, was
a spy. Barbara Walker was an admitted alcoholic, and the FBI initially did nothing about
her charges. But agents in the Norfolk office took her charges more seriously, and
retrieved Walker's personnel file from the Navy. It was written in almost unintelligible

(U)KW-7

They still didn't know about John Walker.'

EO 1.4. (c)

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Navy personnel language, and they needed
an interpreter. The agent in charge of
counterintelligence investigations in
Norfolk had recently collaborated with a
threat analysis office in NSA's COMSEC
organization. He called his contacts at
NSA and asked them to look at the Walker
file. NSA's conclusion that, if Walker were
a spy, the United States had a big problem.
John Walker had had access to a huge
number of cryptographic keys and
equipments.

(U) The Bureau opened a full field
investigation and got a court order to tap
his phones. For some weeks it seemed that
they were running aground, but then he
began talking about an important meeting
in the Washington suburbs. On the
assumption that he would be going to a
dead drop, the FBI deployed a huge
tracking team.

(U) John Walker (on left)

(U) On May 19, Walker drove north on 1-95 to
the Maryland suburbs of Washington. Once
there, he proceeded along a serpentine route
that had him driving to and fro for hours (the
FBI estimated that the full route would have
taken four hours) to the drop location on a
country road outside of Poolesville, Maryland.
There, just after 8:30 in the evening, by a
telephone pole with a "No Hunting" sign on it,
he deposited a package containing classified
material. The FBI swooped down and picked it
up as soon as he was out of sight. But when he
proceeded to the Soviet drop location, there was
no package there (which would have contained
the Soviet payments for Walker's previous drop
material). Puzzled, he drove back to his own
drop location, which was the alternate location
for the Soviet material. He found neither the Soviet payment nor the package he had so
recently deposited there, He drove back and forth between the two locations several times,
checking and rechecking. Then, puzzled and suspicious, he returned to his motel, a
Ramada Inn in Rockville, Maryland, which he reached just before midnight. 45

(U) Drop point

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(U) At 3:30 A.M., an FBI agent posing as a motel desk clerk phoned Walker's room to
tell him that his car had been hit and damaged and that he was needed downstairs. As
Walker left the room he was confronted by two FBI agents. In the confrontation, all three
drew their weapons - Walker dropped his first. The Bureau had just bagged the most
damaging spy in American history. 46

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SO 1.4. (c)

(U) Walker became Walkers, with Whitworth thrown in. It was not just a spy - it was
an entire ring. Walker, a comm center operator and crypto technician when he had been in
the Navy, had been supplying crypto key to the Soviets since 1968. Walker had recruited
Jerry Whitworth, another Navy man in the same line of work, and when John Walker
retired from the Navy in 1976, Whitworth continued to provide crypto material to Walker,
who passed it on to the Soviets. He had recruited his brother, Arthur, and his son,
Michael, and when arrested, John Walker was attempting to pass documents stolen from
the Navy by Michael. The Walker ring had passed operational and technical documents to
the Soviets. But more important, they had supplied crypto key for the KW-7, as well as
several other devices, including the KW-37, KL-47, and KG-13. 47

(U) The Walker operation was built around supplying used KW-7 key. Once a key had
expired, the crypto security person (i.e., Walker) had seventy-two hours to destroy it.
Walker (or Whitworth as the case may be) simply copied the key cards before destroying.
Periodically (generally a matter of months), Walker would give the copied key cards to a
Soviet agent using the dead drop procedure.

■(S)- The Soviet operation of the Walker ring was a textbook in how to handle an
espionage ring. They assigned only their very best KGB agents to the case. These agents
went to unprecedented lengths to keep the operation from exposure, and the instructions
that Walker received to dead drop operations were breathtakingly detailed and precise.
The FBI believed that at any given time, only three people in the Soviet embassy in
Washington were cleared for the operation. In Moscow, only the agents supervising the
operation and a few top KGB officials were in on the secret. 49

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EQ. 1.4. (c) -(6) Processing the take that was potentially available would have strained the

resources of the best espionage organization. Vitaly Yurchenko claimed that the KGB had
"thousands" of people exploiting the material, and decrypted over a million messages, but
this has never been confirmed.

I He knew nothing of any other exploitation group. It is possible

that only a fraction of the available material was exploited because of the inefficiencies
inherent in the Soviet bureaucracy. 52

(U) These reforms were uncontroversial and relatively speedily accomplished. More
divisive was the demand that the use of the polygraph be broadened. This reform was
already being implemented within the military population at NSA when the Walker ring
was exposed. But it undoubtedly reduced opposition to the polygraph in the wider armed
services. NSA's Walter Deeley, the chief of Communications Security at NSA, informed
the SSCI that he was reinstituting the crypto clearance, with its requirement for a non-
lifestyle polygraph. His determination to force this despite doubt about his authority to do
it on his own drew chuckles of admiration from the senators. 53

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(U) John Walker, the principal villain in the story, was paid over a million dollars by
the Soviets. Jerry Whitworth received about $400,000, while the others received
considerably lesser amounts. It is thus paradoxical that John Walker himself did not
receive the longest prison sentence. In the days before his trial was to begin, he plea
bargained to two concurrent life sentences plus ten years. Under the impenetrable
mysteries of the federal sentencing guidelines, this means that he could theoretically get
out of jail by age 75. His son pleaded guilty at the same time and received a twenty-five
year sentence. Both agreed to cooperate with federal prosecutors.

(U) John Walker's cooperation was most unhelpful to his former friend and compatriot
Jerry Whitworth. Whitworth, receiving decidedly bad advice from a coterie of San
Francisco lawyers, chose to go to court. Walker testified at Whitworth's trial and was a
key factor Whitworth's sentence of 365 years in prison and a $410,000 fine. Jerry
Whitworth will die in prison. 54

(U) POLLARD

(U) In September of 1979 the
Navy hired a young Stanford
graduate named Jonathan Jay
Pollard to be an intelligence
research specialist. Pollard was
assigned to the Naval Intelligence
Support Center (NISC) in Suitland,
Maryland, where he was given a set
of special clearances that would
permit him to go to work. Included
was access to SIGINT material. 55

(U) In 1984 Pollard made
contact with Israeli intelligence. He
showed them samples of what, he
could provide, and they were
interested. A flurry of meetings ensued, including trips to Paris and Israel. One of his
contacts was Rafael Eitan, a legendary Mossad agent who had masterminded the capture
of Adolf Eichmann and had headed the vengeance squad that tracked down and killed
Palestinians who had participated in the 1972 Munich Olympics affair. Clearly, Pollard
was regarded as a potential star in the espionage world. 56

(U) Pollard was assigned to the antiterrorism alert center at NISC. His routine duties
would thus give him access to information that Israel was interested in. But Pollard didn't
stop at passive collection. He took a "shopping list" of desired information from his
handlers and scanned DIA's computer databases for "hits." When he found something that

(U) Jonathan Pollard

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looked interesting, he simply asked the relevant office for the document. He was rarely
refused.

(U) He accumulated documents quickly, and three times a week he put them into a
briefcase and, using his courier pass, simply walked out with them. He batched the
documents and once a week delivered them to a handler in a safe house in downtown
Washington, D.C., not far from where Ronald Pelton lived. (They lived so close, in fact,
that Pelton's girl friend noted surveillance, but decided that it was unrelated. It was FBI
surveillance of Pollard.) There, the accountable documents would be copied so that Pollard
could return the original; the rest they would not bother to copy. Once a month, Pollard
made contact with his main handler, Joseph Yagur, who would evaluate the month's take
and pay Pollard. 57

(U) In September of 1985, Pollard's commanding officer at NISC, Commander Jerry
Agee, learned that Pollard's computer searches had included excursions into some
material unrelated to his job. Agee directed that a close watch be placed on Pollard. On
October 25, a coworker reported to Agee that Pollard had apparently walked out of the
building with classified documents. Surveillance of his activities became intense. A
computer check showed that Pollard had acquired a huge number of documents on the
Middle East, and a surreptitious search of his work spaces turned up none of them. At this
point Agee called in Naval Investigative Service and the FBI.

(U) The net closed on Monday, November 18. Pollard was arrested trying to leave
NISC in his Mustang with a satchel full of classified documents. Interrogation continued
off and on all week, as Pollard gradually admitted more and more facts about his
espionage. On Thursday he tried to flee to the Israeli embassy but was refused
admittance. The FBI finally arrested him outside the embassy. Pollard and his wife Anne,
who was deeply involved in the espionage, were out of options. His handlers had fled the
country, and Israel was disowning him. Naval and FBI agents had recovered large
numbers of documents in his apartment. A full confession was in order. 58

(U) The Pollard arrest on November 21 came only three days before the arrest of
Pelton and overlapped the exposure of the Walker ring. It heightened the sense of betrayal
during the "Year of the Spy."

EO 1.4. (c)

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(U) The Department of Justice legal team wanted to try Pollard, but State pleaded that
the diplomatic embarrassment would be too great. Ultimately DOJ fashioned a plea
bargain that worked. Jay Pollard pleaded guilty arid was sentenced to life in prison. (But
the terms of a life sentence have already allowed him to petition for parole, which has been
denied.) In return, Anne Pollard was given only two concurrent five-year terms and is
already out of jail. All along the Pollards maintained that their motivation was ideology.
But they received $2,500 in cash monthly, had $30,000 per year going into a "retirement
account," and were tre ated to lavish all-expense paid trips to Europe and flashy jewelry by
their Israeli handlers.

(U) HALL

(S//S I) James Hall, a young Army enlisted man, was assigned to INSCOM
in 1983. Hall liked money, and in 1983 he contacted Soviet intelligence in Berlin. By this
time he had become arid he offered to

share with the Soviets everything that he knew From
February of 1983 to his reassignment to the U.S. in 1985, Hall did just that, in thirteen
face-to-face meetings with his Soviet handlers, along with dead drops in various/locations
around Berlin.

(U) Prior to his reassignment, Hall had contacted an East German/intelligence agent,
Hussein Yildirim, who headed the post auto shop. In order to supplement his already
substantial income, Hall agreed to provide East Germany the same information that he
has giving the Soviets. / /

(U) During his year in the States, Hall continued to provide information to Yildirim,
although the value was down because he was no longer associated ;mth INSCOM. The
Soviets also set up procedures for receiving Hall's information, but they were complex and
difficult, and Hall chose to drop the association. Then, just a jreaf later, he was back in
Germany with 5th Corps and renewed his contacts with East Bloc intelligence. When he
PCSed to Fort Stewart, Georgia, in 1988, he maintained contaet.with Yildirim, who moved
to Florida to continue to work his contact with Hall. But by tiien the rigidities of the Cold

EO 1. 4 . (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

EO 1.4. (c)

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War were beginning to crack, and an East German source identified Hall as one of their
agents.

(U) The FBI got Hall on a sting, in which one of their employees posed as a Soviet
agent wanting to know what Hall had been providing to the East Germans. In a
videotaped meeting Hall essentially confessed to espionage. He was arrested and is
serving a forty-year sentence at Fort Leavenworth. Yildirim, arrested the day after Hall,
is serving life without parole. 62

(U//'PQ ^Q^ Hall provided the Soviets and East Germans with "tradecraft"
information. J

P.-..L. 8 6-36

In return, Hall took away somewhere between $200,000 and
$400,000. He was definitely in it for the money.

'SO. 1.4. (c)

that he had

(U) CARNEY

tU)..In the spring of 1990,
informatioh | It was an old lead; the spy had been active in the

mid-1980s, but was no longer in the business. /

j The information was fragmentary

and conflicting, and it became bogged down. Then a second source identified the spy as one
"Yens Carney." The FBI traced Yens Carney to one Jeffrey Martin Carney, a former Air
Force German linguist then living in the Soviet sector of East Berlin.

-(G)- Carney came from a difficult family background. He had dropped out of high
school and had enlisted in the Air Force at seventeen. But he was extremely bright., and
had been sent to German school, where he had g otten awards as the best German linguist
in his class

This began a

downward spiral in his Air Force work relationship. Carney became argumentative and
difficult on the job. He also realized that he was homosexual, which led to an identity
crisis. In the midst of this turmoil, the immature Carney, then only nineteen, made a
sudden decision to defect to East Germany, and went to Checkpoint Charlie, where he
made contact with the other side. They, however, convinced him to spy, and he remained
on the job.

(U) Carney began carrying a hidden camera in a Lipton Tea can. He collected
miscellaneous documents while on burn detail and smuggled them out of the operations
building. He met with his East German handlers every three weeks. In 1985 he PCSed to
Goodfellow Air Force Base, where he continued to photograph documents. These he passed
to his handlers during meetings in Berlin, Rio and Mexico City. But he became
increasingly unstable and finally got his clearance pulled after an incident of uncontrolled

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rage with his supervisors. At that point Carney defected to East Germany through Mexico
City and Cuba (the same route that Martin and Mitchell had taken in 1961).

(U) He became a driver on the U-Bahn (Berlin's subway system) while continuing to
work for East German intelligence. But he was in the wrong country. After the fall of the
Berlin Wall it was not impossible to arrest spies, and Carney was arrested in April of 1991
outside his apartment. Brought back to the U.S. to stand espionage charges, he plea
bargained for a twenty-five year sentence in exchange for his cooperation. He was
debriefed, and NSA got a good picture of the damage. Fortunately, it was much less than it
would have been had Carney worked within NSA. 63

(UJ | They were both active in Berlin at the same

time, one working in ASA, the other in ESC. They also worked for East German
intelligence, although Hal l passed information to the Soviets, too. Although neither had
high-level in formation^

A i

(U) THE PUZZLE PALACE

p.L. 8 6-36 (U) The 1982 publication of a book about NSA, The Puzzle Palace, by James Bamford,

eo 1 . 4 . ( c ) brought a new focus to the efforts of journalists and independent writers to break down the

Agency's vaunted anonymity. The Puzzle Palace became the most significant breach in
NSA's anonymity since David Kahn's The Codebreakers in 1967.

(U) As a former NSG enlisted man, Bamford had participated directly in the
cryptologic process. While still in the Navy he had volunteered to help the Church
Committee during its 1975 investigations. The late 1970s found him out of the Navy and
working in Boston as a part-time private detective. He had gone to law school, but had not
taken (or had not passed) the bar exam. In 1979 he approached publisher Houghton-
Mifflin with a proposal to do a book on NSA. The publisher accepted and gave him a
$7,500 advance. 84

(U) Bamford proposed a comprehensive description and history of the Agency, a task
that had never been attempted. Public Law 86-36 had served as a useful barrier against
this type of research, but Bamford proved to be cleverer than others. He began with a
barrage of requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Through this and a lot of poking through publicly available information, he accumulated a
small but useful stack of documents. Then he hit the Mother Lode - a collection of
documents that William Friedman had deposited at the George Marshall Library at
Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia. Among the scattered remains of
Friedman's lifetime accumulations were copies of the NSA Newsletter, addressed to "NSA
Employees and their families." Bamford then submitted a FOIA for the entire collection,
using as his rationale the offending phrase indicating that the information had been
intended for dissemination to uncleared people. NSA succeeded in redacting portions

Tf TP IFf RFT f i""Ofifl l NT 1 l T i M . FN T KFYHOt Ffffil

426

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TOP SECnET//COMI N T - UMDRA/TALCNT KCYI I0LC//X1

using PL 86-36, but a disgruntled former NSA employee gave Bamford an almost complete
collection which permitted him to fill in the redacted blanks. 65

(U/ /FOUO) During the Church Committee hearings of 1975, the attorney general had
asked his staff to investigate the legal culpability of the various intelligence agencies.
Bamford FOIA'ed the resulting document, and he got most of it from the Justice
Department. (Justice did not inform NSA because, they reasoned, the investigation was
still on-going, and they could not inform a possible target of the investigation.) The
document, with some Justice redactions, contained a good deal of information about the
NSA-GCHQ relationship, and served as the basis for Bamford's information on Second
Party issues. During the ensuing negotiations between NSA and Bamford's lawyer, the
government claimed that the documents had been improperly released and should be
returned under threat of prosecution. The lawyer, veteran civil rights attorney Mark
Lynch, invited Justice to do just that, but no case was ever brought. 66

(U/ /FOUO) Bamford knew how' to get information. He drove through the NSA parking
lot jotting down diplomatic license plates and checking known lists to see which countries
maintained representatives at Fort Meade. He badgered retired NSA senior officials,
including famed cryptanalyst Frank Raven, former head of NSA research and
development Ray Tate, and former director Marshall Carter, for information, using as a
wedge the information that he had already gotten from unclassified sources. Some pushed
him aside, but others agreed to talk at length about NSA operations. Carter, for instance,
talked with him for a day and a half at his retirement residence in Colorado Springs. All
was technically unclassified, but it helped Bamford complete his mosaic. NSA policy

(U/ /FOUO) James Bamford broke new ground in intelligence agency research, and his
techniques were adopted by others seeking to investigate reclusive federal agencies. He
did it all within the limits of the law - through attributable interviews, FOIA'ed
documents, and meticulous research in public libraries and newspapers, not with
classified documents provided by unnamed accomplices under cover of darkness. He
"wrote the book" on how to put together a comprehensive picture of an organization that
wanted no such comprehensive picture.

(U//F0UO) The single exception was the exposure of the relationship with the British.
This was properly classified, and GCHQ was not amused. 69 Bamford's lawyers turned out
to be tough and determined, and the information stayed in the public domain. The release
of classified material by, of all organizations, the U.S. Justice Department, left NSA non-
plussed.

'(B7"('7t (€-•) makers felt that Raven was especially indiscreet

(U) Bamford produced a book that was

preoccupation with a lack of statutory controls on NSA. Like Jack Anderson's columns,

P.L.

86-36

P.L.

86-36

I UH SblKk l;/COMINT-UMBBAjTALENT KCYI IOLC//X1

427

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the book -

P.L.

S6-36

(U) THE AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION SUIT p . L. 86-36

(U) Following publication of The Puzzle Palace, General Faurer sent NSA's j |
| to the "Marshall Library to see where Bamford had gotten so much of his
information ! "{discovered that, an archivist had given Bamford access to sequestered
portions of the Friedman collection. NSA re-sequestered the documents, and was
challenged in court by Bamford's lawyer, Mark Lynch of the American Civil Liberties
Union, acting on behalf of the American Library Association. 70

(U) This time the law was on NSA's side. Since the early negotiations with Lynch over
the FOIA'ed Justice Department records, President Reagan had signed a new executive
order, 12033, which permitted publicly available documents to be withdrawn if it could be
shown that they had been improperly declassified. NSA's argument was supported by the
U.S. District Court of Appeals in 1987, which dismissed the case against NSA and ruled
that the plaintiff, the American Library Association, lacked standing.' 1

(U) EPILOGUE

(U) On November 9, 1989, the East German government announced that its citizens
could leave the country without special permission. Within hours, jubilant crowds were
surging through the formerly impenetrable Berlin Wall, to be greeted by their West
German countrymen. The crowds sang and danced that night. They hacked at chunks of
the infamous Wall, and swirled through the Brandenburg Gate. It was liberation day.

(U) November 9 was the culmination of both long- and short-term events. Such
imponderables as the inherent weaknesses of Marxism and the latent inefficiencies of the
Soviet state moved glacially, but they eventually produced Gorbachev, a man who
recognized the situation and tried to reform it. Gldsnost and perestroika (openness and
economic restructuring) were the pillars of his reform program.

(U) But short-term events overtook socialist reform. It was not necessary for the
Soviet government to invent a new form of socialism - a dandy economic model glittered
just across the Iron Curtain in Western Europe. Encouraged to devise their own socialist
economic models, Hungary and Poland moved quickly. In East Germany, Eric Honecker,
the long-time Communist Party boss, thumbed his nose at reform, and got in return unrest
and agitation. Agitation turned into street demonstrations in August. Gorbachev
withdrew Soviet support for more repression, and without this guarantee the East German
authorities could no longer contain the population. In October, Gorbachev personally told
Honecker that the Soviet forces in his country would not come to his rescue. Honecker,
sick with gall bladder cancer, knew the end was near.

TOP SECR E T//COMINT UMDnA/TALCNT ICCYI IOLC//X1

428

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(U) So the end of the Cold War swept in like a sudden storm, leaving prognosticators
dazed. It happened so fast and went so far that it would take a breathless world some
considerable time to assess the event.

(U) For the cryptologic community, it was a new beginning. Nothing like it had
happened since the end of World War II. Major target countries disappeared literally
overnight. Foreign relationships changed, and former enemies became new Third Parties
with scarcely an intervening day.

(U) But from a historical perspective, it was also an ending, a milepost in the course of
history. The bipolar world had defined American cryptology for forty-four years. It was
now over, and it was time to write the history.

(U) Notes fe0 1.4.(c)

EQ 1.4(d)

1 . (U) Interview, David Boak, by Tom Johnson, 20 January 1998.

2. (U) Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 14, Schlesinger papers, NSA memo 21 October 1966.

3. (U '4 Case of Bureaucracy in Action: the U.S. Embassy in Moscow,"
International Journal oflntelligence and Counterintelligence (Fall, 1993).

4. (U) Inman interview. Interview l I bv. Tom Johnson. 8 November 1996, OH 34-96, NSA. de
Graffenreid interview.

5. (U)

| See interview, Lt. Gen. Lincoln D. Faurer, by Tom Johnson, 20 August 1998, OH 15?98, NSA; CCH

Series XII.D., "Gunman," Evaluation of Project Gunman by S65, 28 January 1985. | I nterview.
Interview, ! ~"| by-Tom Johnson and

Director's files, 96026, Box 14, Schlesinger papers.

6. (U j i nterview.' CCH Series XII.D., "Gunman."

7. (U) Interview l

20,July 1998, OH 14-98, NSA. Deputy-,

|=Uy Tom Johnson, 4 August 1998, OH 15-98, NSA.

interview.

| [ interview. CCH Series XII.D., "Gunman," Deputy Director's files, 960iJ6, Box 14, "CIA Damage

Assessment."

8. (U) XII.D., "Gunman." Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 14, "CIA Damage Assessment."

9. (U) Deputy Director's Files, 96026, Box 14, "CIA Damage Assessment;" Box 10, "Moscow Embassy - 1987."

10. (U) Faurer interview } I nterview.

11. <U) Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 14, SShlesinger paper; "Lonetree-Bracy Chronology and Damage
Assessment."

.(U£

"Moscow Embassy - 1 987"; "Laird Panel."

^"A Case of Bureaucracy in Action...." Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 10,

P.L. 86-36

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429

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TOP SECRET//COMINT-UMBRA/TALEN 1 KbV HULb/A ' l

13. (U) Reagan Library, NSP, in CCH Series XIV. J, "Embassy Security," Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 10,
"Moscow Embassy- 1987."

14. (U) Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbot, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), 33-34, 94.

15. (U) Polmar and Allen, Merchants ofTreason, 181.

16. (U) Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 14, "Prime Case Damage Assessment."

17. (U)Ibid.

18. (U) Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 9, "Milkman Damage Assessment." 5001, 40. Polmar and Allen,
Merchants ofTreason, 40.

19. (U) Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 9, "Milkman Damage Assessment."

20. (U) Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Merchants ofTreason (New York: Delacourte Press, 1988), 205-06.

21. (U) Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 4, "Pelton File."

22. (U) NSA, S4 videotape briefing on Pelton. Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 14, "Pelton Damage
Assessment."

23. (U) NSA, GC office files, U.S. v. Pelton working papers. Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 14, "Pelton
Damage Assessment."

24. (U) NSA, S4 videotape briefing on Pelton. NSA, GC office files, U.S. v. Pelton, Pleadings.

25. (U) Ibid.

26. (U) S4 Pelton videotape l I nterview.

by Tom Johnson, 20

27. (U) Polmar and Allen, Merchants of Treason, 207-14. Interview
February 1997, OH 5-97, NSA.

28. (u j I nterview:- - - -

29. (U) Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 4, "Pelton File."

30. (U)Ibid nterviewT "

P.L. 86-36

31. (U

nterview.

32. (U) Interview, William P.'Crowell, by David A. Hatch and
[ nterview. NSA, GC office files, Pelton file.

^interview.

29 May 1996, OH 16-96, NSA.

33. (

34. (U) Ibid.

nterview.

35. (U) NSA, GC office files, U.S. v. Pelton, working papers. Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 14, "Pelton
Damage Assessment"; "CIA Damage Assessment." Ch A2 files, 96228, Box 4, A/J Joint Conference 1987; Box 6
"T230."

36. (U) Ch, A2 files, 96228, Box 4, "Miscellaneous Studies."

TOP SCCnnv/COMI N T UMQRA/TALCNT KEYHOLE//X1

430

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TOP SECRET//COMINT UMBRA/TALENT KCYH0LC//X 1

37. (U) NSA, GC office files, Pelton; U.S. v. Pelton, Working Papers. Interview, Lt. Gen. William Odom, by Tom
Johnson, 19 August 1997, OH 13-97, NSA.

38. (U) NSA, GC office files, "U.S. v. Pelton, Working Papers." Bradlee quote is from Time, June 2, 1986.

39. (U) NSA, GC office files, Pelton. Odom interview.

40. (U) NSA, GC office files, Pelton.

41. (U) Ibid., Durenberger letter to SSCI members, 7 May 1986.

42. (U) Interview
Boak interview.

and Tom Johnson, 2 February 1993, OH 2-93, NSA.

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, "John A. Walker Espionage
Network," July 1987.

43. (U) Telephone interview with
~fr nter.view.

by Tom Johnson, 19 December 1997. | [ interview.

44. (U) Ibid.

45. (U) FBI, "John A. Walker Espionage Network.']"

Jnterview.

>'P.L. 8 6-36

46. (U) Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 14, "CIA Damage Assessment." Pete Early, Family of Spies: Inside
the John Walker Spy Ring (New York: Bantam Books, .1988): FBI, "John A. Walker Espionage Ring/

47. (U) Early, Family of Spies. NSA Archives, acc nr 20960, CBOF 33.

48. <U£

EO 1.4. (c)

49. (U) FBI, "John A. Walker Espionage Ring."

50. (U) Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 1, "Overview of Damage from Recent Espionage." NSA Archives, acc
nr 20960, CBOF 33. FBI, "John A. Walker Espionage Ring."

51 (V) Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 1 4, "CIA Damage Assessment."

52. (U) FBI, "John A. Walker Espionage Ring." Interview
June 1998, OH 11-98, NSA.

_J by Tom Johnson anc

P.L. 86-36

53. (U) NSA Archives, acc nr 20960, CBOF 33; acc nr 19217, H03-0102-6. Deputy Director's files, 96026, Box 14,
"CIA Damage Assessment."

54. (U) FBI, "John A. Walker Espionage Ring.",

55. (U) Polmar and Allen, Merchants of Treason, 292-87.

56. (U) Ibid., 295.

57. (U) Ibid., 288-90.

58. (U) Ibid., 291-93.

59. (U)

Jnterview. CCH Series XII.D., Pollard file, debriefing notes, 13/14 August 1986.

60. (U)Ibid.

61. (U) Polmar and Allen, Merchants of Treason, 288-89, 297.

TOP SECRET//COMI NT UMBRA/TALENT KCYI IOLC//X1

431

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TOP SCCnCT//COMINT ' UMDIWrALCNT ICCYI I0LC//X1

62. (U) S4 files, James Hall, 63.

63. (U) S4 files, Jeffrey Carney.

64. (U) Interview, !" "] by.itebert Farley and Tom Johnson, 14 January 1987, OH 2-87, NSA. Paul

Constance, "How Jim Bamford Probed the NSA/* Cryptologiq, 21 (January 1997), 71-74.

65. (U) David C. Martin, "Putting Secret Puzzles Together," The Waskingtoniiiri Warch.mS), 89-95. Constance,
"How Jim Bamford Probed the NSA," 72 f I nterview.- „

66. (U) { [ ntervtewrComtancr,"H6w:Jim Bamford Probed the NSA." - " " P-L- 86-36

67. (U) | t ntervTew.' Interview, LTG Marshall S. Carter, by Robert Parley, ; 3-6 i October 1988, OH 15-88, NSA.

68. <U) NSA, CCH Series VI.G.4.

69. (U) Ibid.

70. (U \ I nterview. NSA, CCH Series VI.G.2.1.

71. (U) Ibid.

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432

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— TOP SECRET//COMIMT UMBRA/TALCNT KEYHOLE//X 1

(U) Glossary

ABM - antiballistic missile

ACE - American Council on Education

ACRP- Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program

ACSI - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (Army)

ADC - Assistant Director for COMSEC

AFSCC - Air Force Special Communications Center
AFSS- Air Force Security Service

1 _„ - — — " "~E0 1.4. (c)

ALP - Australian Labor Party
ALTROF - alternate remote operations facility
AMPS - Automated Message Processing System
ANO - Abu Nidal Organization

ANZUS - Australia, New Zealand and the United States (diplomatic treaty)
ARDF - airborne radio direction finding
AROF - A Remote Operations Facility

ARVN - Army of the Republic of Vietnam (i.e., South Vietnam)

ASA - Army Security Agency

ASRP - Airborne SIGINT Reconnaissance Platform

AST W - Agency Standard Terminal Workstation

ASW - antisubmarine warfare

AT&T - American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation

BROF - B Remote Operations Facility

BSU - Bauded Signals Upgrade

BWI - Baltimore- Washington International Airport

C3CM - command, control and communications countermeasures

CBR - chemical, biological and radiological

433

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TO P SECRET//CO Ml NT«U MDR A/TALCNT KCY I IOLC//X1

CCP - Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CDAA - circularly disposed antenna array
CDC - Control Data Corporation
CENTCOM - Central Command

I _ „ ----- - - " 16 1.4. (c)

I EO 1.4. (d)

CINCPAC - Command-in-Chief, Pacific

CNO- Chief of Naval Operations

COC - Collection Operations Center

COINS - Community On-line Information System

CONUS - continental United States

COPES - Collection Operations Position Evaluation Standard

COS - Chief of Station (CIA)

CSG - cryptologic support group

CSOC - Current SIGINT Operations Center

CSS - Central Security Service

DARPA - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DAO - Defense Attache Office

DCA - Defense Communications Agency

DCI - Director of Central Intelligence

DDF - Deputy Director for Field Management and Evaulation
DDO - Deputy Director for Operations (NSA)
DDR - Deputy Director for Research

DDT - Deputy Director for Telecommunications and Computer Services
DEA - Drug Enforcement Administration
DEFCON - Defense Condition

DEFSMAC - Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center
DES - data encryption standard

DGTS - Directorate General of Technical Security (South Vietnamese SIGINT service)

DIRNSA- Director, NSA

DO - Director for Operations (CIA)

TOP SECRET//COMINT UMBRA/TALENT KEY I I OLC//X1

434

DOCID: 380734 9

TOP SFf RFT// f QMtf i lT 1 WinH i ' ii TM Tf i tTI r I I II II I /H I 1

DOJ - Department of Justice

DMZ - demilitarized zone

DSA - Defense Supply Agency (U.S. DoD)

DSD - Defence Signals Directorate

DSCS - DoD Satellite Communications System

DSE - direct support element (Navy)

DSSCS - Defense Special Security Communications System

GDRS - General Directorate of Rear Services (North Vietnamese logistics network)
supporting infiltration into South Vietnam)

DSU - direct support unit (Army)

ECCM - electronic counter-countermeasures

ECM - electronic countermeasures

ESC - Electronic Security Command

ESM - electronic (warfare) support measures

EUCOM - European Command

EW - electronic warfare

FANX - Friendship Annex

FCC - Federal Communications Commission

FISA - Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

FOIA - Freedom of Information Act

FRG - Federal Republic of Germany

FSCS - Future SIGINT Capabilities Study

GE - General Electric Company

GROF - G Remote Operations Facility

GSA - General Services Administration

GSFG - Group of Soviet Forces Germany

GTOF - G Tennis Operations Facility

H AC - House Appropriations Committee

HPSCI - House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

TOP SECnnV/COMINT ' UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X 1

435

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TnPSFrRFT/ fl-QMiMT UMnnf n Tfi rrn r nw h h/ u t

IATS - Improved AG-22 Terminal System

IC - intelligence community

ICBM - intercontinental ballistic missile

IDA/CRD - Institute for Defense Analyses/Communications Research Division

IDDF - Internal Data Distribution Facility

IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IFF - identification friend or foe

I - - ~ " ~ EO 1.4. ( c )

INR - [Bureau of] Intelligence and Research (State Department)
INSCOM - Intelligence and Security Command
IR - infrared

IRBM - intermediate range ballistic missile

ITAR - International Traffic in Arms Regulation

ITT - International Telephone and Telegraph [corporation]

I&W - indications and warning

JASDF - Japanese Air Self-Defense Force

I _ ._ -~ ■ — -- ~ "i-EO 1.4. ( c )

I EO 1.4. (d)

JUSMAG - Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group

KAL - Korean Air Lines

KC - Khmer Rouge (communist insurgent force in Cambodia)

LLVI - low-level voice intercept

LMSC - Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation

MAAG - Military Advisory Assistance Group

MAC - Military Airlift Command

MAC V - Military Assistance Command Vietnam

MCSF - Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility

MEAR - Maintenance, Engineering, and Architecture (team)

MEN AS - Middle East and North Africa Summary

MIJI - meaconing, intrusion, jamming and interference

TOP SECnCT//COMINT-UM B tWTAir:NT KCY I I0LC//X1

436

DOCID:

3807349

T OP S E CRET//COMIN l -UMBHA/l ALfcN I Kb VHULb/VXI

MO - method of operation

MIRV - multiple independently targetted re-entry vehicle
MODE - Monitoring of Overseas Direct Employment
NBS - National Bureau of Standards
NCC - National Cryptologic Command
NCO - noncommissioned officer

I. ._ .- - — ~P . L . 8 6-36

NIO- National Intelligence Officer

NISC - Naval Intelligence Support Center

NIST - National Institute for Standards and Technology

NNBIS - National Narcotics Border Interdiction System

NOB - new office building (American embassy chancery, Moscow)

NOIWON - National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network

NORAD - North American Air Defense Command

NPIC - National Photographic Interpretation Center

NRL - Naval Research Laboratory

NRO - National Reconnaissance Office

NSASAB -NSA Scientific Advisory Board

NSC - National Security Council

NSCID - National Security Council Intelligence Directive

NSF - National Science Foundation

NSG - Naval Security Group

NSOC - National SIGINT Operations Center

NTIA - National Telecommunications and Information Administration

NTISSC - National Telecommunications Information Security Committee

N VA - North Vietnamese Army

OCMC - Overhead Collection Management Center

OCR - optical character reader

OMB - Office of Manpower and Budget

ONI - Office of Naval Intelligence

T qp gcrpcTwnn/iiMT mmn t rr* i i- i ,it vuvum e „ i t

437

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TnpgrrnrnfrnntniT QMBftATTOTElTl KEYHOLE/7xi

ONR - Office of Naval Research

OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration

OTAR - over-the-air rekeying

PACAF - Pacific Air Forces

PACOM - Pacific Command

PARPRO - Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program

PC - Problem Center

PDF - Panamanian Defense Force

PERSUM - NSA personnel summary

PFIAB - President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

PFLP - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PLO - Palestine Liberation Organization

PRC - People's Republic of China

PX - post exchange facility

RASIN - Radio Signal Notation

RCA - Radio Corporation of America

' I " EO 1.4. ( c)

1 1 EO 1.4. (d)

RIF - reduction in force

ROC - Republic of China (Taiwan)

ROF - remote operations facility

ROFA - Remote Operations Facility

RSA - Rivest, Shamir and Adelman [name of an encryption algorithm]

SAC - Strategic Air Command

SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SAFSPD - Secretary of the Air Force Special Projects Division

SALT - Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SCA - Service Cryptologic Agency

SCE - Service Cryptologic Element

1UH SblKfc I//COMIN [-UMBRA/TALENT KCY1IQLC//X1

438

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| TOP 5BCRET//C O MI NT-U M BRA/TALENT KEVHOLE//X1

SDS - Students for a Democratic Societty

SIGSUM - SIGINT Summary

SIOP - single integrated operational plan (U.S. nuclear targetting plan)

SLO - SIGINT Liaison Office
SOO - Senior Operations Officer

SORS - SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee

SOUTHCOM - Southern Command
SSA - Special Support Activity
SSBN - ship submersible, nuclear

SSCI - Senate Select Committee on Intelligence . eo 1.4. ( c )

SSO - Special Security Office

STU - Secure Telephone Unit

SUA - Shan United Army

SUSLO - Senior U.S. Liaison Officer [to GCHQ]

TACREP - tactical SIGINT report

TAREX - Target Exploitation

TDOA - time difference of arrival

TENCAP - Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities

TVD - Soviet term for theater of military operations (TMO)

UKUSA- United Kingdom-United States [agreement on cryptologic matters]

USAFE - U.S. Air Forces Europe

USAFSS - U.S. Air Force Security Service

USIB - United States Intelligence Board

U&S - unified and specified [commanders/commands]

TOP SCCRCT//COMINT-UMDRA/TALENT I CCYI I OLC//X1

439

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TO P SCCRCT//COMINT - U M OnA/TALCNT KEYHOIE//X1

USSAG - United States Support Activities Group (the successor to MAC V)

USSID - U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive

VTA - Soviet military air transport arm

ZI - Zone of the interior (i.e., continental United States)

440

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mp<;crPFT//rnMiMT-iimiRPA/TAi cMT*r:vnni emii

(U) Sources

(G//SI) The time period covered by Books III and I V is so recent that there were few
secondary histories of any of it. Notable exceptions wer j very fine history

"EO 1.4. (c)

cryptography during the Inman administration.

and Cfyptologic %mrterly^atti^~maIp»S^^''^ ' P . L . 8 6-36

Jforthcbming history of

also played a useful part. There were few other
internally published secondary sources available. Thus, Books III and IV were produced
through research in primary documents. The two most extensive collections were:

1. (U) The NSA Archives. This consists of two categories of records:

a. (U) Archived records, which have been accessioned into the permanently
retained collection. These appear in footnotes as an accession number (e.g., acc nr 39471)
and a shelf location (e.g., H03-0311-4).

b. (U) Retired records. These are still the property of the donating office and have
not been accessioned. They are identified by a shipment and box number, e.g., 43852,
105915-56.

2. (U) The historical collection of the Center for Cryptologic History (CCH), S542.
This collection of historical documents actually predates the archived collection, and it
contains records going back to the earliest days of cryptology. Records in this collection
generally duplicate those in the Archives, but they are maintained as a separate file for
ease of access by historians. The CCH collection is organized into the following series:

I. Pre-1915

II. 1915-1918 (World War I)

III. 1919-1939 (Interwar period)

IV. 1939-1945 (World War II)

V. 1946-1952 (pre-AFSA and AFSA period)

VI. 1952-present

VII. Special and miscellaneous collections

VIII. Crisis files

IX. Press and journal items

X. References

XI. Papers collected by NSA and pre-NSA officials

XII. Papers collected by NSA historians

XIII. Equipment manuals

XIV. COMSEC documents

XVI. Cryptologic papers duplicated from presidential libraries

Citations from this collection are by series number, followed by subseries designations, for
instance, VI.A.1.9.

TOP SCCnCT/ZCOMlNT-UMPRA/TALENT KEYH O LE//XI

441

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TOP CrrPFT//rniWilMT.IIMBPfl/TAI CMTKTVum C//Y1

3. (U) Oral histories. NSA's oral history collection now comprises nearly 600
interviews with mostly NSA officials on cryptologic topics. This collection is extremely
useful, especially in view of the paucity of official records. Very few subjects covered by
this history were done without reference to oral histories. They are identified by the year
and a one-up number, e.g., 12-94. The most useful for Books III and IV were:

Lew Allen, Jr., 19-96
Eugene Becker, 11-96

119-96

33-96

30-94
1977, unnumbered
15-94 arid.1^96

9 : 86 '<N.N
December 1996 K uniwmbered
David G. Boak. May 1 998; unnumbered
b -86

140-95 -

James V. Boone, 27-86 and unnumbered interview^ June 1998

1 22-95

197.6,' unnumbered

25-96

113-98 ..

-2-97- - -

George R. Cotter, 7-96

6-92

iiii-

V"P.L. 8 6-36

Kenneth deGraffenreid, 5-98
John P. Devine,l-95

January 1997, unnumbered

14-86

4-93 . • ' •

Lincoln D. Faurer, 8 -87

1997, unnumbered

30-87
15 : 96
J4-86

32-87

July 1997, unnumbered

Robert J. Hermann, 45-94

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442

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SECRET//COMINT . UMBRA/TAI.ENT KEYHOUE//X1

February 1997, unnumbered

James G. Hudec, 17-96

5-86

311-97

Bobby R. Inman, 9-97 ,.

•97

Kobert Jackson, February 1997, unnumbered
Timothy W. S. James, 10-97 .
""14 97
10-98

13-86

J5-96

2-87

J10-87.

1.8,86

i-96 ::::

Doyle E. La rson, 15-94, 15-97
^ -1997, unnumbered
]8-92 ~ZZ

February 1997. and April 1998, unnumbered:::
□7-97

Sir Peter Marychurch, 11-89

'Hi'

P.L. 86-36

3 19-85

January 1997, unnumbered
2-93

J23-94 .

March 1997, unnumbered
41-94 y' y "y y

Robert Mueller, 6-8,

. January 1997, unnumbered , .

William E.O dom, 13-97
34-96

J 20-82

~7J September 1997, unnumbered

Russel L. Parker, 52-94
CedlJ Phillins 9.3-33
12-98.

[

1966, unnumbered

Whitney E. Reed, 39-96/
Robert E. Rich, 12-97
Elizabeth Rindskopf, 4-98
I I January 1997, unnumbered

Howard E. Rosenblum, 3-91

I UH SblWI: I//C0MIUT*UMD[1A/TALCNT KEYHOLE//X1

443

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TOP 5ECRET//COMINT-UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1

38-97

15-97

1-92
1992.

KermitH. Spei erman, 2-86
~b-9 3

>IA oral History,

, ESC interview, 1986

24-86

William O. Studem an, 5-91
35-:96

David H. Williams, 23-87

]12-96

1977, unnumbered

Milton Zaslow, 17-93

\' ! 'p.L. 86-36

4^92

4. (U) Internally published, classified, histories included the following:

(U)

Establishment of the

Cryptologic Quarterly, 12:5 (Noforn Issue, 1993)

(U) Boak, David G. A History of U.S. Communications Security [The David G.
Boak Lectures]. Fort Meade: NSA, 1973.

(U) Bradburn, Maj Ge n David D. (USAF, Ret.), Col John 0. Copley (USAF, Ret.),
Raymond B. Potts and

"l97Sj» 1.4. (c)
- 1 EO 1.4. (d)

The SIGINT Reconnaissance Satellites.

Washington: NRO, 1994

(U) interview, [Eryptolpg, December 1976.

'Guardrail: A Joint Tactical SIGINT Support System/'

Cryptologic Spectrum (Spring 1975), 15-18. - " EO 1.4. (c)

(U£ 1 1 /| 1972-1975: An Inside View of Indications and \

Warning," Cryptolog (1st Issue, 1978), 1-8.

(S#Sif

(U)

/ Cryptologic Quarterly, 10:3-4 (Fall/Winter 1991), 1-29.

J The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Cryptologic History. U.S.

' Vol. 8. Fort Meade: NSA,

Cryptologic History, Special Series[

1993.

TO P SECRETY/COMINT - UMBnA/TALCMT KE VHOLE//X1

444

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I UP bblKb I //COM I NT-UMBRA/TALLNT KCY I 10LC//X1

(U)

"The 1983 War Scare in U.S.-Soviet Relations, Studies in

Intelligence, 39:4(1995), 61-72.

[Cryptologic Quarterly, 16:1 (Spring 1997), 75-89.

(U) Hanyok, Robert J. "Scaling Down NSA," NSA Newsletter, January 1995.

(U) . "The Relevant Truths: SIGINT Issues of the Indochina/ I

War, 1950-1975 (Part ID" Cryptologic Quarterly, 16:3 (Fall 1997), 1-50. / j

MO 1.4. (c)

7-9:

-OESEC as a Management Tool." Cryptolog (1st issue, 1975),

PURPLE DRAGON r The Origin and Development o(-4he : -

United States OPSEC Program. U.S. Cryptologic History, Series VI, Vol. 2 ; v Ft. /
Meade: NSA, 1993. ' I

86-36

(U) 1 | . NSA's Involvement in U.S. Foreign SIGINT

Relationships through 1993. U.S. Cryptologic Histpry, Series VI, Vol. ?4. Ft.
Meade: NSA, 1995.

(U)| | "NSA Comes Out 6f the Closet: The Debate Over Public

Cryptography in the Inman Era." Cryptologic Quarterly, 15:1 (Spring 1996), 5-44.

(U) "The Platform Network Evolution," Cryptologic Quarterly,

9:4 (Winter 1991).

An Anierican Perspective^ U.S

(U) Newton, Robert E.\
Cryptologic History Series, Special Series, Crisis Collection, Vol. 4. / Ft. Meade:
NSA, 1991.

(U) Nolte, William.
History. U.S. Cryptologic History Series, # 1. Ft. Meade: NSA, 1981.

An Interim

(U)

Fort Meade: NSA, 1977.

1968-1977.

(U) "Foreign SIGINT Operations: The Legal Side." IAI

International Notes and News. F6rt Meade: NSA, 1993.

"The/Great Conversation." Cryptolog (1st Issue 1992), 2-

(U)
6.

(U] |

NSA, 1988.

Fifty Years of Mathematical Cryptanalysis. Fort Meade:

(U)

et al. "Report of the Second Computer Study Group," NSA

Technical Journal 19:1 (Winter 1974), 21-61.

TOP SECKET//COMINT'UMDnA/TALCNT KEYHOLE//X1

445

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SECRET//COMINT UMBRA/TALENT KCYI I OLC//X1

(U) [Wiley, Edward] On Watch: Profiles from the National Security Agency's Past
40 Years. Ft. Meade: NSA, n.d.

in Intelligence (Fall, 1991), 21-31. (Published by CIA.)

J Studies

5. (U) Internal, but unpublished, historical studies often contain important
information. The more important ones used in this study were:

(U) , "The Reemployed Annuitant (REA) Program in NSA: An

Evaluation of the Agency Archives." CCH files. !

"A Historical Overview of the U.S. SIGINT Effort in

October.4988yin-eqH Series Vr.K:l:4.-

(Uf

EO 1.4. (c)

X "•. 1 EO 1.4. (d)

"A Decade of Change in SIGINT Reporting: The 1970s." 7

August 1979. CCH Series XII.D.

"IOSS and After." 1987 f Available at HQ INSCOM,iFort

Belvoir, Virginia.

(U) ■■"Support to Military Operations: NSA's

Contribution to Operation "Just Cause'. " N.SA/PGIP Class 9101.

(U) "Historical Study of NSA Telecommunications, Annual, ,1973-1975." CCH
Series A. 1.10.

(U) "History of the Poppy Satellite System." October 1978. CCH Series XILOOj
(U) "History of Yakima Research Station:
4S//S11 ~|Historyoi

J ..CCH Series VI.I.L3: ; : : : ,

CCH. Series Vli:89.

:;S [i "'P.SL. 86-36

(U)

"Development of the Australian SIGINT Organization: lA

/EO 1.4. (c)

Synopsis of Major Events from 1947 to 1992." CCH Series yi. J ; l,2:i.

(U) | | "A Brief History of GROF;" CCH files, 1996.

(H I [ Draft, history of 0TAR,,1998, in CCH Series XII.D.

(U) I [ "International Terrorism and the National Security

Agency: The Evolution of a Centralized Response." 1986. CCH files.

(Ul

collection.

] Untitled manuscript on the history

CCH

(U)

1936-1988." CCH Series VI:I.l. 10.
(U)

"As We. Were: An Informal History of Bad Aibling Station,
esVIrl.l.lO.

"History of Menwith Hill Station." CCH Series VI.I.2.11.

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446

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T OP SECKETZ/COMINT - UMDnA/TALCHT KEYHOLE//X1

(U) "The Eagle Watches the Bear: Soviet Involvement in

Afghanistan, 1978-1980." CCH Series VIII.44.

(U) "SIGINT Support to Military Operations" [the Hermann Study]. NSA retired
records, 28792, 80-079.

(U) "Summary of Statutes Which Relate Specifically to NSA arid the Cryptologic
Activities of the Government." Undated manuscript file in CCH files.

..Draft history of computer secufity afNSA. CCHjEiies:

'iP.L. 86-36

6. (U) There are several important documents or . collections of historically valuable
documents that repose in various locations within NSA. The most useful were:

(U)

Study. 1978. CCH Series XII. D.
{SffSrrCDC- l t iles. NSArDireetorate -of Foreign Relations.

Jfiles: NSA; "Directorate of Foreign Relations.
3iles: NSA, Directorate of Foreign Relations.

■mm CDO

«S#Sf) CDO[

EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

(U) CDO UK files. NSA, Directorate of Foreign Relations. j

(U) Drawstring Task Force Report, 10 December 1973. NSA Archives, acp nr
32545. |

(U) Files of NSA's deputy directors, retired records, shipment nr 96026, poxes
104545-10458. This collection was the single most valuable source for these two
books. /

(U) Files of the chief, A2 (office of Soviet analysis), retired records, shipment nr
96226, boxes 105951-56. /

(U) History of the Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program.
DCMCS5321/87JX.

NSA.

(U) HF Modernization Plan (draft). 11 April 1980. CCH Series XII. D.
(U)HF Target Studies, 1975,1978. CCH Series XII.D.

(U) Morrison, John R. (Maj Gen, USAF, Ret.), personal and professional papers in
CCH Series XI.R.

(U) "National Security Agency: The Evolution of a Centralized Response." CCH
files, 1986.

(U) Pelton file. NSA General Counsel office.

(U) Rockefeller Commission Report and related correspondence. NSA Archives,
acc nr 45146N, H07-0201-6.

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447

DOCID: 3807349

T OP SECR E T//COM I NT-UMBWA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1

(U) "Technology for Special Purpose Processors." March 1978. NSA Archives, acc
nr 27451, CBUI 31.

7. (U) A few files and studies by SCE components were used. Available at ALA at
Kelly AFB, San Antonio, are:

(U) "A Historical Monograph of the KAL 007 Incident."

(U) "A History of the USAFSS Airborne SIGINT Reconnaissance Program (ASRP),
1950-1977."

(U) "History of the Electronic Security Command." Annual. (Most are available
in GCH Series X; others can be obtained from AIA, Kelly AFB, San Antonio, TX.)

(U)

EO 1.4. (c)

Chronology of Significant Events in the History of the Electronic Security
Command, 1948-1988."

(U[

I "A- Historical "Study of the rE^abwn^ruSAlgS^
Operations in Southeast Asia (SEA)." San Antonio: USAFSS, 1974.

8. (U) In contrast to Books I and II, outside scholarship played a big role in certain
aspects of the current two books. As NSA's role has become more public, this source of
information will inevitably expand.

Andrew, Christopher. For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the
American Presidency from Washington to Bush. New York: HarperCollins, 1994.

. "The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and .

the Anglo-American Connection," Intelligence and National Security, 4:2 (April
1989), 213-256.

Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982.

Beschloss, Michael, and Strobe Talbot. At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of
the End of the Cold War. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security
Advisor, 1977-1981. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983.

Burrows, William E. Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security. New
York: Random House, 1986.

86-36

Butler, David. The Fall of Saigon. New York: Dell Books, 1985.

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448

DOCID: 3807349

Tnp<;FrpcT//mMiMT.iiiwippArrAi CMTk'cvuni e , »vi

Cline, Ray S. The CIA Under Reagan, Bush and Casey. Washington, D.C.:
Acropolis Books, 1981.

Codes, Keys, and Conflicts: Issues in U.S. Crypto Policy. Report of a Special Panel
of the ACM U.S. Public Policy Committee (USACM). New York: ACM, 1994.

Codevilla, Angelo. Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century. New
York: Free Press, 1992.

Cole, Ronald H. Operation Urgent Fury. Washington, D.C.: JCS Joint History
Office, 1997.

Congressional Quarterly. "The Iran-Contra Puzzle." Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, 1987.

Constance, Paul. "How Jim Bamford Probed the NSA," Cryptologia, 21:1 (January
1997), 71-74.

Dam, Kenneth W., and Herbert S. Lin (eds.). Cryptography's Role in Securing the
Information Society. National Research Council, Computer Science and
Telecommunications Board. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996.

Dobrynin, Anatoly. In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold
War Presidents (1962-1986). New York: Times Books Division of Random House,
1995.

Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth and Caleb Baker. Operation Just Cause: The
Storming of Panama. New York: Lexington Books, 1991.

Draper, Theodore. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affair. New York: Hill
and Wang, 1991.

Early, Pete. Family of Spies: Inside the John Walker Spy Ring. New York:
Bantam Books, 1988.

Goldschmidt, Arthur. A Concise History of the Middle East. Boulder: Westview
Press, 1979.

Greene, John Robert. The Presidency of Gerald Ford. Lawrence, Kansas:
University of Kansas Press, 1995.

Guilmartin, John F. Jr. A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle ofKoh
Tang. College Station, Texas: Texas A&MPress, 1995.

Herring, George. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-
1975. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986.

Hersh, Seymour. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New
York: Summit Books, 1983.

. The Target is Destroyed: What Really Happened to Flight 007

and What America Knew About It. New York: Random House, 1986.

TOP SECRET//COMINT-UMDRA/TALCNT KCYI IOLC//X1

449

DOCID: 3807349

TOP 5ECHET//C O MIN I ' -UMBtW I ALbN I KfcVHOLbVXI

Johnson, L. K. A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation.
Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1985.

Kagan, Robert. A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990.
New York: Free Press, 1996.

Kahn, David. "Cryptology Goes Public." Foreign Affairs, Vol 58:1 (Fall 1979),
141-59.

. "Big Ear or Big Brother?" New York Times Magazine, May 16,

1976, 62-72

. "Soviet COMINT in the Cold War," Cryptologia, 1:18 (January

1988).

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Penguin Books, 1983.

Kneece, Jack. Family Treason: The Walker Spy Case. Briarcliffe Manor, NY:
Stein and Day, 1986.

Nelson, Dick, and Julie Koenen-Grant. "A Case of Bureaucracy in Action: The
U.S. Embassy in Moscow," International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, Fall, 1993.

O'Toole, G.J.A. Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence Espionage
and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA. New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 1991.

Peck, Winslow. "U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir." Ramparts, August 1972,
36-50.

Persico, Joseph. Casey: From the OSS to the CIA. New York: Viking Penguin,
1990.

Ploss, Sidney I. Moscow and the Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet Policies
and Intentions. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.

Polmar, Norman, and Thomas B. Allen. Merchants of Treason. New York:
Delacourte Press, 1988.

Powers, Thomas. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.

Prados, John. "The War Scare of 1983," Military History Quarterly, 9:3 (Spring
1997), 63-73.

Ranelagh, John. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1986.

Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993.

TOH SfcCKb T Z/COMlN l ' -UMBRA/TALEMT KEY! ) OLD/X 1

450

DOCID: 380734 9

TOP S E CftET//COMIMT-UMDnA/TALCNT KCYHOUE//X1

Smist, Frank. Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-
1989. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990.

Spiegel, Steven L. The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East.
Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1988.

Talbot, Strobe. Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. New York: Harper and
Row, 1979.

Theis, Wallace J., and James D. Harris. "An Alliance Unravels: The United
States and ANZUS." Naval War College Review, Summer 1993, 98-123.

Theoharis, Athan. Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the
HustonPlan. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978.

Toohey, Brian, and William Pinwill. Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret
Intelligence Service. Port Melbourne, Australia: Octopus Publishing Group, 1990.

Turner, Stansfield. Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1983.

Walsh, Lawrence E. Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up. New
York: Norton and Co., 1997.

Weaver, Mary Ann. "Burying the Martyrs," New Yorker, January 1993.

White, Theodore H. Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon. 1st ed. New
York: Atheneum Publishers, 1975.

Woodward, Bob. Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1987.

9. (U) Material from the presidential libraries played a key role in this book. Those
visited were:

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California

TOP SECRE TOIUMIN l-UMBK/V lALbN I KEYHOLE//X1

451

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SECRCT//COM1NT - UMDRA/7ALKN I Kb * HULb/yX I

Index

40 Committee

Aaron, David, 104, 257
Abbas, Abu, 352, 355, 360
Able Archer, 319
Abrams, Elliott, 380
Abzug, Bella, 93, 98-99

ACLU - see American Civil Liberties Union

ACRP - see Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program

Adak, Alaska, 44, 134

AFCEA - see Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association
AFSCC - see Air Force Special Communications Center
AFSS - see United States Air Force Security Service

Agee, Jerry, 423

Agency Standard Host (ASH), 291

Agency Standard Terminal Workstation (ASTW), 291

Agnew, Spiro, 182

AGRA (A Group Reporting Authority), 124

Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program (ACRP), 1, 37, 372
Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF), 2, 9, 15, 38, 55-56, 60, 382

TOP SCCRCT//COMlNT - UMPnA/TALCNT KCY1 I OLC//X1

453

DOCID: 3807349

TOP 5 E CRE T //€OMINT-UMDRA/TALCNT KCYI IOLC//X1

Airborne SIGINT Reconnaissance Program (ASRP), 37, 182

Air Force Intelligence Center, 73

Air Force Special Communications Center, 72, 123

Air Force Special Projects Division (SAFSPD), 131, 133

AK-reports, 392-393 _^L~

ALA - see American Library Association ...
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Bureau of, 361

Allen, Charles, 392

Allen, Lew, 9, 11, 25-26, 30, 34, 41, 46, 51, 65-66, 72-73, 84-8(3, 88-91,93^94,96, 99-100, 103,
106, 111, 123, 148, 153, 163, 180, 189, 192, 198, 208, 228-229, 246, 293, 300

Allen, Richard, 270

Amal, 349-350

| - - ~ -f " -f— ~ ~ ~yP. L 86-36

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 428
American Council on Education (ACE), 238
American Library Association (ALA), 428
Ames, Aldrich, 414
Amin, Hafizullah, 251-253
Ampex, Inc., 223

AMPS (Automatic Message Processing System), 141-142

Anderson, Jack, 81-82, 102, 121,150, 414 .
Andrew, Christopher, 265, 308, 379

Andropov, Yuri, 318, 331
Angleton, James J., 365

?EO 1.4. (c)

"/EO 1.4. (c)
/ EO 1.4. (d)

IOP&bCKfcl/;COM>W T -UH/ I BRA/TALEMTKEYHOLE//X 1

454

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TOP SECRET//COMINT . UMBRA/TAI , ENT KFYHfil F / VX1

ANZUS,304, 312

Apex (project name), 198-199 /go 1.4. (d)

Arafat, Yasser, 359

ARDF - see Airborne Radio Direction Finding
Armacost, Michael, 393

Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association (AFCEA), 238

Armstrong, Anne, 265

Army Security Agency (ASA), 1, 9, 25- 27, 31,43, 35-37, 53-57, 70-73, 85,166, 226-228,
245, 278-79, 390

Arneson, Michael, 404

ARPANET, 155[

ASA - see Army Security Agency

ASRP- see Airborne SIGINT Reconnaissance Program

ASTW - see Agency Standard Terminal Workstation
AT&T, 83, 146, 148, 297

Atkinson, Richard, 238

Attain Document (exercise name), 355

EO 1.4(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

Austin, Frank, 61, 65
Austin, Hudson, 371

TOP < tFfRFT7"" n M IM T WVVtWM C HT VTYHOI P i ll
455

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T O P SKRET//COMIMT UMBRA/TAIEMT KEYHOIE//X1

Autodin (Automatic Digital Network), 141
Autosevocom, 142
Aviation Week, 124

Baker Panel, 215 j
Bamford, James, 426-428 I

Bani Sadr, Abdul Hassan, 249 I

I ., -"ISO 1.4. (c)
| E0 1.4.(d)

Ban Me Thuot, Vietnam, 3, 5
Banner, Roy, 85, 112

Barletta, Nicolas Ardito, 380 . x

Barri, Nabith, 350-351 .
Barry, Ann, 265, 412

Bauded Signals Upgrade (project name), 192, 209-210, 215, 221-223, 411

_ . - - - - ' ' EO 1.4(c)

Becker, Eugene, 166, 228, 31 1
Beecher , William, 101

Bell, Ernest, 291,296

Bellfield, 143

Bell, Griffin, 104, 196

Bell Laboratories, 231, 291

Bendix Corporation, 151, 166, 308

Bennett, Donald, 87 EO 1.4. (d)

TOP SEeHETZ/eOMINT-UMBRA/ T ALENT KEYHOLE//XI

456

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TO P 3ECRET//COMINT-UMBRA/TALCNT KCYI IOLC//X1

::r= ' ! P.L. 86-36

Bennett, Fred Warren, 413

E0 1.4.(c)

1 EG) 1.4. (d)

Bermudez, Enrique, 389

Bernard, Richard, 54, 130, 298, 306, 310, 312

Bernstein, Carl, 79, 340

Bertrand, Gustave, 109

Beschloss, Michael, 407

Bien Hoa, Vietnam, 1
Bishop, Maurice, 371

Black Friday, 401 EO 1 A(c)

Black September, 176, 346

Black Widow Mountain, Vietnam, 55

Black, William, 66, 310

Bletchley Park, 110

Blue Spoon (military plan), 381-383

Boak, David, 124, 234, 294, 417

| - — " " — " ~~ ~EO 1.4. (d)

Boardman, Norman, 71

Bogus War Message, 319

Boland, Edward, 237, 389

Boland Amendment, 389

Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Incorporated, 155

Boone, James, 221-222

Border Patrol, 361

Boren, David, 286

Boyce, Christopher, 127-128

T O P SECRET//COM I N T -U MBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X 1

457

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IUH bfcLKb I//COM I N T -UMBRA/TALENT KEYI IOLE//X1

Bracy, Arnold, 406
Bradlee, Ben, 415-416

/EO 1.4. (d)

Brezhnev, Leonid, 118, 122, 183, 255, 317
BROP (B Remote Operations Facility), 50-51, 166, 208, 214
Brooks, Jack, 99, 296
Brownell, George, 65
Brown, Harold, 222

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 104, 148-149, 194, 196, 202, 231, 239, 255, 257/260, 268, 270, 317
BSU - see Bauded Signals Upgrade

/EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

Buffham, Benson, 15, 88, 162; ,191, 228, 306

]

Bunker, Ellsworth, 202

P.L. 86-36

EO 1.4. (c)

P.L. 86-36

P. L. 86-36
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4(d)

Bush, George, 68, 122, 193, 230, 361, 383

Caddell, Pat, 260

"EO 1.4. (c)

Callaghan, James, 198

TOP GCCRCT//COMINT-UMPRA/TALC N T KCVI IOLC//X1

458

DOCID: 3807349

I OP bblKb I //COMI N I -U MDRA/TALCNT KEYIIO L E// X 1

Calvocorresi, Peter, 110

I. _ - - — ~ '.' r P . L . 8 6-36

Canberra, Australia, 160
Canine, Ralph, 191, 224

Carlucci, Frank, 197, 270, 296, 395
Carney, Jeffrey Martin, 425-426
Carson, Neil, 153
Carter, Billy, 197

Carter, Jimmy, 51, 59, 109-110, 148-149, 164, 168, 189, 193-194>196-200, 202, 236, 245-
246, 248-249, 251-252, 254-262, 263, 268, 270, 317, 349, 361, 388-3$9

Carter, Marshall, 87, 96, 268, 292, 427

Carter, Rosalynn, 260.

I > \ ;:™-~-~:' !! 'eo 1.4. (c>

Castro, Fidel, 371, 388 *C"

CCP - see Consolidated Cryptologic Program)

CDC (Control Data Corp.), 120-121, 153, 157, 222, 291 .

""l6 1.4 . (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 5-6, 9, 15, 45, 52, 59-61, 63-66, 80, 82, 85-87, 91, 95, 97,
99, 101-102, 104, 107-108, 104, 180, 183-185, 193-194, 196-197, 202, 224-231, 233, 245-
247, 249, 253-254, 257-260, 258, 265-266, 282, 289, 295, 298-299, 302-304, 307-308, 316-
317, 329 345-346, 360, 364-368, 380, 382, 384, 388-389, 391-393, 402, 411, 420

TOP SECRET//COM I NT UMBRA/TALENT KCYHOLC//X 1

459

DOCID: 380734 9

TO P SECRET//COMINT-UMBRA/TALENT KCYI I0LC//X1

Central Security Service (CSS), 26, 59, 61, 63-66, 70-72, 343

I EO 1.4. (c)

EO 1.4. (d)

Chamorro, Violetta, 388

/ I - ;;;;::" : -" t!! '''EO 1.4. (d)

Cheo Reo, Vietnam, 5

Chraidi, Yasser, 359
Christopher, Warren, 259

Church, Frank, 85, 92-100, 105, 107-109, 111-112, 258, 397, 415, 426-427

CIA - see Central Intelligence Agency

CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific), 9, 63, 89, 213

Civiletti, Benjamin, 197

Clark, Ronald, 110
Clark, William, 270, 289

Claytor, Graham, 296

~ " " /EO 1.4. (c)

Clements, William P., 24-26, 41, 43, 207

Clifford, Clark, 107

Coard, Bernard, 371

Coast Guard, 105,294

COC, 141

TOP SECRET//COM1NT UMBRA/TALEMT K 6 YHOL£//y . 1

460

DOCID: 3807349

T ftp ccrpc-rv/rnn/iiMT i iiwinn r, nrn i tmt if rv r mi r tnr 4

COINS (Community On-line Information System), 155
Colby, William, 59, 91, 95, 127, 228, 365

Collection Operations Position Evaluation System (COPES), 25, 283-284, 288
Collins International, 33, 367
Colson, Charles, 80

1 __ „ • ~ : ~ : ;:Wpo 1.4. ( c )

Commerce Department, 148-149, 193, 237, 295-296 /'/ !

Computer Security Act (1987), 294

Comsat Corporation, 135, 137

Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), 23-24, 39, 44, 53, 162-163, 192/217, 222, 224,
230,282-283,285,289

Conventional Signals Upgrade (CSU), 215, 215, 221-223
COPES - see Collection Operations Position Evaluation
Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, 213

Cotter, George R., 123, 284, 293-294
Cox, Archibald, 86, 183

Cray computer, 153, 218, 222, 224, 291
Cray, Seymour, 153

CRD - see Institutes for Defense Analyses

Criticomm, 141, 152

" S 'P.L. 8 6-36

.,"™"EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

TOP SECRK T V/LUMIN l-UMBKA/ 1 ALbW 1 KE VHOLU/X1

461

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SCCnCT//COM I NT*UMBRA/TALENT K E YHOLE//X I

Crowell, William P., 413-414

CSOC - see Current SIGINT Operations Center

CSS - see Central Security Service

CSU- see Conventional Signals Upgrade

Cuban Missile Crisis, 84, 145, 183, 264, 331, 387-388, 390

Current SIGINT Operations Center (CSOC), 123, 152

Customs, Bureau of, 294, 361 | [ - - - „ ______

1 _____ -- - - — ~ ' . ::: ^^^^vo 1.4. ( c )

Czechoslovakia, invasion of| |ll7,252T25 4r |

Da Nang, Vietnam, 5-7
Dancers, 10, 15

Daniels, Harry, 269, 294, 393, 395

Daoud, Mohammed, 251

I — ~ -76^ ~ " " Pi. 86-36
1 EO 1 A(c)

DARPA - see Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Data Encryption Standard (DES), 161, 232-234, 237, 239, 286, 294, 304, 309

Davida, George ! 1 237-238 " - -

P.L. 86-36

Davidov, Constantino, 374-375

Davidson, Max, 141

Davidson, Phillip, 64

Davis, Ruth, 232, 369

Daysend (computer program), 152

DCA (Defense Communications Agency), 141-142, 297

TOP SECRFT//CQMINT - UM B RA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1

462

DOCID: 3807349

DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration), 105, 361, 363

Dean, John, 91

Dean, John Gunther, 8-9

Debayle, Anastasio Somoza, 388

DeBroekert, Jim, 80

Deeley, Walter, 108, 152, 155, 291, 294, 297, 395, 403, 406, 421

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 155
Defense Communications Agency - see DCA
Defense Communications Satellite System - see DSCS

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 18, 58, 60, 87, 180, 184-185, 141, 155, 190, 246, 248,
266, 293, 336, 339, 372-373, 376

Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS), 141, 290
Defense Supply Agency, 292

DEFSMAC (Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center), 141, 206-230, 284, 320
deGraffenreid, Kenneth, 295, 393
Dellums, Ronald, 96
Delvalle, Arturo, 380
Deng Tsao Ping, 255-256

Derwinski, Edward, 1 04, 197

DES - see Data Encryption Standard

Devine, John P. (Jack), 222-223

DGTS - see Directorate General of Technical Security

DIA - see Defense Intelligence Agency

Diffie, Whitfield, 233-234

P.L. 86-36
EO 1.4(c)
EO 1.4(d)

.•EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

EO 1.4. (c)

EO 1.4. (d)

TOP SECRET//COMI NT-UMBRA/ T ALENT KEYHOLE//X 1

463

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SCCRET//COM1MT UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1

Directorate General of Technical Security, 1-3, 5-6, 9, 15, 312-313

Dobrynin.Anatoly, 117

Donnelly, James, 274

Downie, Len, 415

EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

Drug Enforcement Administration - see DEA
DSD - see Defence Signals Directorate

DSSCS - see Defense Special Security Communications System ,
Dubs, Adolph, 252

Dulles, Allen, 224
Durenburger, David, 416

Eachus Committee, 215

Earle, Ralph, 203
Easter Offensive, 1,3

I „ — — ~"EO 1.4. (d)

Eitan, Rafael, 422

El Dorado Canyon, 356-357

TOP SECRET//COMINT'UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1

Drake, Robert, 106, 162, 191, 243

464

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SECRET//COMINT-UMBRA/TALENT KEY H OLE//X1

Electronic Security Command - see ESC

Ellsberg, Daniel, 80-81
Ellsworth, Robert, 230, 246

Enigma, 109-111, 216, 219, 221

EO 1.4. (c)

.--■yf EO 1.4. (d)

EO 11905, 199
EO 12036, 199

P.L. 86-36

Ervin, Sam, 79, 91

ESC (Electronic Security Command), 72, 73, 223, 287, 289, 306, 321, 323-324, 425-426
E-Systems, Inc., 37, 245

• ; EO 1.4. (c)

Fairchild, 145 -

Family Jewels Report, 91

Far East Economic Review, 1 00
Faulkner, David, 412

Faurer, Lincoln D., 266-268; 270, 275, 292, 327, 332, 371-373, 402, 428

Federal Communications Act (1934), 83

TOP SECRET//COMINT UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1

465

DOCID: 3807349

TO P SCCRCT//COM I NT-UMDRA/TALCNT KCYI I0LC//X1

Fiestel, Horst, 232

- - — " - _ " P.L. 86-36

Fielding, Lewis, 80
Financial Times (London), 358
Finksburg, Maryland, 297

FISA - see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Fitzhugh, Gilbert W., 57-58

P.L. 86-36
EO 1.4(c)

FLR-9 (project name), 26-27, 30, 36-37, 44, 158, 165
FOIA-see Freedom of Information Act

" " ~ "7 : "eo 1.4. ( c )

Ford Aerospace Corp., 132

Ford, Gerald R., 12, 16-18, 59, 79, 91, 94, 97-100, 110, 118, 127, 132, 146, 148, 190, 199-
200, 263, 361

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 106-107
Foreign Technology Division (FTD) , 63
Forrestal, James, 84

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 373, 380-381
Fort Devens, Massachusetts, 70
Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 70
Fort Knox, Kentucky, 21 1

Fort Meade, Maryland, 26, 40, 43-50, 52-54, 61, 64, 122-123, 129-132, 140, 164, 180, 208,
210, 214, 227, 233, 235, 245, 250, 255, 275, 277-278, 285, 288-289, 291, 294, 325, 356, 386,
394

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, 211
Fort Stewart, Georgia, 424
Fossett, B.C. (Bud), 248-249

TOP Si C BETV/COMtNT UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1

466

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SCCRCT//CO M INT - UMDRA/TALCNT 1CCYI I0LC//X1

I , — P . L . 8 6-36

Franks Report, 379

Fraser, Malcolm, 161, 302

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 426

Frequent Wind, 10

FSCS (Future SIGINT Capabilities Study), 281-282
Fubini, Eugene, 127

,jfm 1.4. (c)

Fulbright, J. William, 107

Future SIGINT Capabilities Study - See FSCS

1 '** "" EO 1 . 4 . ( c )

I " EO 1.4. (d)

Gaddhafi, Muhammar, 175, 347, 354-356
Galtieri, Leopoldo, 374-375
Gannett, E.K., 235

GAO - see General Accounting Office

i zm

Gayler, Noel, 9-12, 21, 55, 60-61, 63-65, 87-89

GCHQ - See Government Communications Headquarters

GCSB (Government Communications Security Bureau), 304

Gelb, Lawrence, 81

General Accounting Office (GAO), 141

General Austerity in Government Expenditures Act, 21

General Services Administration (GSA), 273, 294-295

GE - see General Electric

General Dynamics Corporation, 145

TOP SECRET//COM1MT UMDfWTALCWT KCYI IOLC//X1

467

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SCCnCTOCOMINT UMBRA/TALENT KCYI I OLE//X1

General Electric Corporation (GE), 145

Gesell, Gerhard, 397

Ghorbanifar, Manucher, 392

Glomar Explorer (project name), 101
Godding, Terence, 70
Golden Triangle, 273, 363-365
Goldwater, Barry, 92, 94, 265-266, 391
Goodfellow AFB, Texas, 72, 211-212, 425

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 428
Gordievsky, Oleg A., 319
Gore, Albert, 107

7'EO 1.4. (c)
' ED 1.4. (d)

P.L. 86-36

...fyEO 1.4. (c)

Graham, Daniel, 180, 184
Graham, Katherine, 416

Greenville, Texas, 37

Grenada, 267, 297, 371-374, 379, 385

Grumman Corporation, 145

TO P SECRET//COMINT - UMDRA/TALC N T KCYI IOLC//X1

468

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SECRET//COMINT-UMDRA/TALCNT KCV I I0LC//X1

Guardrail (project name), 55, 390

Gulf of Tonkin Crisis, 390

Gunman (project name), 402-403, 406

EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

Habash, George, 176

Habib, Phillip, 34, 103

HAC - see House Appropriations Committee

Hagelin, 82, 158

Haig, Alexander, 296

Haldeman, Robert, 88

Hall, Albert, 24, 26, 39-41, 45, 64, 228, 231

Hall, James, 424-426

I ~ '""EO 1.4. (c)

Hanoi, 3, 5, 7, 9, 117, 160, 255

Harris Corporation, 33, 47, 54, 312-313

"1 .. . • " EC 1 . 4 . ( d )

Hart, Gary, 92

Hart, Phillip, 92 P-L- 86-36

Harvest (project name), 48-49, 151
Hasenfus, Eugene, 387, 391

Hausman, Arthur H., 223
Haver, Richard, 415
Hawke, Bob, 302-304
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, 199

I UP bbLKfa I//LUM I N l -UMBKA/ 1 ALLN I KbVHULb//XI

469

DOCID: 3807349

TOP S E CRET/ZCOMINT - UMDnA/TALCNT KCYI I OLO/X1

Hebern, F. Edward, 107
Hellman, Martin, 233-234, 238
Helms, Jesse, 381

Helms, Richard, 58-59, 85, 87, 101, 105, 122
Hermann, Robert, 39, 66-68, 133, 283-284
Hersh, Seymour, 91, 333, 381, 415
Heyman, Michael, 237
Hezbollah, 349

L •- -- - ;;;; :7:;;-:.-::;Tv 'eo 1.4. (<=)

Hinslcy, Harry, 110
Hodgson, Dudley (Butch), 412

Hollo way, Bruce, 190
Holmes, Jasper, 110

Honecker, Eric, 428
Honeywell, 152, 155

Hoover Commission, 57
Hoover, J. Edgar, 87-88, 106
Hope, R.M., 161

/ I - - — - ~~ - : " EO 1.4. (d)

- - r— - " — ~ ~ " P . L. 86-36

Houghton-Mifflin Company, 426

House Appropriations Committee (HAC), 226, 228-230

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), 104, 108, 237, 389, 396
Houston, Lawrence, 107

TOP SECnET/ZCOMIHT UMBRA/TALENT KCYI IOLC//X1

470

DOCID: 3807349

TOP 5ECRET//C0 Ml NT'U M B RA/TALE NT KEYHOLE//X I

Howard AFB, Panama, 382
Howard, Edward Lee, 411-412

HPSCI - see House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Huddleston, Warren, 92
Hue, Vietnam, 5
Hughes Tool Company, 41
Hughes, Harry, 292
Hughes-Ryan Amendment, 389
Humphrey, Hubert, 80
Hun Sen, 254
Hunt, Howard, 80, 375
Huntington, Samuel, 246

Hussein, KinglbnTalal El-Hashim, 161, 176,424
Huston, Tom Charles, 87-88

IATS (Improved AG-22 Terminal System), 50, 141, 152, 209

IBM (International Business Machines), 41, 142,145, 148, 152, 210, 232, 289-291, 403
IC staff - see Intelligence Community staff
IDDF, 141, 152, 290

IEEE - see Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IengSary, 18 _ -- 'eo 1.4. (c)

Immigration and Naturalization Service, 361
Indo-Pakistan War, 129

TOP SEC R ET//COM I NT UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLC//X1

471

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SCCnCT//COMI N T - UMDnA/TALENT KCYI I 0LC//X1

Inman, Bobby R., 71-72, 89, 104, 111-112, 149, 164, 167, 189-193, 196-199, 207-211, 221-
224, 230-231, 234-241, 248-249, 253, 263, 265-266, 282-283, 293, 295, 300, 375, 395, 406

INSCOM (Intelligence and Security Command), 70-73, 223, 279,306, 376, 424

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 233, 235

Institutes for Defense Analyses/Communications Research Division (IDA/CRD), 80, 219

Intelligence and Security Command - see INSCOM

Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC), 70

Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC), 5

Intelligence Community (IC) staff, 59, 185, 221, 293

International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) ,235 j
IPAC - Intelligence Center Pacific, 5, 18 /

Iran-Contra, 270, 368,381,387,392,395-397 E0 1.4.(c) /
' EO 1.4. (d) |

ITAC - see Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center I

ITAR - see International Traffic in Arms Regulation s
ITT (International Telephone and Telegraph), 297 f

I - ~- '-- - "::..:^: ::::: ~;" i! 'EO 1.4. ( c)

Jackson, Henry M., 118
Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 316-317
Jason Panel, 406
JCS - see Joint Chiefs of Staff

■----""•""p . L , 8 6-36

Johnson, Louis, 84

Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 85, 117, 195, 200

TOP 5ECRr.T//COMINT ' UMDnA/TALCNT KCVHOLE//X1

472

DOCID: 380734 9

TOP SECRET//COMIMT UMDRA/TALCNT KEY H OLE//X1

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 177, 182, 267, 292, 297-298, 248-249, 300, 319, 371-373, 379,
381, 393

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIG), 383

Jones, David, 248 \

^ I - ~ - EO 1.4(c)

1 EO 1.4(d)

Jordan, Hamilton, 260

| - - - - - ~: - ~ - " ~ ~" ~ P . L . 86-36

Just Cause (military operation), 148, 225, 227, 237, 255, 257, 319, 348, 361, 379, 384, 388,
392

Justice Department (U.S.), 84, 103, 148, 161 , 197, 362, 416, 424, 427-428

"~ I ;; : ' := 'eo 1.4. (c)

EO 1.4. (d)

Kahn, David, 100-101, 233, 237, 367
KAL-007, 265, 319-321, 327, 329-330, 332-333
Kalb, Marvin, 83

Kosygin, Alexei, 81
Kreps, Juanita, 193
Kriangsak Chamanand, 166
Krogh,Egil(Bud),80
Kuklinski, Ryszard, 316-318

| - — ™ " 7'EO 1.4. (c)

KW-7, 127, 297, 417, 420-421
KW-26, 150-151, 297
KW-37,417,420
KY-3,150,421
KY-8/28/38,143,421

TOP SECRCT//COMIMT UMB R A/TALENT KEYHO L E//X1

473

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SCCnCT/ZCOMINT - UMDnA/TALCNT KCYI 10LC//X1

: -- -.■.•;:,•■=-- - E0 x _ 4 _ (d)

Laird, Melvin, 60-61, 103, 406 • " ~-p-- :

- • ~ " " " E0 1.4.(c)

Lange, David, 304

Langley, Virginia, 59, 64, 162,179, 194, 199, 225-226, 22&2.30, 245, 247, 316-318, 392

Larson, Doyle, 73

Lee, Daulton, 411

Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 251, 315
Leuchai, 36
Levi, Edward, 106
Levin, Meyer (Mike), 240, 428
Lewin, Ronald, 110
Liberty (ship name), 182, 333
Libya, 175, 250, 264, 303, 355-357, 359-360, 416
Liddy , G. Gordon, 80
Linowitz, Sol, 202

Little, Arthur H. Company, 136, 192
Lloyd's Bank, 232

Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation (LMSC), 41, 80, 1,48, 282

TOP SECKET/ZCOMINT-UMBRA/ T ALEN T HbVHOLfcy/X I

474

,"?EO 1.4. (c)
,.-■"'/ EO 1.4. (d)

DOCID; 3807349

TOP SCCIinV/COM I MT UMBRA/TALENT KCYI IOLC//X1

Lonetree, Clayton, 406
Lon Nol, 7,9

Lord, Charles R. (Dick), 303, 327-328, 333, 346, 359, 395
Lourdes, Cuba, 257

Lucifer (computer algorithm), 232

Lutwiniak, William, 207 .
Lynch, Mark, 427-428

EO 1.4. (c)

MAC - see Military Airlift Command
MACV, 5

Magnuson, Warren, 235

[

Manchester Guardian, 82

P.L. 86-36

EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

TOP SECnET/ZCOMINT UMBRA/TALENT KCYI IOLC//X1

475

DOCID: 3807349

TOP GECflET//COMlNT - UMDnA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1

EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

Marshall (George C.) Library, 426-428
Martin, David, 353, 365

Martin, Graham, 9-10, 14 EO 1 . 4 . ( d )

Masterman, John, 109

Matlock, Jack, 407
Mauborgne, Joseph, 83, 86
Mayaguez, 15-18, 106
McCain, John, 63
McCord, James, 79

- .. . s/EO 1.4. ( c )

McFadden, George, 221

McParlane, Robert M., 270, 354, 397 >; •

McMahon, John, 284
McMathias, Charles, 92
McNamara, Robert, 107-108

I _ - — :^ t- :: " """7 : " : "P . L . 8 6-36

Meese, Edwin, 270

izzr

TOP S ECRET//COMINT UMDIWTALCNT ICCY 1 IOLC//X1

476

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SECRE T /KOMINT-UMBRA/TALENT KEVHOLEffX I

Menzies, Robert, 159

1'--, EO 1.4. (d)

Meyer, Joseph, 235-236

Military Airlift Command (MAC), 11

Military Sealift Command, 334 \

Miller, Carl, 295

Minaret, 83-86, 94, 98

f EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

Mitchell, John, 85-86, 88
Mitterand, Francois, 379

Moffett Naval Air Station, California, 80

Mondale, Walter, 92,94,149,233

EO 1.4. (c)

Moreau, Arthur, 393

Moro.Aldo, 348

Morrison, John, 53, 57, 61, 129

Morrison, Robert E., 64

Moscow Literaturnaya Gazeta, 329

I _ - — P.L. 8 6-36

TOP SCCnCT//COMl N T - UMDl\A/TAL,CNT KCV1 IOLC//X1

477

DOCID: 3807349

TO P SECRET7/COMINT-UMBRA/TALENT KEYUOLE//X1

Mossad, 422

I - - — ~ ;::::";;;?' : "'''eo i . 4 . • ( c )

Motorola, 297

Mubarak, Hosni, 264, 352-353
Mueller, Robert, 396
Murphy, Robert D., 65-66

Muskie, Edmund, 260

NACSI - see NATO Advisory Committee for Special Intelligence
Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 176

National Bureau of Standards (NBS), 232-233, 294, 296

National Cryptologic Command, 59-60

National Institute of Standards and Technology - see NIST

National Narcotics Border Interdiction System - see NNBIS

National Operations Intelligence Watch Officer Network (NOIWON), 18

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 68, 90, 131, 134, 283-284, 286, 300-301

National Science Foundation, 234, 238

National Security Defense Memorandum 266, 145

National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), 237
National Telecommunications Information Security Committee (NTISC), 296
National Times, 160

Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC), 422-423
Naval Investigative Service (NIS), 423

T OP SECRE T /ZCOMlNT-UMBHArf ALENT KCVI IOLC//X1

478

"ko 1.4. (c)
p 1.4. (d)

1
[

t "P.L. 86-36

!
!

DOCID: 3807349

— TOP SCCnnV/COMINT'UMBRA/TAL E NI Kb V HOLE// A I

Naval Research Laboratory ( NRL), 135-136

Naval Security Group (NSG), 23, 45, 51, 82, 134, 136, 153, 223, 225, 367, 421, 426
NBC, 85, 319, 416

NBS - see National Bureau of Standards

Neclzi, Lucien, 95
Neff, Paul, 61, 153

Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, 148
New Republic, 197
Newsweek, 99, 354

NISC - see Naval Intelligence Support Center

NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), 294, 296

Nixon Letter, 59, 61

Nixon, Richard, 18, 57-59, 79-81, 87-88, 105, 117, 119, 182-183, 200
NNBIS (National Narcotics Border Interdiction System), 361, 363
NOIWON - see National Operations Intelligence Watch Officer Network
Noriega, Manuel, 202, 380-381, 383-385
North, Oliver, 327, 353

^?EO 1.4. (c)

P.L. 86-36

New York Post, 354

New York Times, 80-81, 91, 94, 97-98, 100, 197, 381, 415

EO 1.4. (c)

Nhon,PhamVan,3,15 E0 1.4.(d)

Nicolai, Carl, 235

NPIC (National Photographic Interpretation Center), 339-340

I ' OP SECRKT//COMINT-UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1

479

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SECRET//COMINT-UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1

NRL - see Naval Research Laboratory

NRO - see National Reconnaissance Office

NSASAB (NSA Scientific Advisory Board), 153, 236, 292

NSCID (National Security Council Directive) 6, 61, 88, 185, 229, 363

NSDD (National Security Decision Directive) 145, 294-296

NSDD 178, 339

NSDD 298, 295

NSG- see Naval Security Group

NSOC (National SIGINT Operations Center), 141, 152, 155, 182, 249, 323, 333, 351, 357
NSRL - see National SIGINT Requirements List

NTISC - see National Telecommunications Information Security Committee

O'Brien, Lawrence, 80

Ogarkov, Nicolai, 254, 329-330

ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence), 86, 193
ONR - see Office of Naval Research

OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), 182, 345
Operation Phoenix, 10
Operations Advisory Group, 105

]

,-;.; ::: "'eO 1.4. (c)

Office of Naval Research (ONR), 234

TOP SECRET//COMINT UMBRA/TALEMT KEYHOLE//X1

480

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SECRET//GOMINT-UMBRA/TAIENT KEYHOIE//X1

I - - — - - - - ~" ~" ''.:pf EO 1.4. ( c )

Ortega, Daniel, 388-390

OSS (Office of Strategic Services), 86, 263
OTAR(over-the-airrekeying), 297-298 '.' :>< ---...
Overhead Collection Management Center (OCMC), 284, 357, 376 ""'

1 f-^EO 1.4. (c)

" / E0 1.4.(d)

PACOM (Pacific Command), 211

I - - f " ' "~ ! 'p . L . 8 6-36

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 176, 197, 207, 248, 352 ..

Pan Am 103, 325, 331, 360

Panamanian Defense Force - see PDF

PARPRO (Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program), 44

Pasta, John, 234
Pastora, Eden, 388-389
Pavlovskij, Ivan G., 252-253
PD-24, 148, 236, 296

PDF (Panamanian Defense Force), 381, 383-385

Pearl Harbor attack, 109, 180, 183, 185, 213, 254, 265, 377

Peck, Winslow - see Fellwock, Percy

Pelton, Ronald, 150, 223, 359, 366, 397, 410-416, 423, 425

Pentagon Papers, 372-373, 416

TOP GECnCTOCOMlMT-UMBKA/ lALbN I Kb Y HULbVXI

481

DOCID: 3807349

TO P SCCRET//C0M1NT-UMDRA/TALCNT KCYI I 0LC//X1

Penthouse magazine, 100

Perry, William, 39, 120, 127, 217-219, 223

Persico, Joseph, 190

"Eb 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

Pezzullo, Anthony, 388

PFIAB - see President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Phillips, Cecil, 155
Phillips, Samuel, 89
Phuoc Long, Vietnam, 3

Pike, Otis, 95-99, 107-108, 111-112, 185-186, 397
Pincher, Chapman, 83

Platform (computer system), 155
Pleiku, Vietnam, 3, 5

PLO - see Palestine Liberation Organization
Poe, Edgar Allan, 231

Poindexter, John, 270, 327, 356, 380, 393, 397

Pollard, Anne, 423

Pollard, Jonathan Jay, 422-424

Pol Pot, 100, 254

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 176

PouloWai Island, Cambodia, 16, 18
Powell, Colin, 393
Poznan, Poland, 299

:? ;i EO 1.4. (c)

TOP SCCRCT//COMINT'UMPIWTALCNT KCVHOLE//X1

482

DOCID: 380734 9

TOP SEGRET//COMINT UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1

Preface (computer program), .152

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), 105, 265, 368, 406
Press, Frank, 237, 398

Preyer, L. Richardson, 237

Prime, Geoffrey, 302-303, 407-408
Public Law 86-36, 426-427
Public Law 200-135, 296
Pueblo, USS, 15, 17, 96, 420
PURPLE (code name), 94, 120, 294
Purple Dragon (project name), 142

Puzzle Palace, The, 388, 426, 428 „ ",EO 1 . 4 . ( c )

QuangTri, Vietnam, 5
Quantico, Virginia, 283

Radiation Corporation, 54
Radio Act of 1927, 343

... EO 1.4. (c)

"EO 1.4. (d)

Ramparts magazine, 82
Rand Corporation, 151, 292
Ranelagh, John, 193
RASIN manual, 424
Raven, Frank, 180, 427

T OP SECRET//COMINT-U M DRA/TALCNT KCYHOLC/fld

483

DOCID: 3S07349

TOP SECnCT//COMINT UMDRA/TALCNT KEVHOLE//X 1

R-390, 36

1 - - - ~ ~ " ■ ~ " ~ EO 1.4(c)

RCA (Radio Corporation of America), 50, 146, 297

I — - " ; ' EC 1.4. ( c )

~" ^ 1 EO 1.4. (d)

Reagan, Ronald, 78, 104, 149, 248, 263-265, 270-271, 275, 278, 294-296, 299, 302, 304, 308,

317-319, 327-329, 331-335, 343, 345-347, 349, 352, 354-357, 359, 361, 367-369, 371, 375-

376, 381, 387-389, 391, 396-397, 402, 404, 406, 416, 428

Red Brigades, 347-348

Regional SIGINT Operation Center (RSOC), 270, 306

| - - " " ~ " ~ EO 1 .4(c)

Richardson, Elliott, 86

Rich, Robert, 268, 284, 395

Rindskopf, Elizabeth, 397, 415-416

Rivers, Mendel, 107

Rivest, Ronald, 234

Rivet Joint (project name), 26, 37

Robbins, Vernon, 54

Robelo, Alfonso, 388

Rockefeller, Nelson, 148, 150

Rockwell Corporation, 245-246

V - — - - " — " " " " ""EO 1 .4(c)
Rolling Stone magazine, 100

1 - - - — " " " ' ~ ""EO 1 .4 (c)

Rosenblum, Howard, 88, 143, 232

Rosman, North Carolina (USF-790), 279, 287, 340, 363

I - - "~ EO 1.4(c)

EO 1.4(d)

RSA (computer algorithm), 234, 238

RSOC - see Regional SIGINT Operation Center

~~~~~~~~~ I - EO 1.4(c)
' ...EQ. 1.4(d)

-- - " ""' P.L. 86-36

TOP SLCRET//COM1 NT-UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE^X I

484

DOCID:

3807349

TOP SECRET//COM1 WT'U MBRA/TAIXNT 1CCY) 10LU/X1

Rusk, Dean, 117
Russell, Richard, 107
Rye (computer complex), 152
Ryan, Operation, 319

T''"P.L. 8 6-36

SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), 68
Sadat, Anwar, 176, 178, 182-183
Saddam Hussein, 161

Safford Yacht Sales, 411
Saigon, Vietnam, 1, 3, 5-7, 9, 11, 15-17, 34

SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), 117-119, 127, 164, 202, 204, 220, 257-258, 334-
335 /

Sampson, Nicos, 46

Sandino, Augusto Cesar, 387

Sandinistas, 381, 387-389, 391-392

EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

Saville, 143, 158
Schmults, Edward, 348
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, 213

TOP SCCRCT//COMtNT ' UMDRA/TALCNT KEY! 10LC//X1

485

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SCCriET//COMINT UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE//X 1

Schorr, Daniel, 97

Schlesinger, James, 58-59, 65, 88-90, 95, 122, 127, 267, 406

I. - - - - — ;• — ~ - " ~ ~ ~~ P . L . 8 6-36

Schwartz, Daniel, 192
Schweiker, Richard, 92
Scowcroft, Brent, 51
SDC.292

Secret Service , 84, 1 05
Selassie, Haile, 31

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), 104, 108, 286, 389/4li5 t 421

Shamir, Yitzhak, 234, 238
Shamrock, 83, 93-94, 98, 106
Shanghai, China, 227
Shannon, Claude, 231
Shan United Army (SUA), 363-364

SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), 68, 305
Shapley, Deborah, 235
Sheehan, Neil, 80
Shell Oil, 6

Sherman (computer program), 153

Shultz, George P., 327, 352, 393, 416
Sick, Gary, 260

TOP SECRET//COMINT UMBRA/TALCNT KCYltOLCflXI

486

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SECRCT//C0M1NT-UMDRAjTALCNT KEY! IOLC//X1

I I

SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee - see SORS
Signal Intelligence Service (SIS), 83, 120

Singapore, 16, 160

Sirica, John, 79

Smith, William French, 347
Snodgrass, Charles, 229-231
Sokolov, Sergey, 252-2S3
Solidarity, 315, 317
Somoza, Anastasio, 387-388

SORS (SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee), 376

South Florida Task Force, 361
Spadafora, Hugo, 380
. Speakes, Lawrence, 327, 355

Speierman, Kermit, 155, 291-292

Sperry Rand Corporation, 145

Spintcom, 141

SSA (Special Support Activity), 249

'EO 1.4. (d)
EO 1 .4 . (c)

"EO 1.4. (d)

TOP SECRCT//COM1NT-UMBRA/TALEMT KEYHOLE//X1

487

DOCID: 3807349

Tnp«;FCRPT// rniunMT.niwiRBA/TAiFMTyFVHr>i f//vi

SSCI - see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Stapleton, Carl, 63-64
•Stasi, 359

State Department (U.S.), 145, 149, 163, 183, 246, 249, 251, 257-259, 270, 289, 299, 328,
346, 351-352, 359-361, 364, 366, 376, 380, 401, 402, 404, 416, 424

Stethem,.Robert, 350
Stevenson, Adlai, 331

Stone, Richard, 100, 257

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks - see SALT

Strawhat (communications system), 141 .-^ : // E0 1 - 4 -( c '

Streamliner (communications system), 142

STU-I (Secure Telecommunications Unit-I), 143, 150

STU-II, 143, 150, 260, 296-297, 300

STU-III,150,234,297,300

Studeman, William, 270, 395

Sunday Los Angeles Times, 317, 328

Supercomputer Research Center, 154, 292
SUSLO (Senior U.S. Liaison Officer), 191
Sullivan, Brendan, 397
Sullivan, William, 36
Sulzberger, Arthur, 197

Szulc,Tad,153, 233

/EO 1.4(c)
; EO 1.4.(d)

TOP SbCRfc MLUM1H I -UMBRA/TALENT KCYI I OLC//X4

488

DOCID: 3807349

T O P 5E G R ET //COMINT-UMBRA/TALEN T KE T HOLE//X1

Taft, William, 267, 270, 292
Taft, William Howard, 387
Talon Vice, 10-11
TaMok,18

Taraki, Nur Mohammed, 251-253

TAREX (Target Exploitation), 70, 72, 339-340, 343

Target Exploitation - see TAREX

Task Force 157, 193, 339, 361

Tass,328

Tate, Raymond, 146, 427

1 - "/EO 1.4. (c)

TDOA - see time difference of arrival
Teaball (project name) , 72

Teletype Corporation, 209-210, 289
Tempest (project name), 401, 404
TENCAP,68

71 _ / : A- -- " " EO 1.4. ( c)

y_\ EO 1.4. (d)

Ten Thrusts, 269
Tet Offensive, 259

Thatcher, Margaret, 375, 377-379
Theater Support Node, 270
Thieu, Nguyen Van, 5, 9
Thornburg, Richard, 397

Tide (computer system), 152, 155, 249

I OP SbCHb i//C O MINT-UMDRAjTALi:MTKCY I IOLC//X1

489

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SCCRCT//COMIMT UMBRA/TALEMT KEYH QL E//X1

Tighe, Eugene, 190

Time difference of arrival (TDOA), 133

Toon, Malcolm, 401

Tordella, Louis W., 86, 101, 130, 132, 137, 162, 191, 2254, 293

Torrijos, Omar, 200, 202, 380-381, 387-388

Tower, John, 92, 94, 275

Truman, Harry S., 84, 108-109

Tuchman, Walter, 232

Turner, Stansfield, 89, 104, 149, 164, 193rl94, 196-199, 202, 316, 248-249
Tuttle, Jerry, 298, 300
Tuy Hoa, Vietnam, 5
TWA 847, 349-350

:-EO 1.4. (c)

'P.L. 86-36

EO 1.4. (d)

"EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

TOP SCCRCT//COM I NT - UMDRA/TALCNT KCYI I OII//X1

490

DOCID: 3807349

I OP SbCRE T ^COMINT-UMBRA/TAlXNT KCYII0LC//X1

United States Intelligence Board (USIB), 85, 180, 199, 245, 293

United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), 9, 11, 17, 23, 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 51, 55,
63,72-73,82,210-211,227-228,410

United States Communications Security Board (USCSB), 296
United States Support Activities Group (USSAG) , 5
Univac, 152-153

UNIX, 291

Ursano, James J., 69-71, 227
Urgent Fury (military operation), 373, 379-380
USAFSS - see United States Air Force Security Service
USAINTA (U.S. Army Intelligence Agency), 70
USIB - see United States Intelligence Board

v ? 'EO 1.4. (c)
■"' EO 1.4. (d)

U.S. News and World Report, 358

USSAG - see United States Support Activities Group

USSID9,381

USSID 18, 103, 106, 347

EO 1.4(C)

Vance, Cyrus, 24, 26, 203, 258

Van der Rhoer, Edward, 1 10

Veil (cover name), 265, 308, 355

Vessey, John, 371-373

P.L.

86-36

Village Voice, 97

TOP SECHET//COMtNT - UMBnA/TALr.NT KEYHOLC//X1

491

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SCCRCT//CO MI NT - UMDnA/TALCNT KCY I I0LC//X1

Vinson (communications device), 143-144, 158, 297
Vinson, Carl, 107

Vitro Laboratories, 148

Vladivostok Accords, 118-119, 202, 409

Vogt,John, 198

Wagner, Marlin, 220-221, 223, 411

Walesa, Lech, 315

Walker, Arthur, 420

Walker, Barbara, 417

Walker, John, 298, 366, 413, 417-423

Walker, Michael, 420

Walker, Stephen, 155, 293-295

Wall Street Journal, 391
Walsh, Lawrence, 396-397
Waltham, Massachusetts, 297

Ware, Willis, 151, 153, 292
Warren Commission, 84

•'EO 1.4. (c)

P.L. 86-36

Washington Post, 79, 100, 124, 190, 353-354, 368, 415-416
. Washington Star, 319
Watch List, 84-85, 94
Watson, Jack, 260
Weathermen, 85
Webster, William, 286, 303

TOP 3CCRCT//COMINT-UMDRA/TALENT KEYHOIE//X1

492

DOCID: 3807349

TOP SCCRCT//COMINT ' UM0nA/TALCNT KEVH0LC//X1

Weinberger, Caspar, 267, 270, 294, 393
Weisband, William, 414
Welchman, Gordon, 110
Western Union, 83, 336
Weyand, Frederick, 69

White House, 9, 11, 15, 79-80, 84, 87-88, 91, 102-106, 109, 118, 144-145, 148-149, 180, 189-
190, 193, 194, 196, 199, 202, 231, 236, 248-249, 253-255, 257-260, 263, 264, 268, 270, 294,
295, 325-328, 332-333, 352, 354-355, 366, 392-395, 403

White House Situation Room, 196

Whitlam, Gough, 127-128, 159-161, 302

Whitworth, Jerry, 420-422

Winterbotham, Frederick, 109-111

Wise, Phil, 258, 260

Wolf.Markus, 165

Woodward, Bob, 79, 190, 265, 308, 355, 415-416
World Airways, 6

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 72 ......

EO 1.4. (c)

P.L. 86-36
EO 1. 4. (c)

"""'•p . L . 8 6-36

Yagur, Joseph, 423

Yarborough, William P., 85
Yardley, Herbert O., 82

'' EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

T OP 5ECWET//COMlNT»UMPnA/TALCNT KEY! IOLC//X1

493

DOCID: 3807349

I OP jjiRRfc WLUMH l-UMDRA/TALCMT KEY I I O L E// X 1

Yildirim, Hussein, 424-425

Yom Kippur War, 83, 96-97, 127, 129, 259, 336

Young Americans for Freedom, 87

Young, Andrew, 197

Young, David, 80

.EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)

P.L. 86-36

Yurchenko, Vitaly, 409-412, 421

EO 1.4. (c)

TOP SECRET KoMIN 1-UMbtW I ALbW I ' KCYI 10LC//X1

494

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Full text of "United States Cryptologic History, Series VI, Vol. 5: American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-89"

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